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Abstract
This study explores how Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama, an autonomous body of a 
traditionalist Muslim organisation, negotiates its relations with its male-dominated 
parent organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama, from the 1940s up to the period of political 
reform in order to a reach more gender equal basis. The study argues that 
negotiations, which often enter the religious area where Islamic texts need to be 
reinterpreted, affect gender relations toward a more equal basis. However, the 
external factors (such as national politics) sometimes support the process of 
negotiations and in other times make gender relations go backward.
Prior to the independence of Indonesia, women of NU would like to 
organise themselves in a separate section. Based on a traditional interpretation of 
kitab kiining, NU was reluctant to grant women their request. The Japanese 
occupation (1942 -  1945) kept back early women’s efforts since it made women 
more vulnerable. On the other hand, Muslim men gained advantage from the 
occupation. The end of the Japanese occupation made women of NU participate in 
the Indonesian struggle to gain its independence. Women’s participation in the 
war impacted on the agreement of NU to form a special women’s section called 
Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat in 1946.
The withdrawal of NU from the Masjumi Party in 1952 and its 
consequence (i.e. becoming an independent political party) marked a more 
advanced stage in gender relations between NU and Muslimat. NUM acceded to 
larger authorities, changed its name to Muslimat NU, and was enclosed in politics. 
Five women from Muslimat NU became members of the National Parliament in 
the 1955 general elections. The period of Guided Democracy (first half of 1960s) 
showed a close relationship between NU and Soekarno. Muslimat NU benefited 
as a consequence; two other women from Muslimat NU were appointed as 
members of the National Parliament.
However, the political pressure and the highly segregated gender roles 
imposed by the New Order had a negative impact on many aspects of gender 
relations. In addition, Muslimat NU also had to face the impact of NU’s critical
stance to the regime. Muslimat NU focused, then, more on socioreligious 
activities and less on politics. This period marked also the absence of any member 
of Muslimat on the NU central board.
The fall of Soeharto in 1998 and the reformasi era which followed brought 
about several changes to Muslimat’s and NU’s relations. New and renewed 
discourses such as the quota system and the issue of polygamy are likely to allow 
new negotiations on gender relations. The state of how the discourses encouraged 
negotiationg gender relations within NU is explored and asked to the 
interviewees. An analysis of strategies used in negotiating gender relations is 
presented in chapter six.
This study about negotiating gender relations between Muslimat and its 
parent organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama, concludes that the reinterpretation of 
religious texts is only a part of the story in talking about better gender relations 
within traditional Muslims -and Islamic movements at large. The other part is 
whether external political forces support or in contrast hinder equal gender 
relations. Muslim women would gain equal gender relations if both factors, in 
fact, support the project.
Glossary and Abbreviation
Note: Arabic derived words are spelt according to widespread usage in Indonesia.
adalah justice.
adat customary law.
adil or ‘adala just, it refers especially to the emotional justice.
afifah keep in dignified manner.
ahlus sunnah wal jama’ah or aswaja followers of the Prophet’s tradition and the 
community, a term generally used by Sunni Muslims to distinguish 
themselves from the Shia Muslims and other Muslim minority groups. 
Traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia, however, often use the term to 
distinguish them from modernist Muslims.
Aisyiyah woman’s wing of the reformist organisation Muhammadiyah, founded 
in 1917.
akhlaqul karimah good manners.
akil balig adult.
alam gaib supernatural.
alhukmu yaduru ma ’a ‘illatihi wujudan wa *adaman regulation follows the 
reason behind its enactment (a principle of fiqh).
alim mastering several religious sciences and practising his knowledge, singular 
form of ulama in Arabic.
al-qudrah capacity.
amanah trusteeship.
amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (ordering good and prohibiting evil) an obligation for 
all Muslims and a frequently cited phrase in decision-making.
Ansor (supporters) young men’s organisation within NU founded in 1934. At
first, the name was used to refer to Muslim inhabitants of Medina after the 
Prophet moved in.
anti-KKN discourse anti corruption, collusion and nepotism floated in the 
reformasi era.
asas kekeluargaan the ‘family principle’.
asas tunggal (sole foundation) New Order’s program since 1980s of requiring
social and religious organisations to adopt Pancasila as the sole ideological 
foundation.
aurat part of Muslims’ (both men and women) body required by Islam to be 
covered.
vi i
a'wan non-core committee members of Syuriyah NU.
az-za’amah asy-syakhsyiyah private leadership.
babat alas open the jungle.
bahtsul masail (discussing problems) since 1990s the term’s long name is either 
bahtsul masail ad-diniyah al-waqi’iyah or bahtsul masail ad-diniyah al- 
maudlu ’iyah.
bahtsul masail ad-diniyah al-maudlu’iyah (discussing religious thematic
problems) regular collective discussion for delivering fatwa about several 
themes where each theme has been discussed more comprehensively in a 
(or several) seminar. This thematic discussion was a development of the 
previous bahtsul masail.
bahtsul masail ad-diniyah al-waqi’iyah (discussing factual religious problems)
regular collective discussion for delivering fatwa based on questions posed 
by members (or branch) of NU. Thus, the NU’s fatwa takes a form of 
response to the questions.
bait al-mal Muslim treasury.
berkah spiritual blessings, often associated to kyaV s power.
BKIA (Balai Kesehatan Ibu Anak) clinics for women and children.
BKKBN (Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional) National Family 
Planning Coordination Agency.
BKKSP (Biro Konsultasi Keluarga Sakinah dan Poligami) Consulting Office on 
Harmonious Family and Polygamy.
BP4 (Badan Penasehat Perkawinan dan Penyelesaian Perceraian) Advisory 
Council for Marriage and Divorce Settlement.
BPUPKI (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia), the 
committee to investigate preparations for Indonesian independence.
BVV (Beperkt Vergader Verbod), limited prohibition of meetings under the Dutch 
administration.
cancut tali wondo tightening the rope, initiating a protection for the whole family 
while in danger.
CETRO (Centre for Electoral Reform).
dapur umum public kitchens.
dar’ul mafasid aula min (muqaddamun ’ala) jalbi al-mashalih to prioritise
avoiding the danger rather than pursuing the benefit (a principle offiqh).
Dewan Syuro Religious Advisory Council of PKB chaired by K.H. Abdurrahman 
Wahid.
Dewan Tanfidz Executive Board of PKB.
Dharma Pertiwi armed forces wives’ associations umbrella, established in 1964.
Dharma Wanita civil servants’ wives’ association, declared officially in 1974.
viii
DIM (Daftar Isian Masalah) list of important matters, related to the discussion of 
a draft of law.
DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) District Party Board.
DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) Regional Representative Council.
DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) People’s Representative Council -  Indonesian 
national parliament.
DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) Regional Parliament.
DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong) Gotong Royong (mutual 
cooperation) parliament, installed by Soekarno in 1960.
ewuh pakewuh a Javanese tradition regarding the proper manner towards senior 
or elder people.
fardlu ‘ain individual or personal obligation.
Fatayat NU young women’s organisation within NU founded in 1950.
fatwa non binding religious decision on Islamic law.
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence and law.
fitnah slander; trial; turbulence; with regard to women it means character
associated with them inciting men’s desire. In Indonesia, however, this 
word is mostly used to mean accusation.
FK3 (Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning) forum studying religious classical texts to 
examine gender-biased views chaired by Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman 
Wahid.
FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra Puteri Purnawirawan ABRI), a forum gathering 
sons and daughters of retired armed services officers.
formatur usually refers to a team of limited people to set up members of a board 
or cabinet.
GBHN (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara) broad guidelines on state policy.
Gerakan Jum’at Bersih (Clean Friday Movement) focusing on clean water 
sanitation and lavatories.
Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia) women’s organisation affiliated to the PKI.
Gestapu (Gerakan September Tigapuluh), September 30 movement, often 
attributed to the PKI.
ghasab arrogation of another’s property or right.
Golkar (Golongan Karya) Functional Groups, the ruling party during the New 
Order era. It was used by Soeharto as his vehicle to extend his power.
golput (golongan putih), white group who do not vote in the general elections.
GOW (Gabungan Organisasi Wanita) Association of Women’s Organizations.
gus or bagus son of kyai.
hadits traditions or reports of the Prophet’s sayings and deeds.
halal permitted by the religion.
halaqoh study circle, discussion group, seminar.
haram prohibited by the religion.
liarkat dignity.
Hizbullah (God’s party) Muslim militia (mostly young people) commanded by 
Zainul Arifin during military clashes between the Dutch administration 
and Indonesian people after Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 
1945.
Hizbut Tahrir (HT) Freedom Party, a movement connected to the Middle East 
(Lebanon) calling for the restoration of khalifah (Caliph) system.
hurriyah freedom.
IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negri) State Institute for Islamic Studies. 
ibadah worship, ritual. 
ibu sejati truly mother.
idza ta’aradla mafsadatani ra’iya a ’dhamuha dliraran bi al-irtikabi
akhaffihima to consider the less dangerous of two things (a principle of 
fiqh).
ijtihad reasoning, interpretation. In Islamic jurisprudence, it refers to individual 
(or collective) interpretation of the law rather than following the earlier 
scholars’ views (taklid).
ilmu laduni special knowledge from the God.
imam prayer’s leader.
IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia) League of Upholders of 
Indonesian Independence.
IPNU (Ikatan Pelajar NU) male student organisation within NU founded in 1954. 
During the New Order it changed to Ikatan Putra NU or Boys of NU 
following the ban of any student organisation in madrasah and public 
schools.
IPPNU (Ikatan Pelajar Putri NU) or previously IPNU-Puteri, female student 
organisation within NU founded in 1955. During the New Order it 
changed to Ikatan Putri-Putri NU or Girls of NU.
istighotsah mass gathering for praying.
jaiz permitted acts by the religion.
jama’ah group, usually used for praying in group.
jihad (to strive) can be used in a spiritual sense or a physical struggle or Holy war. 
jimat amulets.
K.H. abbreviation of Kyai Haji, a ‘title’ for religious scholars having conducted 
pilgrimage to Mecca.
kampung residential area often occupied by the middle-lower class; village.
kaum adat traditional group who hold customary law.
kaum bapa men’s, husbands’ or fathers’ group.
kaum ibu women’s, wives’ or mothers’ group.
kaum muda (young group) it refers to modernist Muslims.
kaum santri (santri group) it refers to traditionalist Muslims or pious Muslims.
kaum tua or kaum tuba (older group) it refers to traditionalist Muslims.
kebohongan publik make a lie to the public.
kenduri meal of religious character.
khalifah the Caliph; or the system of government.
Khittah 1926 (Charter of 1926) reform programme based on the principles set up 
by NU’s founders in 1926.
kitab kuning or kitab classical texts on Islamic sciences.
KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat) Indonesian National Central
Committee, provisional national parliament after the 1945 proclamation of 
independence.
KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia) Indonesian Youth National 
Committee.
kodrat biological determinations, one’s inherent nature.
Konsepsi idea proposed by Soekamo in 1956 which would comprise all functional 
groups in the society and embrace all ideological leanings in politics.
Konstituante Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 to prepare the Indonesian 
Constitution, dissolved by Soekarno in 1959 before finishing its job.
kopiyah Muslim hat.
Kowani (Kongres Wanita Indonesia) Indonesia Women’s Congress, federation of 
women’s organisations.
KPI (Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia) Indonesian Women’s Coalition.
KPPI (Kaukus Perempuan Parlemen Indonesia) Caucus of Indonesian Women 
Parliamentarians, a caucus gathering cross parties female members of the 
national parliament founded in 2001.
kyai khos special kyais because of their believed blessings.
kyai male religious leader or scholar often he owns a pesantren.
kyai perempuan female religious leader or scholar within pesantren, to 
differentiate her from nyai (wife of kyai).
LAPUNU (Lajnah Pemilihan Umum Nahdlatul Ulama) special committee of NU 
to prepare NU for the elections.
LKBN (Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional or National Family Planning
Institution, the institution which was established prior to the establishment 
of BKKBN.
LKKNU (Lembaga Kemaslahatan Keluarga NU) Family Welfare Institution of 
Nahdlatul Ulama.
LKP2 (Lembaga Konsultasi dan Pemberdayaan Perempuan) Institute for 
Women’s Consultation and Empowerment, an organ of Fatayat NU 
providing advocacy and support for the victims of domestic violence.
ma’ruf just doings, good deeds.
madrasah banat religious school for girls.
madrasah Islamic school having graded classes.
madzab Islamic school of law. There are four popular madzab in Sunni Muslim: 
Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi’i, and Hanbali. However, Syafi’i’s madzab is largely 
followed in Indonesia.
Majelis Syuro Religious Advisory Council.
majlis taklim religious study group, Arabic term for pengajian.
mandi wajib obligatory shower.
manfa'at benefit.
martabat status, social or religious.
masjid wanita women’s mosque initiated by Aisyiyah.
Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia) Religious Council of Indonesian 
Muslims, federation of different Muslim organisations which became the 
name of political party in 1946 and banned by Soekarno in 1960, from 
which NU withdrew in 1952.
materiil- spiritual a fraction in the House of Representatives which emphasised 
on the physical development; Nationalist and Christian parties’ fraction.
memangku to hold a person on your lap.
mengambil hati to win someone’s heart.
MIAI (Majlisul Islamil A’laa Indonesia) Supreme Islamic Council, federation of 
Islamic organisations founded in 1937.
mitra sejajar gender equity.
MPR[S] (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat [Sementara]) People’s Consultative
Assembly [Provisional], National Assembly which sets broad policy of the 
State, previously elected the president and the vice president.
mudharat problems or danger.
Muhammadiyah a Muslim reformists’ movement founded in 1912. Its main 
concerns are education and religious proselytizing.
mukhlis a very sincere person to Allah.
xii
muktamar national congress involving all branches held previously every year but 
now every five years. It elects new central board leaders and delivers 
recommendations and fatwa.
munkar unlawful things
muqarrar prime reference of classical texts in pesantren. 
murahiq adolescence. 
musawah equality.
Muslimat NU women’s organisation within NU founded in 1946. 
musyawarah luar biasa extraordinary congress.
musyawarah nasional alim ulama national meeting held by Syuriyah NU where 
ulama from ahlus sunnah wal jama ’ah are invited. It is often held at the 
same time of konferensi besar and functions to deliver fatwa.
Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the Religious Scholars) a traditionalist Muslim 
organisation founded in 1926.
nahdliyat female members of NU.
nahdliyin or warga nahdliyin members of NU both men and women. 
nahwu Arabic syntax.
Nasakom (Nasionalis, Agama dan Komunis) nationalist, religious, and
communist ideology promoted by Soekarno, previously called Konsepsi.
nidzam system.
tiing daughter of kyai.
non-kodrati antonym of kodrati, often associated to the public roles of women.
NU see Nahdlatul Ulama.
nyai wife of kyai\ female religious scholar.
P2WKSS (Progran Peningkatan Peran Perempuan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga) 
Teams for Uplifting the Status of Women Through Healthy and 
Prosperous Family.
pamrih rewards.
PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) National Mandate Party, headed by Amien Rais, a 
Muhammadiyah leader.
Pancasila Five Principles of State Philosophy.
pansus (panitia khusus) special committee formed by the parliament particularly 
for discussing a draft of bill.
panti asuhan orphanage houses.
PBNU (Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama) NU central board.
pendamping suami standing at the side of their husband, ideology of the New 
Order about women particularly at the beginning of its regime.
xiii
pengabdian devotion.
pengajian akbar mass religious meeting.
Pengajian Al-Hidayah religious wing of Golkar chaired by Aisyah Hamid 
Baidlawi in 2004.
pengajian religious study group.
peran ganda dual role of women.
Peraturan Khususi special regulations.
peristiwa Gestapu Gestapu event (see Gestapu).
perkakas yang ampuh invulnerable instruments.
Permesta (Persatuan Rakyat Semesta) Union of All People, a secessionist group 
during Soekarno’s regime.
Persis (Persatuan Islam) United Islam, a radical reformist Muslim organisation 
established in the early 1920s.
pesantren Islamic traditional boarding school.
pesantren putri Islamic boarding school for girls.
pintu darurat emergency door.
PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) National Awakening Party, a party founded by 
NU’s leaders in 1998.
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) Indonesian Communist Party.
PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga) Family Welfare Tutorship, changed to 
(Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga) Empowerment for Family 
Welfare.
PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia) Indonesian Muslim Student’s 
Movement, NU’s tertiary students’ organisation, founded in 1960.
pondok boarding house.
PP (Peraturan Pemerintah) Government Regulation.
PPKB (Pergerakan Perempuan Kebangkitan Bangsa) women’s wing of National 
Awakening Party.
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) United Development Party, a ‘fusion’ of
several Islamic parties (NU, MI, Perti and PSII) formed in 1973 as a result 
of the New Order’s policy to reduce the number of political parties in 
Indonesia.
PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) Revolutionary Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia, regional government installed in West 
Sumatra in 1957.
PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) Indonesian Islamic Union Party.
PSW (Pusat Studi Wanita) Center for Women Studies.
xiv
PUAN Amal Hayati (Pesantren Untuk Pemberdayaan Perempuan) Islamic
boarding school for women’s empowerment -  Hope of my life, an institute 
founded by Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid advocating gender 
equality.
qadla judging, delivering verdicts.
qasatha just, it refers especially to the material aspect of justice.
rais akbar (great chairperson) head of Syuriyah NU’s central board, only used by 
K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari.
rais am (general chairperson) head of Syuriyah NU’s central board.
reformasi reform, it often refers to the period after the fall of Soeharto in 1998.
Sabilillah (God’s way) Muslim militia (including kyai and older people)
commanded by K.H. Masykur during military clashes between the Dutch 
administration and Indonesian people after Indonesia proclaimed its 
independence in 1945.
santri students of pesantren; devout Muslim.
selamatan meal of religious character, particularly practiced in .lava. 
shalihah pious women. 
sharf Arabic morphology.
SPII (Sarekat Perempuan Islam Indonesia) Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Women, affiliated to Sarekat Islam.
spiritual-materiil a fraction in the House of Representatives which emphasised on 
the religious development, Muslim political parties’ fraction.
suci pure.
sunnah precedent set by the Prophet Muhammad for believers to follow as 
recorded in the Quran and hadits.
syariah the law of Islam.
Syuriyah Supreme Religious Council of NU, usually comprising ulama. 
tabir curtain separating men and women in mixed gatherings. 
tafsir exegesis of the Quran. 
takzim holding someone in high esteem.
Tanfidziyah Executive Board of NU.
taqlid following. In Islamic jurisprudence, it refers to practising the earlier 
scholars’ views.
tarikh history. In pesantren it refers particularly to the biography of the Prophet 
tasawuf Sufism. 
tasbih rosary.
tasharruf al-imam ‘ala al-ra’iyah manuthun bil al maslahah leader’s rule 
according people’s best interests (a principle oifiqh).
tauhid Islamic theology which stresses on the unity of the God.
tidak ikhlas insincerity, do not surrender.
tidak tega do not have the nerve.
tim mantap a PKB’s team to draw up the party selection. 
tim perumus the formulators.
TPQ (Taman Pendidikan Al-Quran) Quranic school for children. 
tsubutu amrin li amrin making laws.
ulama madzhab religious scholar founder of a school of thought in Islamic 
jurisprudence.
ulama perempuan female religious scholar(s) or leader(s).
ulama religious scholar(s) or leader(s).
umat or ummah Muslim community or society.
Utusan Daerah Regional Representative. 
wacana discourse.
wajib ‘ain individual religious obligation.
Wanita Persatuan Women of the United Party, women’s wing of PPP.
YKM (Yayasan Kesejahteraan Muslimat) a foundation under Muslimat NU’s 
central board which is concerned with women’s welfare.
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Chapter one: Introduction
Scope of this study
Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama (or Muslimat NU or Muslimat1) is one of the largest 
women’s organisations in Indonesia. The organisation maintains that its grass 
roots members number about 12 million Muslim women (Media Indonesia, 2004). 
In 2000, Muslimat NU had 26 provincial boards, 326 district boards, 2,650 sub­
district boards, and thousands of village boards throughout Indonesia (see 
Diagram 1 for the Structure of Muslimat NU). It had organised during the year 
more than 26,000 majlis taklim (religious study groups) at village level. It was 
operating more than 6,000 kindergartens and 2,500 TPQ or Quranic schools for 
children aged between 5 and 12 years old. It managed 53 clinics and hospitals, 35 
homes for aged people, and 10 dormitories for young women (PP Muslimat NU, 
2000a:20a).
Historically, Muslimat was a section of Nahdlatul Ulama (or NU), the 
parent organisation. In 1946 Muslimat NU became an autonomous body. 
However, its ties with NU have remained strong. For instance, people often call 
members of NU (including men and women) nahdliyin or warga nahdliyin (both 
mean members of NU). In addition, some people (see among others 
Romahurmuziy, Cahyono & Machrusah, 2000:11) use a more explicit term 
nahdliyat (meaning female members of NU) referring specifically to female 
members of NU though structurally speaking they are members of Muslimat NU 
or one of the other women’s organisations affiliated with NU. Along with this use
1 Muslimat as a name was also used by the Masjumi Party for its women’s wing. However, since 
this party was banned by President Soekarno in 1960 its women’s wing disappeared as well. 
Today the name Muslimat almost always refers to Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama. In this thesis 
Muslimat without additional reference is meant to refer to Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama.
1
of terms, estimated counts of NU members often include women. For example, 35 
million members of NU estimated by Barton & Fealy (1996:xix) that made NU 
the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, included female members as 
indicated in their comment that “(f)our years later, a separate women’s division, 
Muslimat NU, was formally established”. Interestingly, referring to the index, 
Muslimat NU is only mentioned twice. Yet, one of the two instances, it is used as 
an adjective for a man (Barton & Fealy, 1996:263)2.
Such examples support, thus, the argument that women are often included 
and yet not consulted in decision-making. Moreover, women often have to suffer 
the consequences of men’s decisions. This unequal status motivated Muslimat 
NU’s leaders to negotiate better gender relations. For instance, Aisyah Hamid 
Baidlowi during my interview said,
In fact, what I insisted was that M uslimat must have a seat in Tanfidziyah 
(i.e. executive board of NU). W hy? Because I think that the number of 
women within NU is large, but they cannot express their voice. Decisions 
taken by NU also impact on women but M uslimat was not invited to 
discuss these issues.
This study seeks to investigate how gender relations are negotiated 
between Muslimat and Nahdlatul Ulama. It tries to explore through a historical 
perspective how gender issues develop among Muslimat and NU, how Muslimat 
NU internally reviews traditional Muslim perceptions on women and negotiates 
new perceptions within NU, and how external factors such as political situations 
impact on negotiating gender relations. In this study I argue that traditional 
Muslim women (or Muslim women in short) could gain significant advances 
towards equal gender relations if both internal ‘religious’ negotiations as well as 
external political circumstances support the project.
2 It refers to Chalid Mawardi, son of a former general chairperson of Muslimat NU. In addition, 
the book says that the formal establishment of Muslimat was in 1938 as “In 1934, a youth wing 
was founded under the name Ansor. Four years later, a separate women section was formally 
established, ...” (Barton & Fealy, 1996:xix) indicates which is incorrect according to Muslimat 
NU’s sources.
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Methodology
This study covers gender relationships between Muslimat and Nahdlatul Ulama 
viewed from a historical perspective. However, I outline first the difficulties faced 
in this study about Muslimat NU. There were two major problems: the lack of 
previous studies about Muslim women’s movements in Indonesia including 
Muslimat NU; and the lack of first hand data. As Blackburn (2004) argues that not 
enough research has been done on what women do to influence political Islam 
from within. Robinson (2004:184) states a similar view,
But Islam is generally absent not only from these Indonesian accounts of 
“the position of women”. The standard English-language reviews of “the 
position of women” in Indonesia ... rarely mention Islam as a factor 
influencing women’s social position.
The lack of written data appeared also to be a great obstacle. The oral 
tradition that prevails within Muslimat NU may be a reason for this lack. As 
stated by Khofifah Indar Parawansa (interview) “We are not yet a reading society. 
And we are very far from a writing society”. In addition, some particular 
circumstances have also worsened the situation. Regarding collecting historical 
data about Muslimat NU from its office, I experienced something I had not 
expected. During the rebuilding of NU’s office at Jalan Kramat Raya, Jakarta 
where the previous office of Muslimat NU was housed, Muslimat NU had to be 
rehoused into temporary offices in Jalan Amir Hamzah, and then to Tebet, while it 
built a new separate office at Jalan Pengadegan. These relocations impacted on the 
loss of much archival material of Muslimat NU. When I came to the new office of 
Muslimat NU, a member of staff told me that Muslimat NU had lost much of its 
archives while moving from the Kramat Raya office. The very few books that I 
refer to in this thesis are whose that have survived (i.e. the unpublished materials, 
the archives were lost).
Since very little data were available, I have had to be more reliant on 
interviews. Collecting information through interviews was a useful approach to 
explore issues not discussed in the publications. In addition, it deepened
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investigation of ideas. I found that interviewing women politicians of NU, an 
important primary source for this study, offered a key to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the internal dynamics of Muslimat NU’s gender 
related stories. The interviews allowed me to canvass a number of points of view 
concerning the history of Muslimat NU and its relationship with its parent 
organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama.
Method of data collection
This study is based on two types of data. First, I used written sources including 
documents and books produced by Muslimat NU’s central board which are not 
available outside Muslimat NU. I also made use of newspapers and magazines 
from local or foreign sources which I accessed through their websites. I referred 
furthermore to secondary sources on the history of NU and on Islam in Indonesia 
in order to have the big picture.
Secondly, I collected information by interviewing a sample of prominent 
members of Muslimat NU at the national level. I principally chose women who 
were politically active, and most of them were members of political parties who 
also had experience as leaders of Muslimat NU at national or provincial levels. 
Some of them had been associated with prominent male members of NU, whether 
they were the daughter or wife of male leaders of NU (see Diagram 3 for the 
Genealogy of Muslimat NU Leaders). The interviews were conducted in Jakarta 
between Mid February 2004 and Mid March 2004. However, I followed up the 
interviews with some respondents by phone in December 2004.
Sample
The criteria I used in choosing the sample of interviewees were that they (i) were 
members of Muslimat NU; (ii) either participated in party politics or were 
members of Muslimat NU’s central board; and (iii) represented different 
generations of Muslimat NU. I wanted to explore their aspirations and their 
awareness of different aspects of women’s roles, how they articulated their
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aspirations while participating in politics, and how they negotiated their relations 
with NU (that is with male members).
The choice of central board members was based on their 
representativeness of Muslimat NU. The structural model of Muslimat NU’s 
organisation means that policies and activities of the central board will usually be 
followed by Muslimat NU boards at lower levels. The respondents’ participation 
in politics3 was also an important variable for the purposes of this study since it 
revealed the avant-garde struggle of negotiating gender relations.
I conducted all the interviews in a one-on-one situation. I used an 
interview guide to make sure that the same questions were asked of each 
respondent. Sometimes the interviews were accompanied by more informal 
discussions. I was interested to elicit free-ranging responses which revealed 
respondents’ ideas and perceptions. I listened to them while the conversation was 
being recorded. I prompted respondents to expand their story if it broadened the 
picture. Sometimes I followed up the interviews with phone calls which were also 
recorded. I always informed my respondents prior to the interview that the 
information given would be presented in my thesis and any published work that 
resulted.
Characteristics o f the sample
Due to their busy schedules, some of the chosen respondents could not be 
interviewed. Of the sixteen women selected only eleven fulfilled the criteria and 
were also available for interview. These eleven women had the following 
characteristics:
Age: interviewees’ age ranged between 35 and 74 and the mean was 51.5 years 
old (see Chart 1 below).
3 It is interesting that most women from an NU background who participated in politics, whether 
they joined PPP, Golkar or PKB, came from Muslimat NU or were recruited as members of 
Muslimat NU after they became members of parliament.
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Me a n
Chart 1: Age of the interviewees
Education: most of respondents were tertiary educated women. Among them, one 
graduated from a Master’s program and three were preparing for (or had 
postponed) a Master’s program. Two others had finished a secondary education. 
The average number of years in education was 15.3. Some of the interviewees had 
completed their education while working early on in their career (see Chart 2 
below)
Me a n
Chart 2: Years of education of the interviewees
Occupation: seven of them were members or former members of parliament 
(among whom one was a former Minister for Women’s Empowerment). Four 
others were women activists (among whom two were candidates for MPs who had 
contested a seat in the legislature in the 2004 general elections).
Negotiating gender relations within traditional Muslims in Indonesia: key 
issues
This section reviews some of the issues raised in the studies of gender roles and 
how they are perceived within traditional Muslim society.
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Traditional Muslims in Indonesia
In societies where religion plays an important role in public life, as in Indonesia 
where more than 85 per cent of the population are Muslims, religious 
organisations can be powerful factors in determining values especially for their 
followers. As mentioned by Benda (1985:23) in his preface,
Though Islam in the other areas has undeniably played -  and continues to 
play -  a leading role in the political evolution of Indonesia, it is on Java 
that it has found its most important organisational expression. It is there, 
also, that Islamic groups have been most directly involved in the shaping 
of Indonesian politics in general.
Benda (1985:33) further notes “The history of Indonesian Islam is the history of 
this expanding santri civilization and its impact upon the religious, social and 
political life of Indonesia”. Originally, santri refers to the people around the 
traditional Indonesian pesantren or religious boarding school headed by kyai or 
ulama (both words mean Muslim scholars or leaders, while kyai is a Javanese 
word, ulama is a loanword from Arabic).
The best example of santri organisations is Nahdlatul Ulama. Currently, 
official estimation of the number of NU members is about 35 million (Marzu, 
2004). Members of this organisation are often referred to as kaum santri dan 
ulama (santri and ulama group) and largely live in rural areas. The organisation 
was founded in 1926 by several eminent ulama, all were leaders of pesantren such 
as K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari, K.H. Wahab Chasbullah, K.H. Bisri Syansuri all from 
Jombang, East Java, and K.H. Ridwan from Surabaya. It was founded in response 
to the debate after the fall of the Ottoman empire and the abolition of khalifah (the 
Caliph) which was considered as representing the Muslim world. In addition there 
were rumours about the abolition of traditional practices in Mecca which were 
also practiced by people around pesantren. This organisation wanted the Caliph to 
be restored and that the traditional practices should be maintained (cf. Barton & 
Fealy, 1996:xix; Noer, 1973:222-231).
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NU strictly bases its teachings on the classical texts written by some pious 
ulama who referred to the scholars of the first centuries after the Prophet 
Muhammad’s death. Several of those ulama are known as the founders of 
madzhab (school of thought in Islamic jurisprudence). Four madzhab still have 
influence until today and are followed by Muslims worldwide. They are Madzhab 
Hanafi founded by Abu Hanifah and followed largely in South Asia; Madzhab 
Maliki founded by Malik and followed largely in Africa; Madzhab Syafi’i 
founded by Syafi’i and followed largely in Southeast Asia and several Arabic 
countries; and Madzhab Hanbali founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal and followed 
largely in Saudi Arabia. Such prominence has attached to the ulama madzhab 
(founders of madzhab) because of their important role they played in the absence 
of the authority of the Prophet (Noer, 1973:9). People followed these ulama as 
new needs and problems arose. During the life of the Prophet, people asked 
important questions of him. His statements and decisions as well as those of the 
Quran were followed obediently. The Prophet also settled differences among 
members of the community. After his death those functions were, thus, fulfilled 
by the ulama and the caliphs. However, the absence of such authority of the 
Prophet opened ways to different opinions or even contradictory ones.
NU is the leading organisation in Indonesia which emphasizes the practice 
of madzhab and it also makes an effort to guard this practice. Although NU 
acknowledges all four madzhab in its by-laws, in fact, NU stresses upon its 
followers to practice Madzhab Syafi’i (Noer, 1973:224). The attitude to strictly 
follow the orthodox madzhab and to avoid one’s own personal perceptions of the 
two divine sources of Islam (i.e. the Quran and the hadits or the Prophet’s 
traditions) is motivated by the reason that contemporary people are unable to 
reach the true meanings of those sources. This attitude is called taqlid (following) 
whereas the direct interpretation of both sources is called ijtihad (reasoning). 
Those two procedures of using the divine texts are largely followed in delivering 
fatwa (non binding religious decision on Islamic law) (Machrusah, 2002). The 
ijtihad was used by modern Egyptian scholars such as Muhammad Abduh and 
Rashid Ridha, whose influence impacted on the emergence of modern Islam in 
Indonesia. Through these different procedures, thus, the terms kaum tua (older
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group) and kaum muda (young group) were introduced in Indonesia. In this 
regard, Nahdlatul Ulama was considered as the kaum tua or traditional Muslims 
and Muhammadiyah4 as the kaum muda or modern Muslims. However, NU often 
considers itself ahlus sunnah wal jama’ah (abbreviated to aswaja literally 
meaning followers of the Prophet’s tradition and the community) to differentiate it 
from modernist Islamist movements.
The views of NU on social relationships as well as on religious worships 
are based on the classical texts which are called kitab kündig (yellow books). The 
naming of kitab kündig is related to the physical appearance since many kitab 
kundig were printed on yellow paper of lower quality (Yafie, 1989:3). Kitab 
kuning cover Islamic sciences such as fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), tasawuf 
(Sufism), tafsir (exegesis), hadits (traditions of the Prophet), tauhid (Islamic 
theology), tarik'n (history), Arabic language particularly grammar (nahwu or 
syntax and sharfor morphology) and others (Dhofier, 1982:50; Yafie, 1989:4-5). 
On the importance of kitab kuning for traditional Muslims, Azhari (1989:2) 
maintains that they are “the system of values held and influencing all aspects of 
life. They measure people’s knowledge as well as their piety”. He goes on to 
argue that the teachings of kitab kuning are implemented by people around 
pesantren in their ritual practices, social relations, ethics and way of life (Azhari, 
1989:2).
In Indonesia, especially in Java, kitab kuning are taught by kyais (male 
religious leaders). A kyai generally owns and directs a pesantren where he gives 
religious instruction. A kyai is often regarded as a charismatic leader because -  
among other factors- he masters many kitab kuning in different religious sciences 
and implements their teachings in his daily activities or when delivering his fatwa. 
Nasuha maintains that kyai cannot be separated from kitab kuning since “(k)itab 
kuning is the codification of Islamic teachings’ values whereas kyai is the
4 Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 as a Muslim reformists’ movement in Yogyakarta. Its main 
concerns are education and religious proselytizing. An internal estimation maintains that currently, 
Muhammadiyah members amount to 15 million people (Far.ani, 2004). Meanwhile some people 
estimate the number of Muhammadiyah members to reach 29 million people (Leirvik, 2002). 
Politically, since reformasi most Muhammadiyah members have given their vote to PAN (National 
Mandate Party) although some members are affiliated with PPP (United Development Party) and 
Golkar.
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personification of those values” (1989:19). Such kyais become the ummah's 
(Muslim community) guides, not only for kaum santri (literally students of 
pesantren) but also for the society at large. There is a term often used to describe 
this quality of kyai and that is alim (mastering several religious sciences and 
practising his knowledge, singular form of ulama in Arabic). However, kyais are 
very unlikely to master all of the diverse sciences of kitab kuning. Most are known 
and are well respected experts in particular classical texts (Bruinessen, 1995:19).
Another important attribute of a kyai which adds to his charisma is his 
spiritual power. People often believe that kyais possess the ability to give berkah 
(blessing) because of a connection to alam gaib (the supernatural) (Bruinessen, 
1995:19). Dhofier (1982:56) suggests that with his religious knowledge, a kyai is 
someone who knows the God and the secrets of the universe and thus holds a very 
high position. Lately, some kyais were attributed the title of kyai khos or special 
kyais because of their believed blessings. People’s beliefs in the charisma of kyai 
even extend to the family of kyai. Children of kyai are believed to have ilmu 
laduni (special knowledge from the God) (Dhofier, 1982:69).
Furthermore, Dhofier emphasizes the importance of alliances by marriage 
between the families of kyai. These alliances on the one hand assure the continuity 
of pesantren (1982:62) and on the other hand elevate the social status of all 
members of the families including their relatives (1982:69). Within this tradition a 
wife of a kyai receives a special title of nyai, his son is given the title of gus, from 
bagus meaning handsome, and his daughter the title of ning. Since the 1970s, 
however, nyai can also mean a female scholar who may own and directs a 
pesantren and not only a wife of a kyai (Faiqoh, 2003:32). In order to distinguish 
the two meanings, therefore, some people prefer to use the term kyai perempuan 
(female kyai) instead of nyai to refer to a female religious scholar. Another 
common variation for the female religious scholar is ulama perempuan (female 
religious scholar) (cf. Mar’iyah, 2002).
Another important element within the pesantren tradition is santri. This 
term originally meant a student or a body of students who lived in a pesantren. 
However, the meaning of santri has broadened to include all practising Muslims
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living, especially in the neighbourhood of the pesantren. All practising people 
who have received some of their religious instruction from kyai are considered as 
santri. The santri plays an important role in promoting traditional Islam 
throughout Indonesia and in advancing the influence of kyai. Some santri 
graduate to become kyai in their respective villages and further transmit the 
religious teachings of their ‘former’ kyai5. Large pesantren such as Tebuireng in 
Jombang receives santri from far off regions or even from outside of Java 
(Dhofier, 1982:111), so the influence of kyai and traditional Islam reaches those 
regions also.
The attitude of santri is usually developed in the daily lessons given by the 
kyai during their education in the pesantren. The kyai usually sets out certain rules 
for santri prior to further learning of kitab kuning. “Respectful attitude, takzim 
(holding someone in high esteem) and absolute obedience to the kyai are among 
the first values taught for santri” (Bruinessen, 1995:18). Though some rules, 
particularly with regard to total obedience, have changed through this doctrine, 
santri become very faithful in practising the traditional Islamic values as well as 
following the kyai's commands.
These four elements of kyai, santri, pesantren and kitab kuning are the 
important factors of Nahdlatul Ulama in disseminating the traditional Islam 
throughout the society. As the kitab kuning is taught by kyai and delivered 
through his fatwa and then distributed by his santri, most Islamic teachings inside 
those kitab kuning are then accepted as the single authoritative source for the 
society. Even though fatwa delivered by kyai are often considered ‘rigid’ since 
most of the arguments are based on earlier interpretations, the implementation of 
Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh, however, is different. “Practice is usually more 
moderate than the Islamic jurisprudence found in the books ... In addition, rules 
which degrade women are rarely practiced” (Bruinessen, 1995:175)
5 Within the tradition of pesantren, a person would not say my ‘former’ kyai or teachers because 
they consider them as his or her ‘religious fathers’. He or she always thinks about them as his or 
her ‘kyai’ or ‘teachers’ in short and respects them devoutly, even though he himself becomes a 
well known kyai (Dhofier, 1982:82).
1 1
Gender relations within traditional Muslims’ references
Kitab kuning which is taught in pesantren talks also about relations between men 
and women. However, as Bruinessen states, discourses in kitab kuning about 
gender relations are predominantly male-biased (1995:172). He goes on to say 
that in those kitab kuning, men are usually considered as the standard for 
everything and the difference between men and women causes women a martabat 
(status) less than that of men (1995:172).
Muhammad bin Umar Nawawi A1 -Bantani Al-Jawy or well known as 
Syeikh Nawawi was one of the writers of a popular kitab kuning regarding 
relations between men and women, ‘Uqud Al-Lujjainfi Bayan Huquq al-Zawjain 
(The Bond of Two Waves in Explaining a Couple’s Rights). Syeikh Nawawi was 
a very famous religious leader from Banten, West Java who lived between 1813 
and 1898. He once was the imam (prayer leader) at the Masjidil Haram (the
prime mosque in Mecca, where the Ka’bah, as the centre of praying 
direction, stands inside). His name was also put in Al Mutijid, a famous Arabic 
dictionary written by Louis Ma’luf (Amin & Anshory, 1989:95). Moreover, he 
was the teacher of prominent Indonesian kyais such as K.H. Cholil Bangkalan 
from Madura and K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari from Tebuireng, Jombang. Although the 
above mentioned kitab kuning might be expected to talk about men and women, 
Syeikh Nawawi mainly mentions what women had to do at home and in their 
everyday social relations (Wahid et al., 2001:xxvi-xxviii). This kitab kuning also 
maintains that the total obedience of women to their husbands is part of their 
religious duties (Wahid et al., 2001:127). Women are also described as having to 
serve men’s biological needs (Wahid et al., 2001:64-65). Although this kitab 
kuning is not used as muqarrar (prime reference) in pesantren -it is only taught 
during Ramadan- most kyai and santri know about it (Bisri, 2001 :ix). Because of 
its gender-biased views some kyai are opposed to teaching this kitab kuning in 
pesantren. K.H. Bisri Mustofa, according to his son K.H Mustofa Bisri, once said 
that teaching this kitab kuning would cause men to become arrogant (besar kepala 
big head) (Bisri, 200l:x). Recently, a constructive effort was carried out by FK3 
(Forum for Studying (Reviewing) the Classical Texts) chaired by Sinta Nuriyah
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Abdurrahman Wahid, a prominent member of Muslimat NU. In 2001, it published 
a book entitled Wajah Baru Relasi Suami-Istri (New Face on the Husband-Wife 
Relations) reviewing gender-biased views in the Syeikh Nawawi’s kitab kuning 
(Wahid et al., 2001).
Bruinessen maintains that the mixture of Islamic teachings with local 
customs in the Middle East that emphasized women's subordination by men 
produced new gender-biased Islamic cultures. Since cultures are dynamic and apt 
to change, a kitab kuning historically produced by those highly gendered cultures 
would be incompatible with the modern times (1995:173). For example, ‘Uqudul 
Lujjayn says that a wife is not permitted to talk to her husband’s friend if the latter 
visits her home while her husband is absent in order to preserve her husband’s 
jealousy (Wahid et al., 2001:155). In this regard FK3 argues that such teachings 
are incompatible with modern life where such attitudes of a woman towards her 
husband’s friend would be considered harsh. In its place FK3 proposes, thus, that 
husband and wife have to promote mutual trust (Wahid et al., 2001:155). Here, 
Syeikh Nawawi’s point of view in ‘Uqudul Lujjayn is understood as reflecting his 
context. A similar argument about the relation between gender and historical 
context is made by scholars in gender studies. For instance, Kimmel writes “If the 
meanings of gender vary from culture to culture and vary within any one culture 
over historical time, then understanding gender must employ the tools of the 
social and behavioral sciences and history” (2000:3). The need for contextual 
reinterpretation of classical texts in order to have new definitions about relations 
between men and women from the religious perspective, thus, has become an 
important issue. The book published by FK3 (Wahid et al., 2001) is a step in this 
direction.
In addition, writers of kitab kuning were male (Bruinessen, 1995:173). He 
argues that males will use their experience to expose their superiority in kitab 
kuning and to impose it as the standard of piety. For instance, with regard to 
women’s menstruation and mandi wajib (obligatory shower), expression of kitab 
kuning often give the impression that women are not suci (pure) while they are in 
such condition. The aftermath shower is likely to purify them. However, as
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showed by Bruinessen (1995:178), a small kitab hurting written by Fatimah from 
Banjarmasin in Malay, uses a more neutral expression by avoiding the term suci. 
Thus, by making women less pure while in menstruation, men want to impose 
their superiority over women. Men’s dominance in the writing of kitab hutting 
permits this religious interpretation. A parallel idea is posed by Simmel (as cited 
in Kimmel, 2000:8) who says “Man’s position of power does not only assure his 
relative superiority over the women but it assures that his standards become 
generalized as generically human standards that are to govern the behavior of men 
and women alike”. Therefore, a sufficient number of women in power is 
necessary to change gender-unbalanced views and attitudes. Within these 
arguments the emergence of kyai perempuan (female religious scholar) in 
pesantren is a good sign.
Negotiating gender relations within political contexts
A similar argument to Kimmel’s above-mentioned view that meanings of gender 
are historically-specific can be held with regard to negotiating gender relations. 
The process of negotiation does not happen in an empty space. Through its 
history, negotiations conducted by Muslimat vis-ä-vis NU to gain better gender 
relations occurred within different political contexts and in different historical 
eras.
It is interesting that some writers make an analogy about the relations 
between Muslimat and NU like the relations between a wife and husband in a 
family. For instance, Masdar F. Mas’udi (1999:31), one of the leaders of NU, 
points out that discriminations which occur within NU reflect the structural power 
of a family brought into the structure of the organisation (see Diagram 2 for the 
Organisational Structure of NU). But what he forgets in his explanation about 
discriminative relations between Muslimat and NU is that the family of NU lives 
in a space where norms and values about gender relations promoted discriminative 
attitudes and even practice. Thus, as far as negotiations within NU’s family could 
improve gender relations they still depended on external factors (such as political 
factors) whether the latter supported or hindered better relations.
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In understanding negotiating gender relations within the political contexts, 
attention must be paid to the state functioning as a significant agent in shaping 
forms of gender relations. The state, as Waylen (1996:15) maintains, “partly 
reflects and partly helps to create particular forms of gender relations and gender 
inequality”. This means that the state or at least different ruling governments 
which represent different political contexts at some points have created different 
forms of gender relations. A similar argument was maintained by Alvares (as cited 
in Rai, 1996:31) saying that “under different political regimes and at distinct 
historical conjunctures, the State is potentially a mechanism either for social 
change or social control in women’s lives”. For example, the end of colonial rule 
in Indonesia brought new opportunities for women to articulate overtly their 
interests by making repeated demands for more governmental attention to 
problems such as female employment, marriage legislation, etc. (Douglas, 
1980:163). These interests were acknowledged by the colonial government, for 
example marriage repudiation (Vreede-de Struers, 1960:100-103). Women started 
to participate in foreign affairs such as being delegates to international meetings. 
Furthermore, as Parawansa (2002:70) maintains, the newly independent 
government accommodated women's interests. She goes on to say that as a 
consequence women’s organisations flourished. Negotiating new forms of gender 
relations could advance in the particular political circumstance.
The New Order era provides examples of how the state (or the 
government) could exert its power to control gender relations which influenced 
women’s inequality at the level of the organisation. The beginning of the New 
Order regime defined women as to act as pendamping suami ‘standing at the side 
of their husband' (Oey-Gardiner, 2002:102). Defined as such women suffered 
inequality with regard to their relations with men. At the organisational level, for 
instance, wives of civil servants had to cooperate with the state by being active in 
Dharma Wanita, an organisation which was set up to support their husband’s 
career (Oey-Gardiner, 2002:103). Other organisations, especially women’s 
organisations had to follow this model if they did not want to be considered 
‘deviant’, for example the accusation that women’s organisations were used by 
PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in order to break up the society (Tien
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Soeharto [1969] as cited in Zuhri et al., 1979:160). Within this political context 
negotiating gender equality was not expected to advance very far.
But how could certain advances in gender relations deteriorate? One of the 
arguments is that men at certain points felt frightened that equal relationships 
might reduce men’s power or even vanish altogether. For instance, Kimmel 
(2000:93) agues that “men maybe in power everywhere one cares to look, 
individual men are not “in power,” and they do not feel powerful”. Since those 
individual men are less powerful than one imagines then any change in gender 
relations between men and women as two distinct groups can have an affect on 
individual men’s power as well; individual men will try to maintain their power 
over women by holding it together in a group. What Hannah Arendt (as cited in 
Kimmel, 2000:93-94) defines about power in this regard is interesting.
Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and 
remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we 
say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being 
empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The 
moment the group, from which the power originated to begin 
with...disappears, “his power” also vanishes.
The fact that values which maintain gender inequality are always socially 
reproduced means that in specific political circumstances there can be a 
deterioration of gender relations. Among traditional Muslims, as I have previously 
explained, pesantren still teach kitab kuning which maintain gender inequality. 
Although counter discourses have been promoted (e.g. the publications of FK3 
proposing new reinterpretations of gender-biased classical texts) still their number 
is small and more effort is needed.
Having said that political intervention of the state might control gender 
relations and promote less equality, however, it does not necessarily mean that the 
process of negotiations between the two groups, men and women, within a certain 
‘space’ of the state does not occur (see also Waylen, 1996:16; more examples are 
given by Rai, 1996). Neither does it mean that gender relations do not advance or
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decline in all their aspects. Negotiations and strategies to improve better relations 
were always employed whether the political circumstances supported or hindered 
them. For instance, Muslimat and NU still negotiated their relation under the New 
Order regime. A fatwa supporting family planning was delivered by NU in 1969 
as a response to Muslimat NU’s demand (Zuhri et al., 1979:112). With regard to 
negotiating gender relations within NU this deliverance of fatwa was a step in the 
direction of more equal relations. Thus, what I want to argue is that women within 
NU could gain significant advances in equal gender relations if political 
circumstances as well as religious interpretation of texts supported the project.
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Chapter two: The establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama 
Muslimat
In order to better understand the role of Muslimat NU within Women’s 
movements in Indonesia, particularly among Muslim women and its struggle to 
gain better relations with its male partner, it is important to consider first the 
historical development of Muslimat NU. During its history Muslimat NU has 
changed its objectives from its first stated aims as mainly concerned with social 
and religious duties. Less than ten years after the establishment of Muslimat in 
1946, it started to participate actively in formal politics within the NU Party in 
addition to its traditional concerns about social and religious affairs.
In this chapter, I start with a brief account of two women’s movements in 
Indonesia which played an important role in motivating women of NU to organise 
themselves in an organisation: Aisyiyah and the women’s section of Sarekat 
Islam. An incident involving Soekarno, the first President of Indonesia after the 
independence, about the use of tabir (curtain) as the borderline between men and 
women in a Muhammadiyah meeting was another important factor for the 
establishment of Muslimat NU which I also discuss.
State of Muslim women’s movements in the 1930s
Although the establishment of Muslimat NU was likely to be influenced by the 
emergence of many Indonesian women’s movements since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, there are two women’s organisations that are usually mentioned 
in Muslimat NU’s publications, namely Aisyiyah, and the women’s section of 
Sarekat Islam (Zuhri et al., 1979:41-42; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:13). Both 
organisations dwelt on the minds of the women of NU to begin their journey with
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NU to seek women’s emancipation. In addition, these two organisations promoted 
an approach to Islam which was different from that of the women of NU.
Aisyiyah and the women’s section of Sarekat Islam followed the modernist Islam 
approach whereas women of NU were Muslim traditionalists. Furthermore, these 
organisations could serve as a model for women of NU with regard to their 
formation since both organisations were initially formed by their male respective 
organisations (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:13).
According to Nizar (2002:81), Aisyiyah was founded by K.H. Ahmad 
Dahlan and was originally called Sopo Tresno (Someone Loves). It was 
established in 1914. In 1917, it was renamed Aisyiyah under the leadership of 
Nyai Ahmad Dahlan and became then the women’s section of Muhammadiyah 
(Nizar, 2002:81). The primary role played by Nyai Ahmad Dahlan in the 
formation of Aisyiyah, according to White (2004:28), is accepted by most writers 
within this organisation. The main aim of the organisation was “to increase the 
status of women based on Islamic teachings” (Nizar, 2002:81). In order to reach 
this aim Aisyiyah published its own magazine called Suara Aisyiyah (The voice 
of Aisyiyah) and worked to educate women. Already since 1919 Aisyiyah 
operated the “Frobel School” for children and established literacy courses in both 
the Arabic and Latin scripts (Nizar, 2002:82). In 1922, it initiated the 
establishment of a mosque dedicated especially for women called masjid wanita 
(women’s mosque) (Pijper, 1987:3). According to Nizar, members of Aisyiyah 
had grown to approximately 5,000 women in 1929 organising 32 schools with 75 
teachers (2002:81-82).
These efforts shown by Aisyiyah, especially in women’s education, were 
likely to motivate women of NU. In addition, as a reformist organisation,
Aisyiyah often eschewed traditional practices such as selamatan (meal of 
religious character) and called for its abandonment. It regarded selamatan as 
“dangerous because such rites were directed to the spirit world, inciting the sin of 
polytheism” (White, 2004:21-22). Such reformist views were also taught through 
the schools that Aisyiyah operated and religious meetings it held. These views and 
other religious practices motivated women of NU to hold together to reject them.
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In a book edited by Helmy and Ma’shum, Asmah Sjachruni, for instance, told an 
example of violent reactions of some people in her village against the modernist 
views and practices. “There was an incident where a man slapped his nephew 
when returning from the mosque because he saw his nephew wearing trousers 
without kopiyah (hat) instead of a sarong while praying” (Helmy & Ma’shum, 
2002:13).
Sarekat Islam which was established in 1912 by Hadji Samanhoeddhi in 
Surakarta (Noer, 1973:106) was described by Aisyah Dachlan (1955:23) as having 
“opened the eyes of kaum bapa (fathers) and kaum adat (traditional group) 
towards the women’s problem in Indonesia”. In fact, Sarekat Islam was an 
organisation which promoted the views which “rejected inequality in the law, 
recognized the equality of (Muslim) men and women and the equality of husband 
and wife” (Noer, 1973:141). Sarekat Islam had a women’s section called 
Wanudijo Utomo and later on it changed to SPII (Sarekat Perempuan Islam 
Indonesia or Association of Indonesian Muslim Women) (Vreede-de Stuers, 
1960:66; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:50). Although little information is available 
about this organisation, a future leader of Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat was attested 
to join this organisation prior to the establishment of Muslimat. According to 
Lathifah Hasyim (interview), her mother, Mahmudah Mawardi, who led Muslimat 
from 1950 to 1979, was previously a member of SPII and therefore sat in the 
KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or Indonesian provisional parliament) to 
represent this organisation.
Tabir (The curtain)
I have mentioned earlier that the incident involving Soekarno about the tabir was 
another factor which encouraged women of NU to participate in the organisation. 
It was in December 1938, Soekarno, accompanied by his wife, was invited to 
attend a Muhammadiyah meeting in Bengkulu and he decided to leave the 
meeting after they entered the hall. Soekarno, according to Antara (the Indonesian 
news agency), said that he had done that as a protest over the use of tabir in the 
meeting. He further stated that tabir, which usually consists of a white curtain
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separating men and women in a meeting or in a prayer room, is the symbol of 
slavery which is not part of Islamic requirements but is a custom promoted by the 
community (see for the details in White, 2004:120). Following this statement 
from Soekarno, heated debates were aroused within the Muhammadiyah circle 
and other Muslim groups, including among the women of NU. Zuhri says that the 
Soekarno’s statement, reported in Adil magazine January 21, 1939, created 
debates about the role of women (Zuhri et ah, 1979:40). She further commented 
that issues ranging from the emphasis of women’s domestic roles such as taking 
care of their children to the demand for gender equality such as women’s 
education and women’s employment rose (Zuhri et al., 1979:40).
However, the discussion about the tabir from the religious perspective was 
unlikely to attract much attention. For instance, a collection of NU’s fatwa 
(religious advice) between 1926 and 1994 -though it lacks somq fatwa from 
several congresses- does not mention a singlefatwa about it (Masyhuri, 1997). 
Some published books by Muslimat NU only mention the practice of using tabir. 
Women, for instance, “attended the meeting as listeners behind the tabir” during 
the 1938 and 1939 Congresses of NU (Dachlan A, 1955:32). Another book 
mentions that the use of tabir was slowly abandoned right after 1959 (Ma’shum & 
Zawawi, 1996:84).
Asmah Sjachruni and Umroh Machfudzoh, during the interview, told of 
their experience regarding the tabir. Asmah was invited to attend a regional 
conference of NU of South Kalimantan held in 1954 where ulama delegates from 
the central board also attended. She was invited because she had a bright concept 
about the political strategies for the 1955 elections. When she was approached by 
the committee, she agreed to present her concept in front of the ulama on the 
condition that she was allowed to talk without a tabir like men presenters would 
do. She noted that the meeting was held in Martapura where ulama strictly applied 
the religious teaching on tabir. Her demand was then agreed to and she presented 
her idea accompanied by her secretary. She further commented, “When women 
prove that they have the necessary quality, the tabir is abandoned, the tabir in its 
true meaning”.
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Umroh Machfudzoh had another experience. She was one of the 
campaigners for the NU Party during the 1955 elections in Central Java along 
with prominent leaders of NU such as Zainul Arifin and Idham Khalid though she 
was a young woman of 18-19 years of age. During the campaign she rarely saw 
the tabir being use even at village level. She observed that women were often 
separated from men by sitting in the mosque close to the place where such 
campaigns were held.
Embryo of Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat
In the years prior to the official foundation of Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat or NUM 
in 1946, women of NU members were active in religious meetings (pengajian) 
organised by NU. According to K.H.M. Dachlan, who was the chairperson of 
NU’s branch in Bangil, Pasuruan, East Java, in 1930, women of NU were active 
in pengajian held by NU such as Ibu Aslihah, wife of K.H. Wahab Chasbullah, a 
well known ulama (religious scholar) and one of the founders of NU (1955:9). He 
goes on to say that such participation of women of NU was also seen in other 
regions. In addition, women attended meetings held by NU even though they were 
separated from male participants behind tabir (curtain) (Dachlan M, 1955:9).
Dachlan comments on the period of the early twentieth century: “Unlike 
today, the situation at that time was different. We were still under the Dutch 
occupation and our male leaders did not allow women to be involved in any 
organisation” (Dachlan M, 1955:10). Aisjah Dachlan says that “NU still believed 
that the entry of women in NU would pose more problems (mudharat) than 
benefits (manfa’at) (Dachlan A, 1955:27). Some restrictive regulations of the 
Dutch administration applied to organisations such as what happened to Sarekat 
Islam put fear in NU leaders if they were applied to the women of NU. Sarekat 
Islam became subject of Beperkt Vergader Verbod (BVV) -limited prohibition of 
meetings- in 1934 (Noer, 1973:205). The BVV according to Noer (1973:206),
often meant the prohibition of a ‘meeting’ of three persons who belonged 
the same party. This social party, for example when visiting friends or a 
small kenduri, was considered a party meeting and consequently, many
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party members were sentenced, or, at least, brought to the police station 
for a hearing.
But from the women’s perspective the objection of NU to the participation 
of women in organisations indicated the ulama were following the traditional 
view found in the kitab kuning, that women’s appropriate place was their home. 
For instance, Aisjah Dachlan argues that ulama still thought that it was not an 
appropriate time yet for women to join organisations. Women were still 
imprisoned in the household — and were not allowed to go outside (Dachlan A, 
1955:27).
Despite the fact that women were not permitted to be members of NU, this 
situation did not discourage them from coming en masse to the national 
congresses of NU. As mentioned by K.H.M. Dachlan who later wrote the 
Muslimat’s by-laws “However, many of our women were courageous. They dared 
to attend NU’s congresses massively and urged to be accepted as members of 
NU” (Dachlan M, 1955:10). In 1938, NU at last organised a special public 
meeting for women during the thirteenth congress of NU held in Menes, Banten.
It was reported that nearly 8,000 women attended this event. “They crowded the 
building where the NU Congress was held, so that no more seats were left and 
people stood. About 2,000 women were inside and 6,000 more were outside the 
building” (Dachlan A, 1955:30).
In this public meeting, women heard not only male ulama speak but for 
the first time they also heard two women who stood on the podium giving a 
speech to the audience. After the speech of K.H. Wahab Chasbullah who insisted 
on the same obligation on men and women to learn and follow the Islamic 
teachings, and the speech of other ulama, Nyi R. Djuaesih who was the wife of a 
board member of NU of Bandung and who was herself a female preacher 
representing ‘Muslimat’ (female Muslims) of Bandung gave her speech. She 
explained to the audience the principles and aims of the NU organisation. She also 
underlined the importance of women’s education (Dachlan A, 1955:31-32; Zuhri 
et al., 1979:42; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:19 & 110-112).
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The participation of such large numbers of women of Banten in the NU 
congress of 1938 might be explained by the fact that many of the local pesantren 
have already had received female santri and more so than in the other regions. A 
Banten official reportedly reported to Pijper that in the early 1930s many of 
pesantren near Pandeglang Banten contained students of both sexes. He was told 
that in 1915 his informant could by a fortunate accident meet a young girl in the 
same pesantren and she later became his wife (Pijper, 1987:20). A previous report 
by Berg in 1881 even mentions that many young girls of Banten and Priangan 
could read and write as a result of spending time in pesantren (as cited in Dobbin, 
1979:59).
Prior to the establishment of Muslimat, female participation in education 
in different bases of NU was also attested. For instance, Vreede-de Stuers 
(1960:72) says that in 1930, pesantren of Tebuireng directed by K.H. Hasjim 
Asj’ari opened a section reserved for women. Yet, about a decade before, 
according to Marcoes-Natsir and Hasyim (1997:10), K.H. Bisri Syansuri opened a 
pesantren for females. He even worried about the permission from K.H. Hasjim 
Asj’ari for this initiative. According to Marcoes-Natsir and Hasyim, K.H. Bisri 
Syansuri had to hide his female santri when K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari visited his 
pesantren (1997:10). In 1933, Mahmudah Mawardi with her friends established a 
madrasah for female students named Madrasah Nahdlatul Muslimat at Kauman, 
Surakarta. This madrasah developed and consisted then from the elementary to 
the senior high school (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:116).
The event of Menes, Banten, marked a more serious involvement of 
women inside the NU organisation. It also signalled the willingness of women to 
join NU as active members. In following years, at every national congress of NU, 
a special public meeting for women became a routine agenda. At the fourteenth 
congress of NU held in Magelang, Central Java, in 1939, about 4,000 women 
gathered in the courtyard beside the building where the congress was held. All 
delegates from different branches of NU went outside and started the meeting 
together with the women and separated by curtains to hear the speech of Rais 
Akbar (grand chairman), K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari (Dachlan A, 1955:35).
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Some progress was observed at this time. First, a woman took the chair of 
the meeting after the male leaders had given their speeches. Second, there were a 
number of female delegates particularly from different parts of Central Java 
representing their respective regions. Third, about 25 women delegates attended 
enthusiastically meetings of NU’s congress though from behind the curtains 
(Dachlan A, 1955:33).
In the following year, 1940, at the fifteenth Congress of NU held in 
Surabaya, the door was more open for women to be recognized by NU, though the 
majority of male delegates still opposed it. NU women’s meeting of this year 
released a proposal seeking essentially the acceptance of Muslimat as a permanent 
and active section of NU. Among items of this proposition were that Muslimat 
would have their own by-laws as well as a formal structure of their board. Almost 
all of the items in the proposal were agreed to by NU except the demand of a city 
tour (Dachlan A, 1955:38). However, the majority of NU male delegates still 
opposed the idea of the creation of a separate section of Muslimat. The idea was 
still debated and finally reached a compromise, which was to defer the matter to 
Syuriyah NU (Supreme Religious Council) (see Diagram 2) (Dachlan A,
1955:36).
In this 1940 Congress, there were women delegates from different parts of 
Java such as Bandung, Cirebon, and Indramayu of West Java, Tegal and Kroya of 
Central Java, and Jombang and Jember of East Java beside delegates from 
Surabaya itself (Dachlan A, 1955:36). It was reported, among others, that 
Muslimat of Surabaya already had 14 madrasah (religious school), while 
Muslimat from Cirebon, for instance, had conducted regular courses in religious 
teachings, Arabic and Dutch languages for their members (Dachlan A, 1955:40).
In the war period
After the fourteenth congress of NU held in 1940, the prospect of Muslimat being 
admitted as a separate section remained uncertain. The beginning of World War II 
in the Pacific theatre and then the Japanese occupation of Indonesia changed the
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situation. Among the effects of this war were that on the one hand it revived 
Indonesian nationalism, but on the other hand, it made Indonesian citizens 
vulnerable, especially women.
The outbreak of the war with the Japanese in 1941 had affected NU’s 
existence and of Muslimat. Japan, which proclaimed itself as an “old brother” of 
the Great East Asia, had entered finally Indonesian territory in 1942 through 
Batavia (Jakarta), and had succeeded in superseding the Dutch government’s long 
occupation over Indonesia. During their occupation, the Japanese had changed 
certain important policies. It offered to Indonesians a greater degree of 
opportunity to become involved in political organisations than had ever been 
possible under Dutch rule. The attitude of the Japanese occupation towards 
religious leaders was far more accommodating than the Dutch had been.
According to Bastin, the realistic understanding of the key role of ulama in 
peasant life had pushed the Japanese to win allies among religious leaders. They 
“have felt that religious leaders were politically less sophisticated and hence 
ideologically more reliable than Western-educated intellectuals” (1967:149). This 
approach could smooth the Japanese management of the rural area (Abdul Kadir, 
1999:122). This policy brought rural and urban religious leaders together in mass 
movements under military or naval control (Bastin, 1967:149).
At first MIAI (Al-Majlis al-Islami al-ATa Indonesia or the Indonesian 
High Islamic Council) took advantages from the same Japanese policy 
(Bruinessen, 1994:54). According to Fealy (1996:17), MIAI was an organisation 
which the foundation was initiated by Wahab Chasbullah (NU), Ahmad Dahlan 
(NU), Mas Mansoer (Muhammadiyah), and Wondoamiseno (SI) and they held the 
meeting in Wahab’s house in September 1937 (see also Noer, 1973:242). This 
organisation was originally founded as a reaction to several Dutch policies 
perceived to be contrary to Islamic law such as the proposed draft on Marriage 
Law (Bruinessen, 1994:50). According to Abdul Kadir, MIAI was the first arena 
for NU to participate in the nationalist struggle (1999:122; see also Bruinessen, 
1994:51). Although leaders of NU were founders of MIAI, NU appreciated less
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this organisation mainly because leaders of Sarekat Islam wanted to take the 
leadership (Noer, 1973:243).
But later, the Japanese occupation regarded that MIAI could have 
endangered the government by proposing activities such as establishing bait al- 
mal (Muslim treasury) which collected religious donations. In September 1943, 
the Japanese announced that only two Muslim organisations would be legalised as 
national organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah (Benda, 1985:185; Bruinessen, 
1994:54-55). This announcement made MIAI feel that it might be banned by the 
Japanese and it forced the organisation to self dissolve. In November 1943, Majlis 
Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Advisory Council of Indonesian Muslims) or Masjumi 
was established with the blessing and the protection of the Japanese (Benda, 
1985:186; Bruinessen, 1994:55). Like MIAI, this organisation was aimed at 
federating Muslim organisations but it allowed individual members as well with 
the condition that the Japanese gave the permission. Personal membership of kyai 
or ulama had to get the permission from Shumubu, the department of religious 
affairs formed by the Japanese in 1942 (Benda, 1985:185, 273). In the beginning, 
this organisation mainly took NU and Muhammadiyah members as the committee 
because only both organisations were at first legalised by the Japanese (Benda, 
1985:185; Bruinessen, 1994:55). During the Japanese occupation Masjumi was a 
non-political organisation focusing on religious issues but it became an important 
political party after the Indonesian independence.
Following the establishment of Masjumi, K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari, a leader of 
NU, was appointed as the head of Shumubu as well. His son, K.H. Wahid Hasjim 
(he represented his father who preferred to stay in Tebuireng), and Mas Mansoer 
from Muhammadiyah later became the head of this department. This department 
had served, as claimed by Abdul Kadir, as the main artery of contact between the 
Japanese officials and the kyai (1999:122). Through this department, Masjumi 
came in effect to govern alongside the Japanese and on the other hand lessened 
the role of the nationalist (Abdul Kadir, 1999:123; Benda, 1985:186).
Although leaders of NU were involved in Shumubu, NU itself decided to 
be inactive. It limited its activities to focus on religious teaching. According to
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Dachlan (1955:42), this was largely the result of a more severe situation faced by 
almost all Indonesians during the Japanese occupation. Under such circumstance 
NU aimed just at fortifying Indonesian Muslims to uphold their Islamic faith 
(Dachlan A, 1955:42). This affected the establishment of Muslimat since this had 
to be decided at an NU congress. Dachlan further stated that during the Japanese 
time, parents were urged to marry their under age daughters because of their fear 
of the Japanese troops (Dachlan A, 1955:42). Asmah Sjachruni tells her story: 
“Once, my relative was forced to kill a Japanese soldier because he almost raped 
his sister”. She herself had a similar experience “the Japanese troops asked me 
who I am, I replied in Japanese that I am a teacher, and they felt ashamed and 
walked away” (Helmy & Ma’shum, 2002:23).
The Jihad Resolution
After the Japanese government has notified the Allied Forces of its surrender 
following the atomic holocaust at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Indonesian leaders 
proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. This proclamation 
was supported by Indonesian people including the ulama. The ulama within NU 
considered that the proclamation of the new nation was religiously legitimate and 
as such it had to be defended. According to Bruinessen (1994:61), before the 
coming of the Japanese occupation NU had accepted the de facto Dutch 
administration and thought that people should follow it, even though it was not a 
Muslim administration, since it still allowed Muslims to practice their religion. In 
fact, the attitude of NU was in accordance with the sunni tradition in which it was 
preferable to avoid chaos and anarchy caused by revolts, even when the rulers 
were not Muslims, as long as they allowed Muslims to sustain an Islamic way of 
life (see also Abdul Kadir, 1999:125). However, the Japanese occupation ended 
the Dutch administration and when the Japanese surrendered there was no longer 
any “legitimate” administration for Indonesian Muslims. Therefore, the newly 
proclaimed independent state was religiously legitimate.
This religious view influenced NU, whose attitude was previously 
moderate and accommodative towards the Dutch administration, to change to a
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more radical view. Instead of acceptance, the Dutch faced fierce opposition. On 
October 21 and 22, 1945 NU held a meeting joined by all delegates from Java and 
Madura in which NU announced the Jihad Resolution. The resolution declared 
that rising up and taking arms against enemies to defend Indonesian sovereignty 
and treating as enemies anyone who bears arms against the country was an 
individual religious obligation (wajib ‘ain) for both Muslim men and women 
(Dachlan A, 1955:43, Zuhri, 1980:131; and see Bruinessen, 1994:303-306 for the 
complete resolution). Alongside this declaration of jihad, the war against the 
Dutch and its alliances became a holy war. It guaranteed anyone who died in the 
war in the name of Islam the status of a martyr and an automatic place in heaven 
(Abdul Kadir, 1999:123).
This resolution succeeded in garnering mass support for armed conflict 
with the Dutch and the Allies. The ulama and their followers, under the banner 
Hizbullah (God’s party/army), Sabilillah (fight in the God’s path) and, sometimes, 
Mujahidin (fighters) fought together against the returning Dutch administration. 
Among these troops, the Hizbullah was the most prepared since it was trained 
during the Japanese occupation. The Sabilillah, according to Bruinessen 
(1994:60), consisted of non-regular troops that were formed in response to the war 
condition. NU sources suggest that the Sabilillah was the army of ulama and 
consisted of older people. It served as a companion of the Hizbullah (Zuhri, 
1977:212). Meanwhile the Mujahidin was the lesser known troops. According to 
Zuhri (1980:131), the Mujahidin was commanded by K.H.A. Wahab Chasbullah. 
Some pesantren, facing the situation of war, changed their function to become 
army posts. Some kyai were known for their berkah (blessing prayer) by 
distributing jimat (amulets) (Zuhri, 1980:131). The most striking example of these 
fights in order to defend the sovereignty of the new nation occurred when the 
British army came to East Java acting as Netherlands Indies Civil Administration 
(NICA) regain control of the administration from the Japanese. A violent combat 
broke out between the British army and the people of Surabaya and its 
surrounding on November 10, 1945. It is reported that people often cried Allahu 
Akbar (God is Great) to raise their combative spirits (Noer, 1987:125).
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In such combat, Muslim women of NU took an active part. The most 
common activity was providing logistics such as dapur umum (public kitchens). 
Some were involved in forming the Sabilillah Red Cross to help injured people 
both military and civilian personnel (Noer, 1987:125). There were other Muslim 
women who bore weapons or worked in espionage and liaison work in areas 
occupied by the Allies (Dachlan A, 1955:43; Douglas, 1980:163). For instance, 
Asmah Sjachruni, one of the first members of parliament from Muslimat, told of 
her experience,
My profession as a teacher was used for liaison between the army in the 
forest and people living in the city...We became liaison officers in giving 
information and sending food from people sympathizing with our 
struggle. I went in and out by camouflage (Helmy & Ma’shum, 2002:24).
Furthermore, Asmah Sjachruni’s oratorical skill was helpful in enhancing mass 
support for the struggle for independence (Helmy & Ma’shum, 2002:26).
Following the involvement of the Muslim women in the armed combat, at 
the 16ih Congress held in 1946, NU delivered a fatwa  (religious advice) in this 
regard. The fatwa says that women’s participation in a physical war became 
obligatory when the enemy entered the region, just as it was for men. However, 
the training camps for female combatants should be separated from those of men. 
The fatwa also underlined that women could wear uniforms as long as they 
covered their aurat (parts of body which have to be covered) (Masyhuri, 
1997:204). A similar fatwa was also released by the Majelis Syuro of Masjumi 
presided over at that time by K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari, Rais Akbar (great leader) of 
NU (Noer, 1987:126). However, Noer notes a slight difference from NU fatwa 
regarding the uniforms. The female uniform must be different from the male one 
for the sake of avoiding confusion between male and female combatants 
(1987:126).
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The formation of the Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat (NUM) as a section of NU
While the war between the Dutch and the Indonesian people was still going on,
NU held its 16Ih Congress in Purwokerto, Central Java, on March 26 -  29, 1946. 
This congress was the first congress of NU since NU had been forced to be 
politically inactive by the Japanese occupation. In the congress, the male delegates 
finally agreed by acclamation that Muslimat6 would be part of NU as a separate 
section under the name of Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat (NUM), yet, after a sharp 
debate until the last night of congress. The authority of K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari, Rais 
Akbar of NU and K.H. A. Wahab Chasbullah was used in order to achieve the 
acclamation (Dachlan A, 1984:92). K.H.M. Dachlan, chairman of NU central 
board at that time, told his story in this regard as follows (Dachlan M, 1955:10).
My heart is touched and at the same time concerned when I remember 
how were the reactions of some bapak (men/fathers) who totally 
disagreed with Muslimat beginning as part of NU. As the chairman of 
NU at that time, with humility, I gave them reasons and arguments which 
showed the importance of M uslimat being integrated within NU and how 
dangerous if they were still on the outside.
Dachlan notes the importance of the authority of leading kyai in achieving 
this end (i.e. their signatures were used to persuade all delegates)
6 In Muslimat’s publications, the word Muslimat or to be exact Muslimaat (with double ‘a’ to 
signal that the sound ‘a’ is pronounced long) had already been used long before the establishment 
of NU Muslimat in 1946. For instance, Aisjah Dachlan, based on the official archive of 1938, 
mentions the use of Muslimaat by Nyi R. Djuaisih, the woman speaker, in this meeting (1955:32). 
The use of this word is more evident from the 1939 meeting (Dachlan A, 1955:35). However, the 
word Muslimaat can also mean Muslim women, thus it is not clear whether they used the word for 
its meaning or for naming. My opinion is that women of NU in several NU bases had already 
organised themselves before 1938 (see also K.H.M. Dachlan’s witness previously cited). Even the 
name Muslimaat might have been circulated. The event of 1938 was, thus, the result of 
accumulated works done before. For instance, Ma’shum & Zawawi (1996:111) mention that Nyi 
R. Djuaisih had regularly attended NU’s conference to accompany her husband who was an NU 
district board member. It can be assumed that she was not unique, so she met other women in such 
conferences and set up an agenda for an important women’s meeting (e.g. like the 1938 event). I 
have also mentioned the establishment of a madrasah called Nahdlatul Muslimat (awakening of 
Muslim women) in 1933 by Mahmudah Mawardi who later on became the general chairperson of 
Muslimat NU. It is to note ihis mixed name drawing together two words from Nahdlatul Ulama 
and Muslimat. Thus, the need for official acknowledgement from NU was apparently for double 
reasons, first it was an issue of asking ‘permission’ from ‘husbands’ and secondly women of NU 
felt the need for exchanging information, uniting and coordinating their effort, and expanding their 
ideas trough new branches.
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Because of his excellency Hadratus Sjech K.H. Hasjim Asjari and K.H.
Wahab Chasbullah who have already signed the Muslimat’s by-laws, the 
NU Congress finally agreed by acclamation the entering of Muslimat as 
part of NU. (Dachlan M, 1955:10)
K.H.M. Dachlan and his secretary A. Aziz Dijar set up Muslimat’s by-laws. This 
congress also validated the first structure of Muslimat (Dachlan A, 1955:45; Zuhri 
et al., 1979:46; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:20). The 29th of March is celebrated 
then as the birthday of Muslimat.
In this congress, NU released a fatwa regarding the Muslim’s permission 
for joining an organisation which was not based on Islam. NU stated that it was 
haram (prohibited) for the Muslim joining an organisation if it harmed Islam. It 
was good if the organisation gave benefit for Islam, and it was jaiz (permitted) if 
the organisation did not either harm or benefit Islam (Masyhuri, 1994:205).
We can see that the circumstances of Muslimat’s formation were in the 
war period. The war and the jihad resolution impacted on the women of NU in 
that they were more visible in public life. NU men, on the other hand, 
acknowledged the importance of women’s participation: during the war periods, 
women supported men in distributing logistics and helped them in nurseries. 
Moreover, some women of NU participated on the front line. All these 
experiences triggered women of NU to organise themselves and encouraged them 
to urge NU that a Muslimat section should be rapidly formed. The following 
citation by Aisjah Dachlan (1955:45) reflects on this view.
In the middle of increasing combative spirits in holding up the Republic 
of Indonesia where women Muslimat took active part, women of NU felt 
that it was time for them to organise themselves since women should face 
women’s matters by themselves.
Meanwhile male NU members realised that women’s all out participation 
during the war was significant. Some leaders of NU even feared that women of 
NU might join other organisations if they were not accepted as part of NU 
(Dachlan M, 1955:10). So, a special section where women could organise
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themselves was needed. The following testimony of K.H.M. Dachlan (1955:10) 
supports this view.
In the middle of the fight for independence, they [women] were not yet 
accepted within NU. Meanwhile, non-NU women have already joined 
different organisations and political parties. At that time I pushed Pak 
Kyai Wahab and Hadratus Sjech K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari for accepting 
Muslimat as part of NU. In addition, the fight for the Motherland urged 
and needed women forces struggling hand in hand with men.
The first Muslimat chairperson was Chadijah Dachlan from Pasuruan. She 
was actually the wife of K.H.M. Dachlan, one of committee members of NU’s 
Central Board at that time. The proposed chairperson of Muslimat in 1940 had 
been Nyi R. Hindun from Surabaya (Zuhri et al., 1979:45). The appointment of 
Chadijah Dachlan could be seen as a pragmatic choice. The nation was in a war 
situation. The war forced NU in 1945 to move its central board office from 
Surabaya to Pasuruan and into K.H.M. Dachlan’s own house that became the 
office following the deteriorating security situation in Surabaya. It was an 
emergency situation. Thus, choosing Chadijah Dachlan, the wife of K.H.M. 
Dachlan, made the matter of organising the Muslimat easier. Similar event 
happened in 1947 when NU was again enforced to remove its office to Madiun, 
after Pasuruan was occupied by the Dutch army. The Muslimat office was also 
moved to Madiun (Dachlan A, 1955:55; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996: 99).
However, Chadijah Dachlan was a figure of the Muslimat in her own right 
who fought for improvement of the women’s situation. Her preface to the first 
Muslimat first by-law criticised the lack of male attention toward women. She 
wrote:
Indeed women’s matters were less considered, neither by the common 
people nor by the leaders. This view is wrong and it must be eradicated. 
The assumption that women should stay only in the kitchen is false and 
very dangerous for the development of human relationships. This 
assumption which opposes the current era, religious teachings, and the
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certainty of development must be eliminated (as cited in Dachlan A,
1955:51).
Chadijah Dachlan (as cited in Dachlan A, 1955:51) emphasized that the 
same role should be carried out by men and women in disseminating Allah’s 
(God) teachings and cited the verse of the Quran: “For whosoever does a 
righteous deed, be they believing men or women, We shall make him live in the 
best life and We shall recompense them with their wage according to the best of 
their deeds” (The Quran, 16:97).
Peraturan Khususi, Muslimat’s first by-laws
It was mentioned earlier that the first NUM (Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat) by-laws 
were set up and signed by prominent figures of NU. They were written by K.H.M. 
Dachlan and A.A. Dijar and agreed and signed by K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari and 
K.H.A. Wahab Chasbullah. In fact, the first Muslimat by-laws were called 
Peraturan Khususi (special regulations) and not Anggaran Dasar (by-laws). This 
can be understood since the Muslimat in 1946 was only a special female section 
of NU. As such, the articles of Peraturan Khususi should not contradict NU by­
laws. Moreover, it is not strange that some of the articles reflect men’s points of 
view, if they do not represent their interests, as it will be discussed.
There are at least three of eleven articles of the Peraturan Khususi which 
are interesting for further discussion, namely, the objectives of the Muslimat; the 
efforts which Muslimat would make to achieve its goals; and the article relating to 
the spreading of Muslimat’s branches. Some of these articles were felt to be not in 
accord with the interests of Muslimat itself or with the social and political climate. 
Those articles were, later on, revised or changed.
Article 3 of the Peraturan Khususi mentions that the aims of NUM were, 
“(t)o make Indonesian Muslim women aware of their duties in order to become 
ibu sejati (the true mother), so they could strengthen and help the work of NU in 
upholding Islam” (Dachlan A, 1955:48; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:16 of the 
appendix). We can see that this article reflects a male point of view. The article
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emphasizes only the duties of Muslim women and does not mention their rights.
In addition, the Muslimat section was meant to support and help NU which was a 
male-dominated organisation. It is not surprising that this article was soon revised 
to include the rights of women and became “To make Indonesian Muslim women 
aware of their rights and duties in order to become ibu sejati, so they could 
strengthen and help the work of NU in upholding the syariah of Islam” (Dachlan 
A, 1955:48).
The term ibu sejati in this article is another interesting thing. Sometimes it 
was translated to shalihah or pious women (Dachlan A, 1955:73). However, the 
more clear meaning of ibu sejati is a good woman who is able to manage her 
household, to educate her children and to serve the community. Chadijah Dachlan 
in the preface of Peraturan Khususi cited an old Arabic saying “A/ bayt 
mamlakatun tudiruh ai m ar’ah (The household is a kingdom managed by the 
woman).” Being a household manager, which according to Dachlan was 
introduced along with Islam, was a better place for women since previously 
women had been treated like slaves (1955:49). A more recent writing mentioned 
Fatimah Az Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, to describe the ideal 
woman (Zuhri et al., 1979:32). Zuhri says that this example of Fatimah who was 
entitled Sayyidatu Nisaail Mukminin (The leader of the entire Muslim women) 
should be put as a model woman. She described Fatimah: “Her time was evenly 
divided to worship (ibadah), to arrange the household, to serve her husband, to 
educate her children, to serve her father, and to struggle for the glorious Islam and 
its ummah (the Islamic community of believers)” (1979:32). Male NU apparently 
held a similar idea about the role of women as mothers supervising their family. 
For instance, Masbuchin (1968:36) when discussing the Muslimat says,
All daily religious activities are practiced in the family environment and 
are practiced continuously. Here, Muslim families as centres of santri 
(pious Muslim) development play their important role. And there we 
know how big and important is the role of Indonesian Muslimat. Family 
is where the supervision is the best for one’s behaviour. Further, 
cementing and keeping the milieu is in the hands of mothers not in the 
hands of fathers.
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The objective of becoming the true mother (ibu sejati) might not be unique 
to the Muslimat. For other women’s organisations it had been their concerns at the 
beginning of the 20th century. For instance, Vreede-de Stuers says,
The objectives of all these organisations and publications that were 
brought into being between 1913 and 1915 were, as has already been 
stated, purely social. All aimed at the improvement of the woman 
position by means of education in household practices, dressmaking 
classes, courses on child welfare and so forth (1960:64).
But NUM was left behind compared to other contemporary women’s 
organisations. Since the Peraturan Khususi was set up by the male dominated 
NU, this article which limited the objectives of its female section might be another 
indication of how NU through the Peraturan Khususi could still maintain its 
interests.
Article 4 of the Peraturan Khususi concerns the efforts which the 
Muslimat would make in order to achieve its goals, is another interesting issue. 
The article says as follows.
Efforts:
To unite Muslim women of ahlus sunnah wal jama ah (followers of the 
Prophet’s tradition and the community)
To raise women’s knowledge about Islamic teachings and others
To develop more craft productions and ways of gaining righteous income 
(Dachlan A, 1955:58; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:17 of the appendix)
The first point of this article constitutes a form of realisation of what is 
mentioned as “to strengthen and help works of NU” since NU was an organisation 
which aimed at upholding the concept of ahlus sunnah wal jama ’ah.
The article 4c points out that the Muslimat encouraged the production of 
more crafts for economic reasons. This point was probably driven by the fact that 
prior to the formation of NUM, women of NU had produced handcrafts. For 
instance, NU women of Bandung in 1940 reported that they “sell the handicrafts
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and foods produced by the students of their school” (Dachlan A, 1955:39). Selling 
craft products was also reported by women of Surabaya. However, at the 14th 
congress of NU in 1940, women of NU failed to expose their handcraft products 
because “the participants lacked preparation” (Dachlan A, 1955:38). Moreover, 
this point of the article suggests that the women of NU have contributed to the 
economy of their family. The Muslimat would widen its members’ sources of 
income by developing their skills particularly in craft production. The emphasis 
on crafts might also have another significant reason since their production could 
be done independently at home.
Another interesting article is the article 7 that gives the order for every 
branch of NU and every sub branch of NU to form women’s sections (NUM) 
(Dachlan A, 1955:58; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:17 of the appendix). This article 
rises a question of why should the instruction of forming branches and sub 
branches be mentioned in the Peraturan Khususi. Without doubt this instruction 
would help the creation of branches of the Muslimat. Yet it indicates a fear that 
some NU branches or sub branches might not want to open a special female 
section. The instruction, thus, responded to that fear, especially since this 
Peraturan Khususi has been agreed and signed by K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari and 
K.H.A. Wahab Chasbullah, two ulama who were very respected inside NU.
Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat, a women’s section of NU
As a section of NU, NUM had to rely heavily on NU in its earlier periods. For 
instance, the Muslimat’s office joined the NU board. From 1946 to 1950, the 
NUM board office moved three times since every time the NU’s office moved the 
Muslimat’s office moved as well (Zuhri et al., 1979:153). This was the result of 
NUM’s first by-laws, article 2, which stipulated that the Board office should 
follow the NU board office (Dachlan A, 1955:48).
Dachlan states that the period between 1946 until early 1952 was the 
period of murahiq (adolescence) where most of NUM’s activities were under NU 
supervision (1955:71). The unstable political situation of Indonesia after the
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proclaimed independence where the war broke out between Indonesia and the 
Dutch caused further difficulties for organising activities. Thus, only few 
activities could be held by NUM such as the leadership training held in 1948. Yet, 
it attracted enthusiasm from NUM members. Eighty women from several 
branches participated in this training (1955:55). In addition, Muslimat twice held 
congresses, which occurred on May 25, 1947 in Madiun and in Jakarta, 1950. The 
important resolutions released during both congresses were the formation of 
another nine NUM district commissioners. With regard to NU-Muslimat relations, 
NU entrusted NUM’s most prominent member, Mahmudah Mawardi, as a 
member of Syuriyah NU central board (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:99-100). 
Moreover members of NUM actively participated in the war as mentioned earlier.
NU and Muslimat within the Masjumi Party
To describe Muslimat’s participation in the political practice, attention should first 
be paid to the involvement of NU in Masjumi. It was through Masjumi that NU 
slowly changed its orientation from a purely religious organisation into a socio­
political organisation. Since Muslimat was a women’s section of NU, the 
involvement of NU in political activities directly and indirectly attracted the 
Muslimat to the political arena.
Masjumi as a federation of several socioreligious organisations was 
created in the period of the Japanese occupation as previously discussed. It had 
continued as such up to the Indonesian proclamation of independence. On 
November 7 and 8, 1945 Masjumi held a meeting in Yogyakarta. During this 
meeting, members of Masjumi had agreed to change the orientation of the 
organisation from a federation of religious organisations to a political party. Since 
the name Masjumi had been largely known, the majority of delegates voted for the 
use of this name instead of Partai Rakyat Islam (Muslim Citizen’s Party). 
However, the new name was no longer an abbreviation of Majelis Syuro 
Muslimin Indonesia as it was before (Noer, 1987:47; Zuhri, 1977:223).
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The Masjumi Party retained its dualistic membership where certain 
organisations as well as individuals could join it. However, after the 
transformation, non-political organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama, 
Muhammadiyah and some regional organisations in West Java became 
“extraordinary members” (Boland, 1971:42; Noer, 1987:48-49). Problems with 
this dual membership were one of the reasons NU later withdrew from the party 
(Noer, 1987:53).
The structure of the Masjumi party consisted of the Majelis Syuro or Party 
Council and the Pengurus Besar or Party Executive. The Majelis Syuro was first 
headed by K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari, Rais Akbar of NU, while his son K.H. Wahid 
Hasjim, a young leader of NU at that time who had already been a member of the 
committee to investigate preparations for Indonesian independence (BPUPKI) 
during the Japanese occupation, became one of the vice-chairmen. Other vice- 
chairmen were Ki Bagus Hadikusumo from the Muhammadiyah and Kasman 
Singodimedjo. The executive was headed by Sukiman, a western educated person. 
He was backed by people such as Abikusno Tjokrosujoso from Sarekat Islam 
(first Islamic organisation then party emerging in the Dutch period) and Dr. Abu 
Hanifah (Boland, 1971:42; Noer, 1987:101). Kahin comments that this 
composition of Masjumi’s structure shows the mix of people inside of the party. 
There were people who “drew much of their inspiration from the teachings of 
Muhammad ‘Abduh” (i.e. Muslim reformist thinker from Egypt died in 1905) 
such as Abu Hanifah and later Natsir. People such as the leaders of NU and 
certain conservative Muhammadiyah formed “the conservative older-religious 
leaders” wing and in the middle as intermediaries, Sukiman and later Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito (cited in Boland, 1971:42).
Since Masjumi was a federation of Muslim organisations, the new party 
was intended to serve as “the Islamic unitary party” (Boland, 1971:42; Noer, 
1987:47). The party’s first appeal, in this period of defending Indonesian 
independence, was urging Muslims “to fight in the way of God”. It set up 
emergency programs in 1946 to realise “the ideals of Islam in state affairs, so that 
a form of state can be created which is founded on the sovereignty of the people,
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and a society which is based on justice, in accordance with the teachings of Islam” 
(Boland, 1971:43). However, the Masjumi Party always emphasized that the fight 
for these principles has to be in “a democratic way” (Boland, 1971:43). In 
addition to this religious program, the party paid attention to the social problems 
such as the demand for increasing the wages of labourers, the limiting of working 
hours, social insurance, an agricultural law to protect small farmers, and its 
improvement of agricultural methods (Noer, 1987:119-120).
There is no information signaling when the women’s section of Masjumi 
was formed, which was named Muslimat, too. However, it had been already 
reported that in the first congress held in Surakarta on February 10 -  13, 1946 (a 
month before the official formation of the Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat), Muslimat 
Masjumi appealed to the government for limitations on women’s involvement in 
armed combat in order to protect women and men from bad relationships. 
Muslimat Masjumi voiced that women should join the Red Cross and formed the 
Sabilillah (God’s path) Red Cross (Noer, 1987:125).
Like Masjumi, the membership of Muslimat Masjumi also consisted of 
several women’s organisations including the future Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat 
(Zuhri et al., 1979:63). This involvement of women of NU in Muslimat Masjumi 
marked their first participation in politics. In 1946, the chairperson of NUM, 
Chadidjah Dachlan, was appointed a member of the National Central Committee 
of Indonesia (KNIP Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat), a temporary parliament 
before the elections could be conducted. In this committee she represented 
Masjumi until she died in November 1948 (Dachlan A, 1955:63, Zuhri et al., 
1979:57). According to Lathifah Hasyim (interview), her mother, Mahmudah 
Mawardi who became then the Muslimat’s chairperson in 1950, was another 
KNIP member representing Masjumi but she was at first appointed from Sarekat 
Islam element in Masjumi. Aminy (2004:19) mentions the name of Mashud 
Mahmudah (Mashud is her father’s name) among 30 women in KNIP 1949.
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Illustration 1: Traditional pengajian (religious study group)
"Qur'an lessons" for rnoslem women are part o f  the activities in many neighbourhood 
community or Rukun Tetangga (RTj (NUphoto)
Source: (Department of Information, 1985)
Illustration 2: Cadre training organised by Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat, 1948
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Chapter three: The beginning of political participation
The withdrawal of NU from the Masjumi Party
Nahdlatul Ulama’s withdrawal from the Masjumi Party in 1952 marked an 
important milestone in Indonesian politics. And since the Nahdlatul Ulama 
Muslimat was part of the NU, this political event affected the course of 
Muslimat’s development. To draw the significance of this political move, Fealy 
(1996:21) states that this secession was “the greatest upheaval in Islamic politics 
of the early 1950s.” Scholars of Islamic politics in Indonesia such as Noer 
consider NU’s decision to withdraw from the Masjumi party as demolishing the 
idea of an Indonesian Muslim community being politically unified. “From that 
moment the unity of the Indonesian Muslim community became just a dream” 
(1987:344). However, Noer admits that not only was the NU to blame in this 
political upheaval. Noer (2003:151) recounts the confession of Jusuf Wibisono, 
one of Masjumi’s leaders of that time, regretting that Masjumi’s board refused 
NU’s demand to continue to hold the ministry of religious affairs, though this 
regret came late, since in 1952 Wibisono did not support the NU candidate.
The contention between the NU and the Masjumi party board started from 
the Masjumi’s Congress in 1949 held in Yogyakarta where young modernists led 
by Mohammad Natsir took control of the Party Executive. Under their auspice 
new rules were introduced minimizing the role of Majelis Syuro (Religious 
Advisory Council) chaired by Wahab Chasbullah, Rais Am of the NU and 
dominated by NU ulamas. This later council became a mere advisory body while 
the politicians (i.e. the Party Executive) took the lead of the party (Boland, 1971: 
46; Fealy, 1996:21; Noer, 2003:149). This shift in Majelis Syuro’s function, 
according to Wahid Hasjim (as cited in Boland, 1971: 46), made “the ulamas
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withdraw and no longer developed their activities in the struggle, because every 
problem was henceforth considered only from a political point of view, without 
the guidance of religion”. Furthermore, Wahab Chasbullah considered these 
actions not only an attempt to marginalize the NU, but was also a personal affront 
to his authority as the chairman of Majelis Syuro (Fealy, 1996:21).
Another reason of contention was the frequent disputes occurring during 
party meetings. Modernist speakers often ridiculed the political competence of 
NU’s kyai (religious scholars) leading to a walkout by the latter (Fealy, 1996:21). 
The following citation exemplifies the type of statement ridiculing the ulamas of 
NU. A Masjumi’s figure have said (as cited in Noer, 1987: 88)
This politics is w ide...This is politics, brothers, it cannot be discussed by 
holding a tasbih (rosary), do not even think that the scope of politics merely 
surrounds the pondok and pesantren (Muslim boarding school). It spreads to the 
entire world.
Such feeling of being disrespected was aroused, for instance, when a meeting 
attended by mixed members— male and female, young and old —was once held. 
Wahid Hasjim said that in such a mixed meeting, ulama delegates were placed to 
sit together with young men and young women. The revolting thing for those 
ulama was that some of the young women wore short skirts showing the knee. He 
added, “The meeting had only started in 20 minutes and 60 percent of the ulama 
have left the session” (Sanusi et al., 1985:123).
However, the factor most directly influencing the withdrawal of NU was 
the conflict that occurred in 1952 over the portfolio of the Minister of Religious 
Affairs. NU had expected to hold the ministry within the new cabinet to be co­
formed by Prawoto Mangkusasmito, one of Masjumi’s leaders, and Sidik 
Djojosukarto from the Indonesian National Party (PNI). In fact, the ministry had 
been headed by an NU member in two successive cabinets after Indonesia gained 
international recognition of its independence. Apparently the Masjumi board 
refused the demand of NU and that spread disillusionment within members of NU 
(Fealy, 1996:22). Wahab Chasbullah, Rais Am of NU, then without the approval 
of the NU board, sent a letter to the Masjumi board demanding them to endorse
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NU’s proposal or NU would consider splitting from the party. About the same 
moment an interview with Wahab Chasbullah containing a similar demand had 
been released to the press which infuriated the Masjumi board (Adnan, 1982:24; 
Fealy, 1996:22-23) The Masjumi board decided finally to refuse NU’s demand. 
They argued that “Masjumi is a unitary party and the criteria for nominating a 
minister are decided through the discussion among Party leaders. ...Candidates 
are chosen not because of their membership of ‘special member’ of Masjumi” 
(Adnan, 1982:24). The nomination would be, in addition, made by voting (Noer, 
1987:85). Finally, K.H. Fakih Usman from Muhammadiyah won the majority of 
Masjumi votes and was nominated Minister of Religious Affairs.
The demand of NU to retain the Ministry of Religious Affairs was related 
to its interest. This department, as Fealy (1996:22-23) argues, “had become NU’s 
stronghold in the bureaucracy and an important source of patronage”. It should 
also be noted that since the Indonesian proclamation of independence in 1945 up 
to 1952, the ministry was almost always headed by an NU representative. From 
September 1945 to November 1945, Wahid Hasjim headed this department.
During cabinet Syahrir I, this department was headed by H. Rasyidi (Masjumi, 
non NU). In January 1946, following the first opening of the department, the head 
was K.H. Fathurrahman (Masjumi, NU) then in July 1947 H Anwaruddin from 
PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) took the head because the Masjumi party 
refused to take part in Amir Syarifuddin’s cabinet. From November 1947 until 
December 1949, the Religious Affairs Ministry was headed by K.H. Masykur 
from NU for four different cabinets. In December 1949, when Indonesia adopted a 
federal system, Wahid Hasjim headed this department (Adnan, 1982:26-27). In 
1951, there was considerable animosity caused by Amels, Masjumi non NU, for 
his part in sacking Wahid from his position based on an allegation of 
mismanagement about the trip to hajj (Adnan, 1982:45).
All these reasons finally led the NU to decide to withdraw from Masjumi 
in 1952. In fact, NU was not the first to withdraw. PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam 
Indonesia) had withdrawn from Masjumi in July 1947. The NU council 
conference held on June 5, 1952 announced the change of NU’s character as a
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socio religious organisation to become an independent political party. During the 
nineteenth congress of NU, which was held on April 28 to May 1, 1952 in 
Palembang, South Sumatra, Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat was granted by NU an 
autonomous status and changed its name from NU Muslimat to Muslimat NU 
(Zuhri et al., 1979:80). The name switch might also signal a further independent 
status of Muslimat NU (Rachman, 2000:266).
Muslimat claimed that the Palembang congress was the fourth congress of 
Muslimat. The first congress was when the first Muslimat was admitted by NU as 
part of NU’s women section in 1946, followed by the second congress held in 
1947 in Madiun, and the congress which took place in Jakarta in May 1950 was 
regarded as the third congress of Muslimat NU (Zuhri et al., 1979:79).
From Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat to Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama
In addition to granting Muslimat a status of an autonomous body, NU announced 
its reorganisation from a socioreligious organisation into a political party. Aisjah 
Dachlan (1955:63), an eye-witness during the congress, commented on “(t)he 
unusually intensive and poignant agenda”. It was because some participants were 
“apprehensive about being seen to divide the umat” so it would seem that they 
still disagreed with the NU’s estrangement from Masjumi (Fealy, 1996:26-27). 
After K.H. Wahab Chasbullah’s speech convincing the audience of the need for 
separation from Masjumi and establishment of the NU organisation as an 
independent political party, the participants finally accepted the estrangement 
decision made by NU (Fealy, 1996, 25-26)
During its fourth congress, Muslimat NU made several decisions. There 
was an acknowledgment of the leadership of Mahmudah Mawardi from Surakarta, 
Central Java, and the appointment of secretaries and treasurers. Muslimat NU 
approved the proposal to form ‘household schools’. It decided further to expand 
its branches (Dachlan A, 1955:65-66). During this congress Mahmudah Mawardi 
was the first woman of NU appointed as one of Syuriyah NU members (Noer, 
1987:116). Later, two other members of Muslimat were appointed, Nyai Fatmah
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and Nyai Choiriyah Hasjim (PP Muslimat NU, 2000a:5). One rare event 
introduced during the congress was the ‘fancy fair and baby show’, which, 
according to Aisyah Dachlan, had never happened during previous congresses 
(1955:63-64).
Muslimat NU as an autonomous body had full independence in managing 
the organisation, social activities as well as income - generating planning. 
Decisions made by Muslimat NU need no longer wait for NU’s approval. 
According to Aisyah Dachlan, the period after which Muslimat gained its 
independent status was a period of akil balig (adult) where they were free to 
manage their own matters while on the other hand they had to obey the parent 
organisation as the head of the household (1955:71). For instance, Muslimat NU 
had to follow NU “in politics and the NU political direction”. Such dependency 
upon NU was seen later in the Muslimat’s political journey. Another form of its 
obedience to the parent’s organisation was to move the central board office from 
Surabaya, East Java, to the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. In 1953, Muslimat NU 
central board moved to Jakarta in the same year as NU (Dachlan A, 1955:70). As 
mentioned earlier, the Muslimat board conducted its business from the leader’s 
house. Such an attitude was again evident when Mahmudah Mawardi was the 
head of Muslimat NU. In 1954, the central board used her address as the official 
address (Zuhri et al., 1979:65). Yet, an interesting case similar to this tradition 
occurred when Khofifah Indar Parawansa built the new office of Muslimat NU 
close to her house.
A year before the first general elections in 1955, Muslimat NU as well as 
NU held a congress (Zuhri et al, 1979:63). Many significant decisions were made 
during the Muslimat NU Congress which to some extent expressed Muslimat 
NU’s stance on political and gender issues.
The declaration of Muslimat on the child marriage prohibition was yielded 
to the public in 1954. The reason for exposing that prohibition was based on the 
increasing number of child marriages which, in Muslimat’s view, often reflected 
compulsion to which they were vulnerable because of family poverty (Zuhri et al., 
1979:63-4). Another decision also related to marriage was the participation of
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Muslimat NU in BP4 (Advisory Council for Marriage and Divorce Settlement) 
which was founded by Mahmudah Mawardi, the head of Muslimat NU, Mrs. 
Pudjotomo (Muhammadiyah Muslimat) and Nasruddin Latief (head of Religious 
Affairs of the Jakarta Municipality) (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:71; Vreede-de 
Stuers, 1960:146, 188). It was mainly concerned with marriage issues where the 
function of BP4 was a third party.
Muslimat NU also supported women to become members of religious 
courts with several requirements such as the candidate should be married, she has 
a broad knowledge about Islamic law, and has good manners (Dachlan A, 
1955:68). Another decision was that Muslimat NU requested to LAPUNU 
(Lajnah Pemilihan Umum Nahdlatul Ulama), a special committee of NU to draw 
up the party lists of candidates and to prepare for the 1955 elections that women 
had to be represented as members of parliament at the regional and national levels 
and to be given priority (Zuhri et al., 1979:64). Muslimat felt that the struggle for 
women should include equality between men and women in the public domain. 
These could also be fought for by women themselves and Muslimat could provide 
the vehicle (Zuhri et al., 1979:64).
Muslimat NU within NU’s political party
In order to secure voters, NU released a fatwa supporting women’s candidature in 
the 1955 general elections (see NU’s fatwa in the following section). This might 
have been an NU strategy to compensate for its lack of cadre with sufficient 
educational and administrative experience. NU was often denigrated by its 
opponents because of this lack (Mawardi as cited in Zuhri et al., 1979:169; see 
also Fealy, 1996:24). After NU agreed to the resolution proposed by Muslimat 
NU, Muslimat’s participation in the political campaign was even greater. 
Muslimat NU interpreted the fatwa as the obligation of both Muslim men and 
women to flood the House of Representatives and the General Assembly with 
prominent Muslim people. During her campaign Aisjah Dachlan said (1955:86- 
87),
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The role of women cannot be ignored. Women’s vote can determine the 
victory or the failure of the Muslim group. Why? Because the number of 
Muslim women, I guess, is higher than that of men. It will be a 
disappointing if women are not smart to use their political rights.
Indonesian Muslims will lose if women are silent.
Another Muslimat leader, Mahmudah Mawardi, said that Muslimat supported the 
NU party in garnering mass support through pengajian and a show of force 
though with some constraints. She further said that Muslimat had to assist in 
restoring the value of ahlus sunnah wal jama ’ah and defending NU to the ultimate 
degree (as cited in Zuhri et al., 1979:169-70).
It was noted that five candidates of Muslimat NU were among the NU 
candidates, who were given priority in the party list of candidates such as Asmah 
Sjachruni from Kalimantan. Her attempts at convincing people of the need for 
women’s representation in the House of Representatives had not been an easy task 
especially at the province level. During the selection of candidates for the national 
parliament from South Kalimantan, Asmah affirmed of women’s chances of being 
selected. Reactions in South Kalimantan, however, were varied and tensions often 
rose when confronted with the possibility of women appearing in the political 
arena. Soon the issue was referred to the charismatic ulama at the provincial level, 
K.H. Anang Zainal Ilmi, who allegedly had conservative views about women. He 
approved Asmah’s proposal. The reason he gave was that the House of 
Representatives was not a court (where he did not agree with the role for women) 
(Helmy & Ma’shum, 2002:34). Finally Asmah was selected as the woman 
candidate from South Kalimantan together with the provincial chairperson of 
Nahdlatul Ulama, and Mohammad Hanafiah, who was the Minister of Agriculture 
at that time (Helmy & Ma’shum, 2002:34).
In the first Indonesian general elections held in September 1955, 
surprisingly NU won 18.4 % of the total legal votes, and lifted its parliamentary 
representation from a mere 8 while under the Masjumi Party in 1949 to 45 seats 
(Bruinessen, 1994:69). By comparison, Masjumi gained 20.9 %, and lifted its 
parliamentary representation from 44 in 1949 to 57 seats. Two other national
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parties, PNI (Indonesian National Party) gained 22.3 % (adding 15 more seats in 
1955 to hold 57), and PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) 16.4 %. PKI won 39 
seats from 17 seats in 1949 (Bruinessen, 1994:69). NU emerged as the third 
largest party in Indonesia but the result was essentially a moral victory for NU and 
its affiliates, including Muslimat NU.
Muslimat succeeded in representing women in the House of 
Representatives. Muslimat NU gained 10 % of NU’s total achievement. Five 
Muslimat NU members were elected to the House of Representatives from four 
different provinces and branches. Mahmudah Mawardi represented Central Java 
province, Maryam Kantasumpena represented West Java province, Maryamah 
Junaidi from Jember, East Java province, Hadiniyah Hadi from Surabaya, East 
Java province and Asmah Sjachruni from South Kalimantan province (Zuhri et al., 
1979:66, interviews Asmah). In fact, NU had a higher proportion of women -all 
of them from Muslimat NU- than the other two major parties. Women within PNI 
were five of 57 seats and Masjumi had three of 57 seats. Meanwhile, PKI, the 
fourth largest party, had the highest proportion of women: five out of 39 seats 
(Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:73).
As well as Muslimat NU’s success in gaining the House of 
Representatives seats, another six members of Muslimat NU were selected as 
members of the Constituent Assembly at the elections for this chamber in 
December 1955. They were Solechah Saifuddin Zuhri et al. (Central Java), Adiani 
Kartodirjo (East Java), Ratu Fatimah (West Java), Abidah Mahfudz (East Java), 
Nihayah Ma’shum (East Java) and Zamrud Ya’la (South Sulawesi) (Ma’shum & 
Zawawi, 1996:74).
Soon after the result of the general elections was declared on March 2, 
1956, the new cabinet was formed. NU as the third largest political party took five 
ministries in the new cabinet: the Vice Prime Minister II, the Minister of Home 
Affairs, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Social Affairs and the Minister 
of Religious Affairs (Noer, 1987:250). Moreover, from the first general elections 
until 1965, the NU party had participated in all cabinets and had a monopoly over 
the ministerial portfolio of the Ministry for Religion (Abdul Kadir, 1999:146).
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Following the quite extraordinary performance of NU (which included 
Muslimat NU) in the general elections, Muslimat NU joined KOWANI (Kongres 
Wanita Indonesia), a federation of women’s organisations which, in 1956, covered 
some forty-five nationally based organisations (Zuhri et al., 1979:64, Vreede-de 
Stuers, 1960:121). One of the requirements to become a member of KOWANI 
was that the women’s organisation should have at least 5 branches in Indonesia 
and should by its by-laws been struggling for the advancement of Indonesian 
women. Muslimat NU had similar goals to KOWANI, and had more than 10 
branches (Zuhri et al., 1979:64). Thus, Mahmudah Mawardi, representing 
Muslimat NU, was entrusted as member of the presidium (core members) of 
KOWANI from 1956-1965.
The presence of Muslimat NU in the political sphere nevertheless gave 
them the opportunity to be representing all Muslim women in Indonesia. During 
its representation in the House of Representatives, Muslimat NU played an 
important role. One of the achievements was Muslimat NU’s rejection of the draft 
of the marriage law initiated by the government in 1957. In collaboration with a 
representative of Muslimat Masjumi, Mrs. Sunaryo Mangunpuspito, they finally 
succeeded in having the marriage draft withdrawn, which, in their opinion, 
contravened Islamic law (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:75). They did not agree with 
the concept of a secular marriage law.
However the success of Muslimat NU in representing its members in both 
the House of Representatives and the Constituent Assembly was not considered as 
a victory for women’s representation. As Vreede-de Stuers commented: “It must 
also be said, that none of the sixteen women elected to parliament was chosen in 
her capacity as a member of a women’s association” (1960:122).
N U ’s fatwa on the political participation o f women
The resolutions proposed by Muslimat NU in its congress were daring decisions 
since NU was initially depicted as a traditional and orthodox Muslim organisation. 
It was plausible that NU be regarded as such because its attitude towards Muslim
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women had initially proposed limiting women’s activities in the public domain. 
Until the early 1940s, the NU fatwa suggested that the necessary place for women 
was in their home. For example, during the fifteenth NU congress held in 
Surabaya 1940, one question, which was posed by a male participant about the 
law relating to women, was when women could pray outside with other women. 
The answer was that it was sunnah (precedent set by the Prophet Muhammad for 
believers to follow as recorded in the Quran and hadis) for women to pray in 
jama 'ah (praying in groups) at their houses and sunnah for older women, 
unfashionable women or beautiful women who were not well - groomed and 
perfumed (and safe from fitnah) to go outside the home for prayer and it was 
haram (unlawful) for attractive women or beautiful women to wear a neat dress 
and perfume. The reason given was that there would be possible fitnah (slander).
In addition, women had to have permission from their husbands (Masyhuri, 
1997:187).
It might have been the experience during the war that made both men and 
women within the NU organisation realize that women should be given more 
opportunities to participate in public life. Vreede-de Stuers (1952:163) says:
The struggle for independence she could rightly call her own, for in it she 
played a part equal to that of the man. The danger and the suffering of the 
revolutionary period broke down the barriers which had hitherto 
“protected” women. Other barriers were to fall in their turn, those which 
had separated women from each other: regional barriers and those 
formed by religion and class.
The post-war period indeed gave more opportunities for women to be present in 
the public domain. In the twenty-second congress held in Surabaya 1954, the NU 
board through Syuriyah (Religious Advisory Council) finally agreed to all 
proposals put forward by Muslimat NU (Dachlan A, 1955:69).
In 1957, Nahdlatul Ulama reinstated the 1954 fatwa relating to NU’s 
permission for women to be members of parliament, during the twenty-third 
congress of NU. There was a question about women once becoming MPs that they
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were obliged to make numerous suggestions addressed to the head of the plenary 
session, which would sometimes become references for solving important issues. 
He compared the position of women MPs to the Prophet’s hadits saying “A nation 
can never prosper which has assigned its reign to a woman” (Masyhuri,
1997:211). In response, NU delivered a fatwa in a rather confusing way by 
separating the function of making laws (tsubutu amrin li amrin) and delivering 
verdicts (qadla). Since the parliamentary office took the first function women 
might become MPs. However, thefatwa mentioned several requirements for 
women to become MPs such as afifah (keeping in dignified manner), having a 
broad knowledge about social matters, covering the aurat (the requirement for 
Muslim women not to display their sexual charms), having the permission from 
the authoritative person, safe from fitnah, and not becoming the cause for munkar 
(unlawful things). Furthermore, the fatwa said that NU had the right to recall 
female members of NU if they did not fulfil all the requirements (Masyhuri, 
1997:211).
Another development for Muslimat NU was that in September 1954 
Syuriyah NU delivered a decision supporting Muslimat NU’s proposal relating to 
the permission for women to be members of religious courts (Dachlan A,
1955:69). After the general elections, several Muslimat leaders became members 
of the religious court such as Abidah Maksum, from Jombang, East Java 
(Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:73).
The period of Guided Democracy
The political situation in Indonesia during the 1950s was unstable. This apparently 
derived from the critical condition of Indonesia following the final acceptance by 
the Dutch to Indonesian independence in 1949. The Republic of the United States 
of Indonesia was established under a federal system consisting of the Republic of 
Indonesia and the 15 small states set up by the Dutch during the previous four 
years. Such a political structure did not suit most national leaders who strongly 
advocated the idea of the unity of Indonesia rather than a federal system. Attempts 
were made to find a better solution and finally national leaders agreed to the new
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formation of Indonesia as a Unitary Republic (Noer, 1987:201). Eight months 
from the date of the agreement signed by both the Dutch and Indonesia 
concerning the country’s status as a federated republic, Indonesian national 
leaders repudiated the Round Table Conference agreement by dissolving the 
federal system and establishing a unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950.
The new system limited the role of both the president and the vice 
president to merely symbolic heads of state. Meanwhile the bureaucracy was run 
by the cabinet ministers and appointments were based on their party affiliations. 
Initially it was called the parliamentary cabinet system (Noer, 1987:201-2). 
Negotiation among parties sometimes ended in the breaking of the cabinet 
coalition and the sacking of the cabinet became quite common (Noer, 1987:198). 
NU was very much part of the government, as I have mentioned, alongside the 
other three major political parties.
The problem of changing governments was mainly related to the political 
system where each of the political parties had different ideas. For instance, the 
new government appointed after the first general elections lasted no more than a 
year because many political parties were dissatisfied with the policies created by 
the government. The regular rise and fall of cabinets left little time for the actual 
conduct of government and, indeed, was strongly resented by many provinces.
The more intervention of the president in internal cabinet matters the more 
resentment was felt against the central government in Jakarta (Noer, 1987:363). 
The more significant criticism aroused during the 1950s was that too much of the 
national income was being spent in Java though the outer islands produced more 
of the natural output than Java. Many of the local army commanders believed that 
decentralization of the administration was possible without destroying national 
unity and to some extent it lessened the concentration of political power in Java 
(Noer, 1987:263; Boland 88). Such accumulation of disappointment towards the 
national policy triggered some regional provinces, especially those that had more 
natural resources, to slowly take over the administration from the existing regional 
governments appointed by central government and had fragmented Indonesian 
unity (Boland, 1971:88).
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The mounting hostility finally reached a critical state and led to further 
physical conflict after the rebellious groups formed themselves into PRRI 
Permesta in 1958 in areas of Sulawesi and Sumatra following the failure of 
negotiations with the central government. The rebellion was headed mostly by the 
former leaders of the Masjumi party as well as former prime ministers of 
Indonesia such as Natsir, Syafrudin Prawiranegara, and Boerhanoedin Harahap 
(Noer, 1987:415). Although strong action was taken by the national army 
commander which ended with some leaders being arrested, it can be described 
that the fighting in Sumatra was considered “not too serious” (Boland, 1971:89). 
Finally, President Soekarno dissolved the biggest Muslim political party,
Masjumi, on August 17, 1960 because of its leaders’ role in the 1958 rebellion 
(Noer, 1987:367).
In 1959, the president declared a State of Emergency following the failure 
of the agreement between the president and the political parties regarding his 
proposed new system of polity through his idea of Konsepsi which was first 
published in October 1956 (Boland, 1971:86). This idea would be comprised of 
all functional groups in society, whose membership would embrace all ideological 
leanings including the atheistic communist ideology. That proposal was discussed 
and was at first rejected by the majority of the political parties since it meant that 
they had to endorse the existing communists. According to Noer (1987:61), many 
strategies were taken by the government in defending the Konsepsi such as the 
offering of portfolios to the political party leaders and also by intimidation and 
terror (Noer, 360-61). Such terror actually occurred with the kidnapping of the 
prominent woman, Maria Ulfah Santoso (former Minister of Social Affairs in the 
third government and the president of Kowani at the time). In the midst of the 
uncertainty over Konsepsi, Soekarno, supported by the army, on July 5, 1959 
suddenly announced a Presidential Decree to dissolve the Constituent Assembly 
as well as the announcement of the new system of Guided Democracy and the 
return to the 1945 Constitution (Boland, 1971:99-100).
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Muslimat and NU under the Guided Democracy
Following the dissolving of the parliament and the renewal of its name to DPR- 
GR (Gotong Royong or mutual cooperation parliament), the President began to 
impose his authority to choose the members of DPR-GR. He, furthermore, 
imposed his ideology of Nasakom (Nationalist, Religious and Communist) which 
was previously called Konsepsi. The NU party as well as Muslimat were at first 
reluctant to accept an ideology that might decrease Islamic values or other 
religious values. However, the majority of NU leaders -headed by K.H. Wahab 
Chasbullah, Rais ‘Am of N U - accepted later the president’s idea aiming at 
protecting NU from possible threats of retaliation from Soekarno and the army if 
NU did not accept the Guided Democracy. In addition, the PKI (communist) 
factor within Soekarno’s ideology threatened NU leaders that without their 
involvement in politics PKI would seize power (Fealy, 1996:34). NU leaders who 
used this accommodatory approach were considered as the pragmatists (Fealy, 
1996:34).
Another group of NU leaders, ‘the hardliners’ -headed by K.H. Bisri 
Syansuri, Vice Rais ‘Am , according to Fealy (1996:36), were still opposed to 
Soekarno and forced Syuriyah NU to issue a split decision with regard to the 
participation in the new parliament. The decision stated that according to Islam 
such participation was: allowed with intention of amar ma’rufnahi munkar 
(ordering good and prohibiting evil); disallowed because it entails ghasab 
(arrogation of another’s property). Therefore, NU’s nominees to the new 
parliament were free to accept or reject their appointment (Fealy, 1996:36). With 
regard to this choice Asmah Sjachruni said,
The government had sent an acceptance form to be appointed as 
members of DPR-GR. I signed that form and I gave it to my brother 
ordering him to send it to NU’s fraction on the condition that Mrs. Wahid 
Hasjim did the same... Why? If Mrs. Wahid Hasjim who was the 
daughter of K.H. Bisri [Syansuri] accepted why would I reject? I am a 
pragmatist and I followed the majority of NU leaders.
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The Muslimat NU’s representatives followed the accommodatory choice to be 
appointed in both DPR-GR and MPRS (Provisional National Assemby) from 
functional groups. From seven women appointed as members of DPR-GR, five 
were the previously elected women and two members were new: Solichah Wahid 
Hasjim and Mrs. Munir Munawar. Meanwhile, two Muslimat women were 
appointed as members of MPRS: Chasanah Mansjur and Aisjah Dachlan (Zuhri et 
al., 1979:66).
The dissolving of Masjumi in 1960 left NU as the biggest Muslim political 
party in the 1960s and NU became a critical partner in the newly established 
government led by President Soekarno (Abdul Kadir, 1999:146). NU filled major 
posts in both DPR-GR and MPRS as well as many Ministerial portfolios. 
Muslimat NU as one of NU’s supporters benefited from the position of NU at that 
time especially in expanding the education system and health institutions (Zuhri et 
al., 1979:88-92).
The Muslimat NU participation in the political arena did not only occur at 
the national level. In this period, Muslimat NU members were also entrusted to be 
the leaders of many regional House of Representatives. For instance, Atikah 
Musaddad was the former vice chairperson of DPRD of the Yogyakarta province 
(Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:74).
The involvement of Muslimat NU in political practice was also 
demonstrated through its collaboration with the Indonesian military in training for 
National Defense. In so doing, Muslimat NU was represented by Solichah Wahid 
Hasjim who became a treasurer of Badan Kerjasama Wanita Militer (Women’s 
Military Collaboration Council) in the 1960s (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:27). In 
1964, Muslimat NU held several military training camps for women as a 
preparation for possible physical conflict following the deterioration of relations 
between Indonesia and Malaysia (Zuhri et al., 1979:68; Douglas, 1980:166). 
However, such activities might also be motivated by the fact that the rival 
organisation, Gerwani, conducted several military trainings for the same purpose 
(Douglas, 1980:166; Zuhri et al., 1979:6).
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Illustration 3: Muslimat NU members joined the voluntary army program, 1964 & 
1965
(A woman practiced shooting assisted by a female soldier, 1964)
Sukarelawati Muslimat N.U. angkatan "Dwikora” clalam latihan mcnembak 
tepat, Jakarta 1964.
Source: (Zuhri et al., 1979:130)
(A group of Muslimat NU members practiced bearing arm, 1965)
Perjuangan emansipasi kaum wanita. Kader-kader Muslimat NU mengikuti 
latihan sukarelawati Muslimat NU, 1965.
Source: (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:29)
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Chapter four: Muslimat NU under the New Order
The September 1965 event
The participation of Muslimat NU in politics was more apparent during the 
attempted coup allegedly commanded by PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) 
aimed at replacing the existing government on September 30, 1965. This 
attempted coup is commonly known as peristiwa Gestapu (The September 30th 
Movement event). The attempt to seize power resulted in the assassination of six 
of the top generals of the Indonesian army (cf. Douglas, 1980:169). This 
assassination marked the beginning of negative views towards women since there 
was a suspicion that Gerwani (Indonesian Women’s Movement), a women’s 
organisation affiliated to the PKI, played an important role in that event.
According to Douglas (1980:169), although the involvement of Gerwani members 
was not clear and none of the murders can be attributed to specific young women 
who were present, the Indonesian society has accepted the official view that has 
associated them with the torture and humiliation of the generals before their 
deaths. This was supported by the fact that three days prior to this tragic event, a 
large group of demonstrators, primarily women of Gerwani, took mass action in 
Surabaya ending in the damage of a house, grounds, and furnishings. This excess 
justified the claims to the negative stereotype of Gerwani (Douglas, 1980:169). 
Saskia E. Wieringa in her thesis argued different evidence of Gerwani’s role in the 
attempted coup through the autopsy of the murdered generals which showed that 
they were not tortured. She went on to argue that the women allegedly involved in 
the assassination were prostitutes taken from the surrounding streets after the 
tragic event (Wieringa, 1999:499-507).
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On October 2, 1965, two days after the failure of the attempted coup, 
Muslimat NU announced its resolution condemning PKI as the traitor and asking 
the government to take action against the perpetrators (Zuhri et al., 1979:68). Still 
in October, Muslimat NU released another resolution addressed to the Minister of 
Education and Culture to dissolve the kindergartens formed by Gerwani, Melati, 
and to be taken over by the government. This resolution was supported by Kowani 
and was then agreed to by the ministry (Zuhri et al., 1979:69). Muslimat NU was 
one of the organisations allied to Front Pancasila that declared on October 5, 1965 
a statement calling for a ban on the PKI and its affiliated organisations (Zuhri et 
al., 1979:68). On November 8, 1965, a big rally organised by the women’s 
alliances in the capital city of Front Pancasila demanded the government to 
dissolve PKI. This protest was led by two prominent Muslim women, Asmah 
Sjachruni from Muslimat NU and Aruji Kartawinata from PSII (Zuhri et al., 
1979:68).
There was another important event related to the September attempted 
coup which was significant with regard to the relations between Muslimat and 
NU. Solichah A. Wahid, a Muslimat NU leader, played an important role in the 
first days of Ocober 1965. Solichah A. Wahid opened her house to NU and 
nationalist leaders to hold meetings (Baidlowi, 1984:114; Ma’shum & Zawawi, 
1996:127). According to Ma’shum & Zawawi (1996:127), she pushed NU leaders
n
into taking firm action against PKI .
In March 1968, General Soeharto, who was the chief of the army’s 
strategic reserve and had commanded the actions against PKI in the aftermath of 
the September event, was elected as the new president. Meanwhile Soekarno was 
sacked and placed under house arrest (Boland, 1971:142). The installation of 
Soeharto and the success of the military in handling the attempted coup marked
7 According to Masbuchin (1967:56), there were three statements of NU regarding the September 
1965 event: Subchan ZE’s statement on the name of NU Party on October 2 1965 condemning 
PKI and its involvement in the event; musyawarah pimpinan's (leader’s meeting) statement on 
October 2 condemning Dewan Revolusi and NU’s clearance from its alleged involvement in 
Dewan Revolusi held at Munasit’s house in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta, and then reported by 
Machbub Junaidi to the army’s strategic reserve; PBNU’s statement on October 5 signed by all 
autonomous bodies demanding the dissolving of PKI.
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the beginning of the military’s involvement in Indonesian politics. Soeharto 
supported by the military formed then a new regime known as the New Order.
The political repression of the New Order
The September 1965 event and the political turmoil which followed (e.g. the ban 
of PKI and the massacre of its alleged members) marked a massive change for all 
Indonesian political parties. The New Order regime made an effort to control the 
instability by imposing certain political repressions. One of its policies was the 
program of rural depoliticisation commonly called the ‘floating mass’ doctrine. 
The New Order, through this doctrine, banned mass organisations in the villages 
and considered that people’s backward was not fit to free political activity 
(Robinson, 1998:209). Since NU had mainly its mass support from Muslims in the 
rural areas, NU and other organisations affiliated to NU suffered many political 
pressures during the New Order.
Another repressive policy which impacted on the political development of 
Indonesia was the forced ‘fusion’ of political parties. A year before the elections, 
the New Order required political parties in DPR GR (Mutual Cooperation 
Parliament) to group into three different political fractions. On March 13, 1970, 
NU Party and other Muslim parties grouped under the banner of “spiritual-
o
materiir fraction , that is emphasising spiritual development without neglecting 
physical development (Aminy, 2004:236). After the 1971 elections, political 
parties which had already been grouped were required to merge. From ten 
contestants during the elections, only two were left and Golkar (Golongan Karya 
or Functional Groups), which at that moment did not want to be considered a 
political party. On January 5, 1973, NU and other Muslim parties fused to form 
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party). Other 
political parties which had already been grouped under the banner of “materiil-
8 This fraction grouped NU, Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia or Indonesian M uslims’ Party), 
PSII (Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Union Party) and Perti (Pergerakan 
Tarbiyah Islamiyah or Movement for Islamic Education), called Persatuan Pembangunan (United 
Development) (Aminy, 2004:236).
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spiritual” fraction9, that is emphasising physical development without neglecting 
spiritual development, fused to form PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or 
Indonesian Democratic Party) (Aminy, 2004:236).
The so-called ‘simplifying political parties’ policy to reduce the number of 
political parties was more destructive than beneficial for NU. PPP, from where 
NU Party fused, was the second biggest party after Golkar. As such, the 
government considered PPP as a political rival. Any critical stance from PPP was 
perceived as opposition to the government. There were several significant 
‘confrontations' between PPP and the government (Bruinessen, 1994:104-106). 
For example, in 1973, PPP opposed the draft of the Marriage Law proposed by the 
government. One controversial article was about the legality of a marriage. The 
draft mentioned that a marriage could be considered as legal if it was registered. 
PPP representing the Muslim view opposed this article since it neglected religious 
regulations on marriage (Aminy, 2004:251). Members of parliament who were 
originally from the NU Party played a significant role within PPP because they 
formed the majority. At the moment of fusion they were 58 out of 94 members of 
PPP or 62 percent of all PPP members.
Having parliamentarians forming an important majority of the opposition 
led to a deterioration in the relationship between NU and the regime. NU Party, 
since 1973, did not formally exist anymore because of the fusion. However, the 
connection between NU, as an influencing social-religious organisation, and PPP 
was still not clear. Therefore, NU, as a social-religious organisation was identified 
as the government’s opposition (Abdul Kadir, 1999:176). As a consequence, 
ulama of NU who mostly lived in the rural areas had to face mounting threats and 
pressures from local state officials. This situation worsened during the 1977 
general elections. The New Order regime targeted NU leaders especially in 
several districts of East and Central Java. They were seriously intimidated by
9 This fraction grouped nationalist and Christian parties, including PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia 
or Indonesian Nationalist Party), Murba (Common-People Party), IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia or League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence), Partai Katolik 
(Catholic Party) and Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia or Indonesian Christian Party), called 
Demokrasi Pembangunan (Democratic Development), formed on March 9, 1970. It changed to 
PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Democratic Indonesian Party) on January 10, 1973 (Aminy, 
2004:235-236).
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using ‘horrors or scare-tactics’ (Abdul Kadir, 1999:179; Bruinessen, 1994:105). 
Abdurrahman Wahid described the events as evidence that oppositions groups 
have been little tolerated by the government (as cited in Abdul Kadir, 1999:179). 
All these repressions, especially during the general elections, led to the decision of 
several ulama to join Golkar on the one hand and on the other hand motivated 
several younger NU activists to advocate NU leaving the political arena (Abdul 
Kadir, 1999:180).
The political pressures exerted by the New Order, in addition to the New 
Order’s ideology on women affected Muslimat NU’s representation in politics. 
Only four members of Muslimat NU were elected for the House of 
Representatives in the 1971 general elections and two members were appointed 
for the National Assembly (Zuhri et al., 1979:67). During the guided democracy, 
Muslimat NU was represented by seven members in the DPR GR and two in the 
National Assembly (MPRS) (Zuhri et al., 1979:65).
The ideology of the New Order on women
The New Order regime, which according to Jackson was “characterized by the 
decline of political competition and by elimination of groups from the ruling 
circle” (cited in Blackburn, 1991:31) also affected the state intervening upon 
women. Oey-Gardiner writes that from the beginning the New Order defined 
women in the context of national development. It emphasized women’s kodrat 
(inherent nature) and nurture as the ideal portrait of women in Indonesia 
(2002:102). The government emphasized the same ideology when Muslimat NU 
commemorated its 23rd birthday in March 1969. In her speech, Tien Soeharto, the 
first lady, said (cited in Zuhri et al., 1979:159)
Let us choose the development sector in which we able to express our 
women’s objectives and conform with our function as wives 
(pendamping suami-standing at the side of their husbands) and mothers 
who nurture our children...Especially for kaum ibu (mother group) who 
become wives of leaders, they should have to support their husbands to
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be more submissive for the society’s interest without any pamrih
(reward).
The word pamrih according to Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis (1987:46) is a threat 
to power, since pamrih is the hidden personal motive, which means that doing 
something not because it has to be done, but because it satisfies personal interest 
or desires.
In order to confine the women’s role as wife and mother, the New Order 
regime used the atrocities allegedly committed by Gerwani as its main justifying 
propaganda (Oey-Gardiner, 2002:102). For example, during the meeting of All- 
Indonesian Congress of Catholic Women in August 1967, the acting President 
Soeharto mentioned the role of Gerwani in the attempted coup, thus, after his 
speech, the Congress of Catholic Women made a statement saying that “Political 
slogans should be abandoned, divisive statements and activities should be 
eliminated, and deliberations and programs should focus on improvements in 
social welfare” (Douglas, 1980:179).
In expanding the New Order’s ideology on women, it established PKK 
(Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga or Family Welfare Tutorship), Dharma 
Wanita (civil servants’ wives’ association), and Dharma Pertiwi (armed forces 
wives’ associations umbrella). These organisations were designed to further their 
husbands’ careers as well as to maintain the government’s power over the people 
(Parawansa, 2002:71; Oey-Gardiner, 2002:102). For instance, the PKK’s structure 
reached village or sub-ward level. In order to influence the society to take part in 
this organisation, the head of PKK was selected by the state at various levels. At 
the ward levels, the head of the PKK was the ward chiefs’ wife. They were also 
members of Dharma Wanita because their husbands worked for the civil 
bureaucracy, whereas their husbands worked for armed services, they were also 
members of Dharma Pertiwi (Sullivan, 1994:61). According to Sullivan, the PKK 
ideology has redefined women’s place even more narrowly in the domestic sphere 
while the domestic sphere was associated with home, and the home was 
misleadingly regarded as ‘the arena of national development’ (Sullivan, 1994:80).
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The state intervention in confining women’s roles nevertheless impacted 
also on Muslimat NU. In addition, as part of NU, Muslimat sometimes carried the 
burden of the deteriorating relations between NU and the regime, even though 
Muslimat NU’s main programs were focused on socioreligious activities. 
According to Asmah Sjachruni, Muslimat NU faced the impact of being affiliated 
with an opposition party during the New Order. She further said (interview),
We as the outsider faced many difficulties because we were members of 
a political party. Truly, Muslimat was very tired. From the Muslimat 
Congress held in Surabaya 1967, for twelve years we were paralysed and 
we could not hold any congress until 1979. It was because of the 
grouping of Dharma Wanita and Dharma Pertiwi. These organisations 
took all Muslimat’s leaders especially at regional level. Teachers were 
not allowed to be members of Muslimat, wives of civil servants were not 
allowed to be members of Muslimat. Wives of civil servants had to join 
Dharma Wanita, wives of the army forces had to join Dharma Pertiwi, 
teachers were paralysed... We could not join PKK nor GOW [Gabungan 
Organisasi Wanita or Association of Women’s Organizations]. We were 
not invited to do courses related to women’s career development held by 
the government.
Such intimidation created a fearful feeling for NU members. Abdul Kadir 
(1999:186) writes that civil servants who hoped to advance their careers within 
the bureaucracy stayed away for fear that any association with NU would “led to 
unwanted reprisals”. Intimidation by the regime continued to occur in the 
minimising the Muslimat NU’s institutions. As this was partly the strategy of the 
regime to reduce the power of NU (considered as an opposition). The regime 
intervened in property owned by Muslimat such as kindergartens’ schools. 
Khofifah Indar Parawansa in the interview said that during the 1970s several 
kindergartens’ institutions owned by Muslimat NU in Mojokerto, East Java were 
suddenly taken over by PKK who claimed that the institutions were theirs.
Although Muslimat faced the effects of mounting threats addressed to NU, 
according to Ma’shum & Zawawi (1996:93), Muslimat NU was fortunate since it 
did not neglect its important socioreligious activities. They (1996:93) go on to say
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“But not like a car, the realisation of those activities could not move quickly”. 
Muslimat implemented several programs concerning women and children since its 
beginning. Despite its activity in supporting NU in politics, Muslimat NU’s 
primary concern was with women’s empowerment, for example the establishment 
of 19 BKIA (Balai Kesehatan Ibu Anak or clinics for women and children) and 
two clinics for delivering babies in 1969 (Zuhri et al., 1979:101). Muslimat NU 
also established several kindergartens and panti asuhan (orphanage houses). In 
1969, Muslimat NU sent its representative to Pakistan and India under the auspice 
of LKBN (Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional or National Family Planning 
Institution, the institution which was established prior the establishment of 
BKKBN) (Zuhri et al., 1979:115).
NU’s fatwa on family planning
In 1969, Muslimat NU reported its activities on family planning program to 
Syuriyah NU (Supreme Religious Council of NU) and asked the council to release 
a fatwa concerning this program. After the hearing, Syuriyah NU indicated its 
support for the program, though it made several conditions such as that the 
program had to be a plan to manage the pregnancy. It is not intended to cease nor 
to abort the pregnancy. It should not become a mass movement. In addition, a 
wife has to ask permission from her husband first before she followed the program 
(Zuhri et al., 1979:112). The 25th Congress of NU held in Surabaya December 
1971 confirmed the fatwa (Zuhri et al., 1979:113).
Following this fatwa which permitted and religiously legalised the family 
planning program, Muslimat NU started to coordinate its activities on this 
program especially for NU members. The coordination was then conveyed to a 
foundation called YKM (Yayasan Kesejahteraan Muslimat or Muslimat Welfare 
Foundation). A circular letter signed by the NU central board in 1974 reconfirmed 
its support for the program. It stated (as cited in Zuhri et al., 1979:113),
Although the decision of the National Assembly mentions that the
program [the family planning program] should be implemented
voluntarily, here and there we hear that the voluntary principle was not
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respected by agents who directly contacted the people. This forced or 
semi forced practices resulted in some psychological problems which 
were not expected. Those negative impacts, in fact, could be avoided if 
people were first informed and motivated to understand the importance 
of the Family Planning Program for the national development and for 
their familial interests, in addition to the disappearance of sinful feeling 
because of a perception that following the program contradicted the 
religious teachings.
The circular, further, pointed out that the 1969 fatwa of NU could be used to reject 
such a religious perception. The circular also requested board members of NU at 
regional level to support Muslimat NU in this program through its foundation.
Muslimat NU later admitted that the Family Planning Program concerned 
with the people at large (including men and women) and their interests (Zuhri et 
ah, 1979:118). Therefore, Muslimat requested NU to work on the program 
together. Another possible reason behind this request was the attitude of 
reluctance to support the program which Muslimat faced in the field from men as 
the previous circular letter indicated. In addition, the 1969 fatwa of NU, which 
mentioned the permission from the husbands among the conditions for following 
the program, was used to obstruct women’s participation in the program. Yet, 
Muslimat NU had only influence over the women. In order to maximise the 
success of the program, Muslimat NU, thus, had to make an alliance with NU.
The proposal was accepted by NU and in December 1977 and a new institution 
called LKKNU (Lembaga Kemaslahatan Keluarga NU or Family Welfare 
Institution of NU) was then formed. Members of a joint committee were 
appointed including six men and four women in the core committee (Zuhri et al., 
1979:119).
New relations between NU and the New Order regime
The awkward relationship between NU (as well as Muslimat NU) and the regime 
did not last long. NU made several decisive decisions during its 27th Congress 
held from December 8 to 12 1984 in Situbondo, East Java (Nakamura, 1996:109).
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First, NU accepted Pancasila as the asas tunggal (sole foundation) in its by-laws 
as imposed by the regime on all organisations including political parties. Second, 
NU restored the primacy of ulama leadership by reconfirming the supremacy of 
Syuriyah over Tanfidziyah. Third, NU declared openly its withdrawal from 
‘practical politics’ by prohibiting the core members of NU boards at all levels to 
simultaneously hold core positions in any political party (Nakamura, 1996:105- 
106). A year prior to this Congress, Syuriyah NU board held its national meeting 
in the same place and recommended to all NU members to return to the Khittah 
NU 1926 (Charter of NU 1926). This call meant that NU started to stay out of 
politics (Nakamura, 1996:99).
The Situbondo Congress finally marked the beginning of smooth relations 
between NU including Muslimat NU with the regime. Starting from 1983, the 
membership and the activities of Muslimat NU increased. Young cadres were no 
longer afraid to publicly announce their membership of Muslimat NU (Ma’shum 
& Zawawi, 1996:96). As a women’ socioreligious organisation, Muslimat NU 
received a lot of benefit from the NU decision, for example Muslimat NU 
engaged in the government’s programs concerning health issues such as Gerakan 
Jum’at Bersih (Clean Friday Movement) focusing on clean water sanitation and 
lavatories (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:51-2). Muslimat NU also started to 
collaborate with several non-governmental organisations from national and 
international levels such as Yayasan Melati, UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, as well as 
with Ministries such as Depnaker (the Ministry of Labour) (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 
1996:41).
Muslimat NU also started to engage in various sectors. In the economic 
sector, it established, for instance, the central co-operative called An-Nisa’ in 
collaboration with Fatayat NU in 1996. This joint agreement was a further 
development of already existing co-operatives at regional level. Muslimat NU 
maintained that in 1996 there were 88 co-operatives run by Muslimat NU regional 
boards in 11 provinces (PP Muslimat NU, 2000a). These co-operatives included 
saving and lending co-operatives as well as consumer co-operatives (Rahman, 
2000:272). The government through the Ministry of Co-operatives assisted
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Muslimat NU’s co-operatives by training managerial skill for their staffs and by 
soft loans (PP Muslimat NU, 2000a).
During this period, Muslimat NU also showed more concern for the 
development of its members’ skills. In fact, Muslimat NU had established from 
the beginning centres for training in different regions (Rahman, 2000:272). 
Starting from 1994, it built a representative multi purpose centres. This centre was 
aimed at training skills (e.g. patisserie, nurseries, Co-operative training), holding 
meetings (e.g. istighotsah or religious mass prayer), etc. It was the Minister of 
Religious Affairs who laid the first stone and gave initial assistance to the project. 
The project was lastly assisted to finish by Mbak Tutut (Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, 
Soeharto’s daughter) in 1996 when the general chairperson of Muslimat NU 
joined Golkar (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:60; PP Muslimat NU, 1998:24).
In the religious sector, in addition to its traditional activities such as 
organising majlis taklim (religious study group), Muslimat NU established 
Yayasan Haji Muslimat NU (Hajj Foundation of Muslimat NU) in 1992 (PP 
Muslimat NU, 2000a). This foundation organises several activities relating to the 
hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca such as publishing guide books, preparing candidates 
for the hajj rituals, medical check-up’s, etc. Muslimat NU has also established 
relations with several broadcasting services both television and radio, for 
example, Dialog on Islamic Nuances in Radio Attahiriyah since 1996 (PP 
Muslimat NU, 1998:16).
Participation of Muslimat NU in politics during this period changed 
drastically. Based on NU’s decision to return to the Khittah 1926, many Muslimat 
members joined Golkar, the government party, in addition to PPP, the traditional 
party of Muslimat NU members. In 1996 during Muslimat NU’s 50th birthday 
celebrations attended by 10,000 people, Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi, the general 
chairperson, stated (Kompas Online, 1996)
Muslimat NU emphasizes its commitment to its members for the 1997
elections. It allows its members to independently choose the party
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affiliation within the frame of responsible freedom towards the continuity
of the national development and responsible toward the God...
She furthermore said, “Muslimat NU encourages people to welcome the 1997 
elections. Therefore, people should use their right carefully and avoid golput 
(,golongan putih or white group who do not vote in the elections)” (Kompas 
Online, 1996).
This statement of an independent choice was often understood as a 
campaign for Golkar, since members of Muslimat NU chose traditionally PPP, the 
political party with whom the NU Party merged in 1973. Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi 
herself was then selected as a candidate from Golkar in the 1997 elections. This 
attitude of Muslimat NU of trying to keep the same distance from different 
political parties or giving an independent choice marked the beginning of the 
spread of Muslimat NU leaders to different political parties. The 1997 elections 
resulted on the election of six members of Muslimat NU in DPR, five from PPP 
and one from Golkar. Nine other members were appointed as members of MPR, 
seven women from PPP, one woman from Golkar and another woman from 
Utusan Daerah (Regional Representative) (PP Muslimat NU, 1998:5).
Through the growing smooth relations with the state, Muslimat NU 
expanded its activities in the international fora. Starting from 1986, Muslimat NU 
sent more regularly its members to international forums which was mostly 
concerned with social and health issues (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:83-84). In 
September 1995, Muslimat NU participated in the 4lh World Conference on 
Women. The involvement of Muslimat NU in the international activities slowly 
motivated Muslimat NU members to reconstruct their relations with NU.
New discourse on women within NU
In November 1997, there was an important fa twa delivered by NU that later 
affected women within NU. Through hahtsul masail ad-diniyah al-maudhi ’iyah 
(thematic discussion on religious problems, a regular forum conducted by NU to 
deliver its fatwa on different religious themes), held during the national meeting
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of ulama in Lombok, NTB, NU delivered a fatwa concerning the place of women 
in Islam. This fatwa stated that women are allowed to take part in the national 
leadership if they fulfilled certain qualifications such as quality, capability, 
capacity, and acceptability (Sekjen PBNU, 1998:59). Although, this fatwa still 
underlined the natural role of women (kodrati) such as first and primary educator 
for their child, pregnancy, delivering baby, breastfeeding, and other functions 
within their family, the fatwa admitted that the public role of women (non- 
kodrati) have to be clearly respected and protected (Sekjen PBNU, 1998:59). In 
this meeting two women of NU, Machrusah Taufiq and Najihah Muhtarom 
involved actively in formulating the fatwa and were two out of the eight tim 
perumus (the formulators) (Sekjen PBNU, 1998:60).
This fatwa was considered by some people to politically support Mbak 
Tutut’s (Soeharto’s daughter) possible candidacy for the national leadership (PP 
Muslimat NU, 2000a:26). The time of its deliverance (November 1997) matched 
with the period before the election of the President and the Vice President in 
March 1998. Mbak Tutut was at that time one of leading political figures who had 
the chance to be elected as the Vice President10. Days before the fatwa was 
delivered, a meeting attended by 100 kyai was held in East Java discussing about a 
similar issue (Robinson, 2004:187). This argument was never put to the test, but 
one thing is for sure that both discussions helped to increase the discourse about 
women’s position as a leader and about gender relations within NU. Women’s 
organisations within NU held further discussions concerning gender equity from 
the Islamic perspective.
International fora and their impact on the New Order
The changing policy of the state toward women such as to the Muslimat NU did 
not come instantly. Although family and household became the main focus of the 
state to confining women, the state actively participated in almost all international 
forums of women held by the UN that initially discussed more about the role of
10 Lastly Mbak Tutut was not selected by Golkar, the ruling party to run with her father. The 
honour went to BJ Habibie who then became the third President of Indonesia.
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women in the public sphere, for example the establishment of the Ministry for the 
Role of Women in 1978, following the UN declaration of the Decade for Women 
(1975-85). In the 1983 and 1987 Broad Guidelines on State Policy (GBHN) the 
government took the broader meaning of women’s responsibilities which was to 
manage their peran ganda (dual role) where women despite their duty to manage 
their family household, were also to build their potential in the economic and 
political arena (Oey-Gardiner, 2002:103). In extending the state’s policy, the 
government formed P2WKSS (Teams for Uplifting the Status of Women through 
Healthy and Prosperous Family) at regional levels (Soetjipto, 2000:71). Along 
with that, the government through the State Ministry of the Women’s Role formed 
the PSW (Center for Women Studies) in several public and private universities.
The government’s support for the modification of the role of women was 
even developed further after it ratified several other conventions on women. The 
government ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (Law No. 7/1984). In the 1993 GBHN (broad 
guidelines on state policy) the government emphasized women’s role as mitra 
sejajar (gender equity). The government confirmed women’s role as equal to the 
male and stated that development should be broadened as long as women retained 
their women’s kodrat (women’s nature), harkat (dignity), and martabat (prestige) 
(Soetjipto, 2000:72). In 1998, following the downfall of former President 
Soeharto on May, the government under President Habibie released the 
Presidential Decree 181/1998 with the reference to the Women’s convention 
which was implemented in the establishment of a National Commission on 
Violence against Women on July 15, 1998 (Parnohadiningrat, 2002:xxiii).
From the period of the New Order, one thing that can be pointed out is that 
the repressive regime of the New Order affected all areas of Indonesian society. 
NU as one of the social organiations regarded as an opponent of the New Order, 
felt the detrimental effect of state policy. As Muslimat NU was the supporter of 
NU in politics, the awkward relations between NU and the state impacted on 
Muslimat NU as well. Through the restrictive position of women by the state,
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Muslimat NU was also forced to avoid political discourse and focus more on 
family matters.
The engagement of the state with the international convention to 
reconsider its definition about the role of women was justified as the regime’s 
strategy to “legitimise its authoritarian power” (Robinson, 1998:205). To end this 
chapter, Robinson’s question is interesting, “Would gender equity, or women’s 
rights in general, have got onto the public agenda of New Order Indonesia at all 
without this externally originated push?” (1998:217).
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Illustration 4: Orientation about the Family Planning program organised by 
Muslimat NU, 1972 & 1979
(Mixed meeting of the opening)
(Unveiled young women in the reception desk. Sinta Nuriyah sat on the extreme 
left while Farida Saifuddin Zuhri stood on the extreme right)
Pagi-pagi para penerima tamu telah siap di tempat Orientasi k.B. se Jaw a, Ma­
dura dan Bali (Jakarta Juli 1972).
Source: (Zuhri et al., 1979:129)
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Chapter five: Muslimat NU and new (renewed) discourses 
in the period of political reform
The fall of Soeharto and the emergence of new (renewed) discourses
Following the downfall of the New Order regime under Soeharto in 1998, 
Indonesia entered a new era called era reformasi (reform era). This reformasi 
brought about the essential change to the opening up of Indonesian democracy. 
Habibie, who succeeded Soeharto as the President of Indonesia in 1998, called for 
legislative reform. Several important laws such as a set of three Laws on Politics 
(No. 2/1999, 3/1999 and 4/1999) were enacted during his short presidency 
(Aminy, 2004:334-335). Under these new laws 48 political parties (including the 
three old parties) were qualified to participate in the 1999 elections. Moreover, 
Law No. 4/1999 reduced to half the number of MPs appointed from the military 
from 75 to 38. The democratic election of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, former 
general chairperson of Tanfidziyah NU, as the new President of Indonesia by the 
National Assembly in October 1999 showed that the democracy within Indonesian 
political system had really started to be implemented.
The initial discourse of anti-KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism), 
which emerged at the beginning of this period of transition, was followed by other 
discourses with less interventions from the authority. Freedom of exposing 
different opinions as well as asking for more rights emerged in daily discussions 
in the media. New policies on mass media and the new law on press freedom 
enacted during Habibie’s presidency went hand in hand with this freedom of 
expression. K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid’s short presidency was marked by another 
step towards a free press when he abolished the Ministry of Information, an organ 
which censored and banned many newspapers and magazines during the New 
Order.
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This period of transition also provided a momentum for overtly criticizing 
the New Order political machinery in limiting and exploiting women’s 
participation in social and political life. Women were often projected as wives and 
mothers in order to support Indonesian development (Parawansa, 2002:70-71). 
Another female activist, Arivia (1999:5) says that during the New Order women’s 
orientation was to support the physical development of Indonesia. It was never 
directed to develop women’s personal enrichment. In addition, the idea that 
women’s social participation was restricted to the domestic sphere, as part of the 
assertion of asas kekeluargaan (the ‘family principle’) was promoted by the New 
Order and was considered as fundamental to the Indonesian-style of ‘democracy’ 
(Robinson, 1998:205).
When women’s political participation increased they were exploited in 
order to maintain the status quo. As argued by Asmah Sjachruni, former member 
of parliament from Muslimat NU (interview),
The bigger percentage of women in the parliament during the New Order 
was not based on quality rather it was based on power. There were 
agreed proportions how many seats for wives of governors, how many 
percentages for wives of military district commandants in the general 
assembly (MPR). Thus, it has been reached because of the authority’s 
facilities in order to back up the regime.
Ani W. Soetjipto maintains that women’s political recruitment was mainly aimed 
at supporting the profession and position of their husbands (Soetjipto, 
2000:295)". In contrast, in the same period, Muslimat NU offered women a way 
to be politically active in their own right.
11 There were also other motivations such as the prestige of being a parliamentarian and the 
financial rewards. However, from Taju & Dewanto’s book (1997) based on interviews of women 
parliamentarians in the 1992-1997 session, the prestige factor was clearer than other factors. For 
example, a parliamentarian said “Entering the House of Representatives at that moment was 
amazing (weeeh...!). Moreover, when she was elected and really works in the house it is 
marvellous (wuaaah.../) (Taju & Dewanto, 1997:44). A confession of a parliamentarian such as 
“If the salary is not increased, it does not matter. The previous salary, I think, was quite big” (Taju 
& Dewanto, 1997:87) indicates that financial reward was another motivation. Some interviews 
express, further, that corruption opportunities were open by being a parliamentarian such as 
“Before someone was an ordinary businessperson. After being in the House of Representatives the
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Another issue that was rarely discussed during the New Order era is Law 
No. 1/1974 on Marriage and PP 10/1983 (Government Regulation) which made 
polygamy difficult. Debate about polygamy itself is not new, but soon after the 
beginning of the reformasi era it became daily conversation and was no longer 
viewed as a taboo issue (Gatra, 2003). This issue was firstly re-exposed by Puspo 
Wardoyo, a successful restaurant chain owner in Central Java who in 1999 began 
to campaign about the positive sides of polygamy. He himself had practiced 
polygamy since 1990. On the other hand, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, the State 
Minister of Women's Empowerment, asked to review Law No. 1/1974 and PP 
10/1983 which she considered were no longer relevant (Gatra, 2003). She 
furthermore said that PP 45/1990 which is the revised regulation of PP 10/1983 
(but less known) contains gender-biased rules on the ground that the penalty of 
male civil servants who do polygamy is softer than that of female civil servants 
who become the second wives (interview; Gatra, 2003).
Two important issues will be discussed in this chapter, namely the political 
participation of women, particularly the 30 percent quota for women in the 
parliament and the debate around polygamy. These issues relate closely to the new 
political climate of reformasi and also to new negotiations of gender relations 
between Muslimat and NU. These issues were discussed with Muslimat NU 
members that 1 interviewed. In this regard, a general account of the interview 
subjects follows.
General account of the interviewees
During the research, I interviewed eleven women, all prominent members of 
Muslimat NU. The majority are politicians, parliamentarians and a former 
minister. They are -sorted alphabetically by their first name- Aisyah Hamid 
Baidlowi, Anisah Mahfudz, Asmah Sjachruni, Ermalena Mhs, Ida Fauziyah, 
Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Lathifah Hasyim, Ratu Dian Hatifah, Sinta Nuriyah
businessperson wants to become a conglomerate” (Taju & Dewanto, 1997:131). But it is not clear 
whether this practice applies to women parliamentarians.
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Abdurrahman Wahid, Umroh Machfudzoh Tolchah Mansur, Zunatul Mafruchah. 
The following is a general account of those interviewees.
First, all interviewees have been members of one or more of the 
autonomous organisations within NU and had held different positions (see 
Diagram 1). This fact conveys a strong impression that being an activist of an 
organisation is a ‘mandatory’ criterion for becoming a politician. Marwah Daud 
Ibrahim (1997:XVI) made a similar observation about female members of 
parliament in the 1992-1997 session. It indicates also that different organisations 
within NU function to produce political cadres as well as being social 
organisations, although the New Order regime virtually prohibited political 
activities of such organisations. The fall of Soeharto in 1998 increased the demand 
for ‘ready’ people (i.e. selected by members, having held different positions, and 
having had experience in organising people) from such organisations by new 
political parties especially PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National 
Awakening Party) formed by NU’s leaders. In addition, active members of those 
organisations are often well known people within their community, a quality 
which is needed in order to attract mass electoral support.
Second, the majority of interviewees have studied in pesantren (Islamic 
boarding school) or have a degree from IAIN (State Institute for Islamic Studies) 
or have passed through dual education (religious and public education). This 
characteristic influences their behaviour including their political behaviour. The 
case of Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Ida Fauziyah (see their profile in the 
appendix) when they meet their seniors (kyai or nyai, male or female religious 
leader) revealed how deep the pesantren model of education influences their 
behaviour. Khofifah admits that she cannot in practice refuse requests of kyai, 
while Ida always kisses the hand of her senior, a common tradition within 
pesantren.
Third, the majority of interviewees are descendants or relatives of kyai or 
nyai or what Bruinessen (1994:154) refers to as members of the ‘NU elite’ (see 
Diagram 3). Bruinessen describes the ‘NU elite’ as a relatively small group of 
kyai families who manage big pesantren and they are connected to each other by
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marriages or teacher-student relations. Within this elite group, relatives of 
pesantren of Jombang hold dominant roles (1994:154). Although Bruinessen 
discusses NU, a similar pattern emerges in Muslimat NU. Kyai families of 
Jombang are dominant in Muslimat NU’s structure. However, if the case of 
Muslimat is compared to NU, Muslimat NU is much more open. From its first 
establishment, Muslimat NU knows of only five chairpersons within whom only 
one is directly linked to Jombang kyai families (i.e. Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi). 
Moreover, two of those five chairpersons defeated their opponents in an internal 
election, even though the latter were directly linked to the ‘NU elite’. I refer to the 
case of Asmah Sjachruni who defeated Solichah Wahid (daughter of K.H. Bisyri 
Syansuri) and Solechah Saifuddin Zuhri (wife of a former Minister of Religious 
Affairs) in 1979 and to the case of Khofifah Indar Parawansa who defeated 
Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi (daughter of K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim) in 2000.
Fourth, the majority of interviewees are Javanese. In fact Javanese 
(including Maduranese) people are dominant members of Muslimat as well as 
NU. For instance, 42 out of 52 members of parliament (2004-2009 session) from 
PKB, the closest political party to NU, were elected from East Java, Central Java, 
and Yogyakarta. That means about 81 percent of parliamentarians from PKB are 
Javanese. According to Bruinessen (1994:151), the Javanese dominance in NU 
has given rise to some tension between Javanese and non-Javanese members. 
However, such tensions are not evident in Muslimat NU. Even more, non- 
Javanese members sometimes are appreciated because of their cultural 
background. For instance, Khofifah Indar Parawansa appreciates her predecessor 
Asmah Sjachruni who is from South Kalimantan for defending Muslimat’s 
interests vis-ä-vis NU with her flexible ways. Khofifah argues further that Asmah 
Sjachruni “is an NU female figure from outside Java, so that she can freely and 
flexibly confront feudalistic Javanese culture especially that of kyai'’ (2002:144).
The quota system for women’s better representation
At the beginning of the reformasi era women as well as the Indonesian society at 
large expected that political reform would increase essentially and significantly
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their political participation. In December 1998, KPI (Indonesian Women's 
Coalition) organised the Women’s Congress for the specific purposes of 
pressuring gender mainstreaming in politics, preparing a platform for justice and 
democracy, and implementing a joint intent. At the Congress many young 
participants had already voiced for a quota of 30 percent for women’s 
participation (Bianpoen, 2000:292-293). While the civil society has benefited 
from the reform, women on the other hand have suffered a poor result on their 
representation in the 1999 elections. In these elections women gained only 9 
percent of seats in the national parliament (45 members). The number of women 
was, in fact, in decline over four general elections. In 1987 women held 13 
percent of the seats in the national parliament, their numbers decreasing to 12.4 
percent (62 members) in 1992 and 10.8 percent (54 members) in the 1997 general 
elections (see Chart 3) (CETRO, 2001). Compared to neighbouring countries such 
as Malaysia with 10.5 percent (elected 1999), the Philippines 17.8 percent (elected 
2001) and Vietnam with 27.3 percent (elected 2002), Indonesian women were less 
represented (Wijaksana, 2004:93) though Indonesian women were still better 
represented compared to the majority Muslim countries (Robinson, 2004:188).
□ Number of 
female 
members of 
DPR
□ Perecentage 
of female 
members of 
DPR
1992 1997 19991955 1971 1977 1982
Chart 3: Number of female members of DPR from 1955 to 2004 and their percentage 
(source: CETRO [nd. 2001])
The result has made women realise that euphoric sentiments were not 
enough. Laws and regulations which guarantee the increase of women’s political 
participation have to be enacted. One of the strategies is an affirmative action 
policy that should be first embraced by the state. This policy is one of several
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recommendations of the UN Fourth World Conference for Women held in Beijing 
September 1995. Indonesia has participated and endorsed the Beijing 
recommendations (Parawansa, 2001:71). Nevertheless, the everlasting propaganda 
of governments to superimpose the ideal of women as mitra sejajar (equal 
partners) in development with the remained male-biased concepts of women, such 
as women’s kodrat (nature), harkat (dignity) and martabat (status) (Oey- 
Gardiner, 2002:103), impacted on the invisibility of women in the public sphere.
About the year 2000, the State Ministry for Women’s Empowerment 
headed by Khofifah Indar Parawansa, proposed a quota of 30 percent for women 
in the top two echelons of the bureaucracy and in the legislature. The same quota 
was proposed for the recruitment of civil and military leaders (Parawansa, 
2001:76). But the nominal proposed 30 percent was a revised idea as admitted by 
Khofifah (interview) “I was rather conservative by asking only 20 percent at first. 
Soon after, when I considered the reality faced by women I decided to raise it by 
ten per cent for women’s representation in political life”. Furthermore, at a 
workshop organised by CETRO in April 2001, the Ministry reconfirmed its 
support for a quota system which is a necessary strategy to increase the number of 
women in the legislatures. At this workshop an agreement also emerged from 
several organisations including the Indonesian Women’s Political Caucus within 
parliament and women activists that political parties should be lobbied to support 
this system, though there were debates about the percentage and how the quota 
would be applied (Bessell, 2004).
The struggle for a quota system moved then to the national parliament. In 
July 2002, KPPI (Caucus of Indonesian Women Parliamentarians) held a 
workshop seminar to discuss women’s participation in politics. The objective of 
the workshop was to revise three laws on politics (Aminy, 2004:369). However, 
passing laws which mentions the quota for women was hard. Many political 
parties were reluctant to accept the 30 percent quota for women when discussing 
the drafts of law on politics proposed by the government between September 2002 
and February 2003. At first, only PKB and Golkar proposed the quota system for 
women in their DIM (list of important matters) (Kompas, 2002). The obstacles
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mainly came from male members and the government. The failure to enter the 
quota system in Law No. 31/2002 on Political Parties enacted in November 2002 
was followed by more women’s protests and rallies (Parawansa, interview). Lastly 
Law No. 12/2003 on the Election enacted in February 2003 mentions that political 
parties should list 30 percent female candidates for the 2004 general elections.
The idea of affirmative action and quotas within the NU circle
An affirmative action statement was also introduced during NU’s thirtieth 
Congress held in Pesantren Lirboyo, Kediri, East Java, in 1999. Among Masail 
Diniyah al Maudlu iyyah (i.e. thematic discussion on religious problems which is 
regularly held during the NU congress) there was a fatwa supporting affirmative 
action entitled Islam dan Kesetaraan Gender (Islam and gender equality). In this 
fatwa NU was critical with regard to three main areas that isolated women from 
the public domain, namely the theological interpretation, the culture of patriarchy 
and the political discrimination (Sekjen PBNU, 1999:55-56).
The fatwa proposed, therefore, solutions to all three. First, it encouraged 
reviewing some gender-biased theological interpretations by using historical, 
sociological and anthropological approaches to the religious texts. For instance, 
women have the right of public leadership as well as men, thus, the phrase 
qawwamuna ‘alan nisa’ in the Quran (4:34) -yet still interpreted as men being 
leaders upon women- has to be put in terms of domestic relations and cannot be 
used to hinder women’s rights to hold public positions (Sekjen PBNU, 1999:57).
Second, the fatwa promoted critical thinking towards patriarchal cultures 
which are embodied in the religion. It admits that the leadership is no longer a 
matter of private leadership (az-za ’amah asy-syakhsyiyah), that is, that leadership 
in the modern society has changed from someone’s personal charisma such as 
chief of a tribe, to the collective leadership within an institution (nidzam or 
system) (Sekjen PBNU, 1999:58-59).
Third, the fatwa states that political practices which discriminate against 
women must be changed. The democratic system of politics should be
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implemented through the development of five principles such as equality 
(musawah), justice (adalah), freedom (hurriyah), exclusion of the use of 
force/non violence, and capability (al-qudrah) in politics. An affirmative action 
policy should be taken in order to make women more visible and better 
represented in decision-making positions such as in both the House of 
Representatives and the National Assembly (Sekjen PBNU, 2000:60).
In the year 2000, Muslimat NU during its fourteenth Congress in Jakarta 
made a firmer recommendation regarding affirmative action. In article 7 (political 
recommendations), Muslimat NU projected a 30 percent quota for women to be 
established for both Legislative and Executive as an implementation of semangat 
dan jiwa reformasi (spirit and soul of reform) (PP Muslimat NU, 2000b:65). 
Muslimat NU can be considered one of the first organisations to voice the 30 
percent quota.
The quota is actually a new discourse introduced within and by Muslimat 
NU in the period of reform. During the New Order regime, Muslimat NU focused 
on more social and humanity activities rather than on political practices. Since the 
downfall of Soeharto, Muslimat NU has increased its concerns with politics. It 
conducted voters’ education programs together with other female organisations 
within NU (Fatayat NU and IPPNU), on the eve of the 1999 elections (Munir et 
al., 1999; PP Muslimat NU, 2000a:31-32). This political education was in parallel 
with the UN policy to pay more attention to the Indonesian general elections of 
1999 which could be manipulated by the disgruntled elements of the ousted New 
Order regime.
Slowly, the affirmative action and the quota system also become an 
important subject of discourse within PKB. Ida Fauziah, a member of Muslimat 
NU and member of parliament from PKB, said that PKB during its Musyaxvarah 
Luar Biasa (Extraordinary Congress) held in Yogyakarta 2001 recommended 
affirmative action through a quota for women in politics (interview).
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Interviewees’ responses to the quota system
All of the interviewees agreed that more participation of women in politics is 
necessary. Some of the arguments reflect their deep consciousness of this 
necessity. For instance, Ermalena during the interview said,
I believe that if the concept of a balanced percentage regarding the sex is 
not applied the decision taken will be biased since at a certain point the 
ego of women and that of men would appear. There would be an 
unconscious reaction of women’s needs and those of men. What we see 
now is men’s needs because they know what they need. Women’s needs 
are neglected and not adopted in the process of enacting laws.
She gave, furthermore, a simple example which shows the negligence of women’s 
needs.
Women are not involved in how spaces of a house are distributed, 
although the house is a domestic area where women participate more.
Where should the bed rooms be and where should the kitchen be, so that 
women could easily manage the household? This is not even thought 
about.
Some others rely on a more formal argument. Lathifah Hasyim in the 
interview, for instance, said that women’s organisations started to move in the 
aftermath of the Beijing Conference. “The 2000 Muslimat NU congress which 
demanded a 30 percent allocation for women in the legislative and executive 
bodies took the Beijing Conference as reference”.
The debate about better participation of women has been argued by some 
interviewees since the 1950s though in a persuasive way. According to Asmah 
Sjachruni, women were often described as the left wing during the period of the 
‘Old Order’. Based on this perception of women she tried to empower women’s 
role as she said in the interview,
It’s okay that we are the left wing. But for a bird or a plane the left has to 
be the same as the right wing in their power. A bird could not fly with the
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paralysed left wing. So, the right and left wing have to be both powerful.
This response was developed and it should be discussed by Muslimat 
within the NU.
This argument encouraged Asmah Sjachruni to further propose the concept 
of ‘priority arrangement’, as well as a woman being chosen as member of the 
committee which drew up the candidature list. She said,
In a congress we proposed to the NU Party the priority arrangement that 
meant that the first and second candidate should be from the NU and the 
third should be from Muslimat in order to empower the left wing. For 
instance, if we predicted four winning seats here, the first candidate from 
the NU, the second from Muslimat and the third and fourth from the NU 
and the Ansor and so on. We demanded also that at least one woman had 
to become a member of committee which drew up the iist of candidates. I 
was chosen to represent Muslimat of all Kalimantan.
Her idea was accepted by the NU party board of South Kalimantan, and she, thus, 
was selected to be the second candidate behind the provincial chairperson of NU 
South Kalimantan. However, she was then moved to the third position when the 
list arrived in Jakarta. She criticised this change but finally she had to accept the 
NU central board decision (see also Helmy & Ma’shum, 2002:34-35).
Interviewees are also aware that the majority of men are reluctant to accept 
more women to participate in politics. Interviewees often used the religious term 
“tidak ikhlas” (insincerity, do not surrender) to describe men’s attitude toward this 
issue. For instance, Lathifah Hasyim said,
Like today, we have a chance to put our candidate from Muslimat for 
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (i.e. Regional Representative Council) 
without passing by political parties. Although NU has already had men in 
politics [as MPs], many of NU’s members still want to put forward their 
candidature. They were not really sincere (ikhlas) in giving up to 
Muslimat.
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Asmah Sjachruni, another interviewee, expressed a similar experience. 
“That is the reality. Men do not sincerely accept the gender equality”. Along with 
the term “tidak ikhlas” a softer expression “tidak tega” (do not have the nerve) 
was also used. Aisyah Baidlowi, for instance, said “Men do not have the nerve to 
allow women to participate in politics”. Meanwhile some interviewees expressed 
themselves in a more frank way. Ratu Dian Hatifah said “It is hard to pass through 
those barriers even though we have struggled, men as a group do not appreciate 
(tidak welcome)”. Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid stated that “In fact, we can 
satisfy that requirement, providing 30 percent of candidates with acceptable 
quality. However, men still wedge (mengganjal) women”.
Although all interviewees agreed about the importance of more women’s 
participation in politics and they are aware of men’s unwillingness to concede, 
they are slightly divided vis-ä-vis the quota policy. The majority supported this 
policy and some others reserved their judgement. Supporters of the quota policy 
argue that without any political pressure, men tend to persist in their attitude. For 
instance, Ratu Dian Hatifah said, “Without any pressure from the law men think 
that we are just playing. Under the pressure of law we are serious, men are serious 
and the government is also serious [to apply the quota]”. The embarrassment also 
plays an important role in pressuring men. Khofifah Indar Parawansa said, “They 
will feel shame if they are perceived as gender insensitive. This feeling makes a 
big influence”. In addition, she said that the implementation of a quota policy has 
to be maintained until there is no more doubt that women’s political participation 
is assured.
Anisah Mahfudz, another supporter of the quota policy, bases her 
argument on two reasons. The first is related to the idea of democracy. She said, 
“The democratic system is based on representativeness. You know that half of the 
worldwide citizens are women, so their representatives have to meet their 
percentage”. The second is related to power. She said, “Many women’s problems 
are not accommodated by policy makers such as violence against women, gender 
inequalities, etc ... because few women hold decision-making positions. However, 
if a female in a decision-making position is powerful she can influence the floor”.
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Anisah Mahfudz further admits that men who are gender sensitive can 
accommodate the second reason. However, women representatives have to reach 
first the critical percentage, so they can always remind policy makers to pay 
attention to women’s issues.
Umroh Machfudzoh also argues on the power reason. Since all heads of 
political parties are men, as she said, “Many times we see that women’s political 
participation depends on the leaders. This has to change”. She further agues that 
women’s participation in the political domain is part of their religious duties. She 
said, “My argument is Wal mu'minima wal m u’ minat ba'dluhum auliyau ba'dlin. 
Ya’muruna bil m a’rufwa yanhauna ‘anil m unkaf ’. This quotation is part of a 
verse in the Quran (9:71) meaning “Faithful men and faithful women, part of 
them, are guide to each other. They order what is just and forbid what is evil”. 
Based on this verse Umroh Machfudzoh concludes that part of Muslim men as 
well as Muslim women have the same responsibility and that is to find out what 
are munkar (evil doings) in the society in order to forbid them and what are 
m a’ruf (just doings) in order to command them. All aspects of life in this world, in 
fact, may contain just and evil. Therefore, women have to participate in all aspects 
of life as well as men. Women deserve demanding the quota policy to be 
implemented, even as she said, “the percentage should be increased”, if the system 
hinders women to fulfil this religious duty.
Khofifah Indar Parawansa argues that women have to be supported by the 
quota system since women carry a big burden at home which obstructs them from 
greater access, financial support, and making networks. In the interview she gave 
an example,
If they (i.e. women) have a baby and do not possess a car, without a 
driver, a maid at home, how can they make networks? The same thing 
may happen to men, but they still can attend a seminar until 5 pm. At 
home all have been prepared foods, children have already taken shower.
This big burden obstructs women if they want to develop outside access, 
communicate with constituents, etc.
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The small percentage which is traditionally ‘reserved’ for women in 
politics makes the competition between women themselves unfairly done. Ratu 
Dian Hatifah based on her experience, for instance, commented, “Women 
politicians are more unkind” than men. Furthermore, she compared between 
women’s behaviour and men’s behaviour in politics. According to her, men tend 
to pardon more easily than women do. A conflict with another member of PKB, 
her previous party, made her decide to move with the assistance of her brother to 
Golkar. To avoid a similar experience she chose research and development 
division within Golkar where women are less. Khofifah Indar Parawansa also 
underlined the problem, “Competition between candidates especially women is 
not well since that part of the “cake” which is distributed is small” (Kompas, 
2003).
During the interviews, some interviewees told about their experience in 
passing the Law mentioning the quota. Ida Fauziyah told about the internal 
process within PKB,
There was not any quota in the government’s draft. At that time, I made a 
sounding on my colleagues in the party and made approaches to them 
about the issue ... In fact, the quota is a mandate of the Party 
implementing a recommendation of the extraordinary congress. But, if no 
one keeps an on it, it can disappear. Usually, one who keeps an eye on 
such recommendation can decide in plenty on it. So, I typed the DIM by 
myself. Then, I brought it to my colleagues. “How many percentages do 
you put? 15?” asked a colleague. “No, at least 20 percent, but the critical 
point is 30 percent”. I proposed the minimum since many NGOs and 
CETRO said that 20 percent is already good. We can correct that at the 
following elections.
She went on to say that many of her male colleagues were critical about the 
percentage. They were not sure that PKB could provide enough qualified women 
to be selected. As the general chairperson of PPKB (women’s wing of PKB) she 
insisted that there are enough qualified women. Though she was not chosen as a 
member of pansus (special committee) for discussing Laws on Politics, she
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maintained that the issue of quota could pass -at the party level- because when 
the DIM has already been internally agreed upon it becomes the party policy 
which every member has to defend.
Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi on the other hand reported how the quota system 
was defended in the parliament’s discussions. She said,
In discussions about the affirmative action we always took as reference 
the United Nations’ convention on the abolition of all discriminations 
against women, the origin of the affirmative action idea. We emphasized 
this convention to bapak-bapak (men). If we only argued that there is a 
different starting point between men and women in political participation 
they would not accept. However, when we talked about the world and 
our global interests they started to accept.
Some other interviewees who make reserve about the quota system argue 
that it can negatively impact on the quality of women’s selection. Asmah 
Sjachruni said,
The importance is not just to fulfil the 30 percent quota, but to really 
reach gender equality. Do you think with the current situation, 
candidature filled with intrigues, particularly with money, we can recruit 
qualified women? I am afraid that only wealthy women are selected and 
get winning seats.
Ermalena also expressed her fear of the negative impacts of the quota system 
though she believes in the importance of affirmative action.
The state should systematically prepare political spaces for women.
Women have to be facilitated. But this does not happen, so what is the 
solution? Setting a quota system. Thus, the responsibility of the state 
comes next. I think it should be otherwise. The state must understand that 
women’s participation is worthy for national development. The quota is a 
forced measure, a final alternative. As such, it produces dilemma. If we 
research on women joining political parties, we will find their 
configuration. Like this and that (i.e. not a happy one).
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Zunatul Mafruchah does not agree with the principle of quota which places 
an artificial limit on women’s political participation and their capacity. According 
to her, women have to be represented equally and the mentioned percentage 
carries with it, though without negative intention, an unfair portion of women’s 
participation. People may be used to that and think that women’s capacity in 
politics is limited at that percentage. In addition, men will have another argument 
to trivialise women if they cannot fulfil the percentage, though this is not their 
fault. According to her, there are a lot of social as well as legal problems faced by 
women which obstruct their participation. She prefers that people work first to 
eliminate regulations which are discriminative toward women before setting the 
quota. She further maintains that in a fair competition, some women’s qualities 
such as their ability in negotiation are good capitals for the political contest.
Discourse on polygamy
The discourse around polygamy became once again a popular one since 1999 at 
the beginning of the reform period. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
discourse around polygamy was introduced by a successful restaurant chain owner 
Puspo Wardoyo who has four wives. He claimed that polygamy is good and it 
does not contravene Islamic teachings. In order to promote polygamy he further 
founded a family consultant office called BKKSP (Keluarga Sakinah dan 
Poligami or harmonious family and polygamy) located in a special room of a five 
star hotel in Surakarta, Central Java. According his office there were more than 
100 women on a list of widows and young women who were ready to be married 
as the second, third or fourth wives (Gatra, 2003). Moreover he introduced names 
for his restaurant menus using words associated with polygamy such as polygamy 
juice which contains four tropical fruits.
The Persis’ (United Islam) statement demanding the government to 
withdraw the Government Regulation No. 10 of 1983 (PP 10/1983) revived the 
discussion. (Nurohmah, 2004:32). The PP 10/1983, in fact, regulated male public 
servants when thinking about taking a second wife. They have to fulfill 
complicated procedures including permission from the first wife. According to
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Muslimat, a demand to review PP 10/1983 was also stated by NU during its 
thirtieth congress held in Kediri, East Java, in 1999 (Thohir, [nd. 2001 ]:66). The 
misunderstood positive response from Khofifah Indar Parawansa, the Minister for 
Women’s Empowerment at that time, to review some regulations related to 
marriage was strongly resented among women (Nurohmah, 2004:32). In fact, 
Khofifah (interview) was positive about reviewing these regulations especially the 
Government Regulation No. 45 of 1990 (PP 45/1990) which was discriminative 
against women. For instance, a male public servant who does not fulfill conditions 
for taking a second wife will be sanctioned. On the other hand a female public 
servant who accepts being the second wife will be fired. During the interview 
Khofifah said that while she was the State Minister she had to face this problem 
when she was asked to sign a decree firing a female public servant because of this 
issue. This experience raised her concern about the discriminative aspects of PP 
45/1990.
The debates on polygamy heated up from 2001 during Megawati’s 
presidency since her Vice President Hamzah Haz has more than one wife. Even 
worse Hamzah Haz took his third wife in 2002 while the Vice President (Gatra, 
2003). An award called “Polygamy Award” sponsored by Puspo Wardoyo mid 
2003 ceremonied in a five-star hotel kept the controversy alive. Puspo Wardoyo 
handed out trophies to several winners. The Vice President Hamzah Haz was one 
of the nominated winners. However he did not attend the party (Mapes, 2003).
The issue of polygamy attracted more pros and contras among Indonesian 
Muslims. Puspo Wardoyo, for instance, often cited a Quranic verse mentioning 
the permission for Muslim men to marry more than one wife. He went on to say 
that Muslim men should live according to true Islamic teachings by taking at least 
a second wife, and preferably four as he has (Mapes, 2003). This use of Quranic 
verses by Puspo Wardoyo to justify his attitude created more reactions from 
Muslim women’s organisations. For example, Maria Ulfah Anshor, the head of 
Fatayat NU said that the attitude of Puspo to use Islamic symbols could be 
categorized as undermining the women’s movement and must be criticised 
(Mapes, 2003). In a different way, Muslimat NU also reacted to the polygamy
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issue by starting a serial of Bahtsul Masail (discussion of problems) held between 
November 2000 and April 2001 (Thohir, [nd. 2001]: 15).
Yet, discussions about polygamy were not a new issue in Indonesia. 
Discourses surrounding polygamy were debated at least a hundred years ago 
dating back to R.A. Kartini’s era. Through her letters written in Dutch addressed 
to her pen friend Stella Zeehandelaar and later published in Door Duisternis Tot 
Licht (Through Darkness to Light) she often criticized Javanese cultures that did 
not give more opportunities for women to participate in public life. One of her 
displeasures was the Javanese male attitude of polygamy. She further said,
The public must not know what we are really fighting -  the name of the 
enemy against which we take the field must never, never be cried aloud -  
it is polygamy. If that word were heard no man would trust his child to 
us. I have struggled against this, for it is as though we began our work 
with a lie. (Zainu’ddin, 1980:10)
Through the Javanese tradition, which was eventually called as adat, 
polygamy was practiced by the society. Vreede-de Stuers (1959:39) states,
Adat allows polygamy. These are several rules, some of them very strict, 
to regulate this institution, and in order to take a second wife, the 
husband has to submit to these rules. It often happens that he has to 
inform his first wife and even ask her permission. The Muslim 
prescription of limited polygamy, which commands the husband to be 
just to his wives, has been reinforced by adat.
Marlita and Poerwandari (2000:84) also argue on the importance of religious 
teachings’ interpretation to legitimise cultural practices of polygamy.
However, the Indonesian adat was rarely used as an important source to 
analyse the rooted polygamy practice which occured in the society. Islam which is 
embraced by the majority of Indonesian people was more commonly used in the 
debate about this practice. It partly explained also why tensions sometimes 
occurred between Muslim organisations and nationalists when holding a discourse 
on the subject. For instance, during the first congress of Indonesian women in
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1928, Aisyiyah, one of the Islamic movements, was in disagreement with other 
women’s organisations which opposed polygamy. Aisyiyah argued that polygamy 
was an institution allowed and tolerated by the Quran (Vreede-de Stuers, 
1960:104). In 1931 there was a demonstration organized by Sarekat Istri Jakarta 
against the decision announced by the All-Women’s Conference (where an 
Indonesian radical organisation, Isteri Sedar, took part) in Lahore which had 
declared itself to be opposed to polygamy (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960:91). In 1952, 
the protest posed by mostly women’s organisations minus Muslim women 
organisations such as Muslimat NU against PP 19/1952 which guaranteed more 
pensions for civil servants who did polygamy (Radjab, 2004:78). 1974 marked the 
end of the debates on polygamy through the marriage bill released by the New 
Order government. Even though as Marlita and Poerwandari stated, “this 
legislation does not eliminate the practice of polygamy” (2000:104).
In the period of reform, the polygamy issue took a new form of debate.
The discourse was initially exposed by males who had been, according to 
Blackburn (as cited in White, 2004:274), ‘the main defenders’ in the pre-war 
period. Men showed the benefit of doing polygamy and took some actions 
towards its promotion. On the other hand, Muslim women, who had often been 
uncritical, began to criticise polygamy and urged the reinterpretation of Islamic 
texts in favour of Muslim women’s rights.
Muslimat NU’s fatwa on polygamy
Muslimat NU, which in 1952 stood for defending polygamy based on the Quran, 
started to view polygamy as a marriage form that should not be practiced by 
males. Muslimat NU held two seminars, in November 2000 and in April 2001, 
concerning current issues on marriage such as polygamy, marriage of a couple 
having different faiths, abortion and pornography. The seminars were followed by 
bahtsul masail and a fatwa related to polygamy and divorce (Thohir, [nd.
2001]:61-65). Through this fatwa, Muslimat NU stated that the principle of 
marriage in Islam is monogamous. Islam allows polygamy as only a pintu darurat 
(emergency door) based on the Quran (4:3) and (4:129) (Thohir, [nd. 2001 ]:61).
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The verse (4:3) is the main reason behind people’s subjection about Islamic 
permission to men to take more than one wife. The verse (4:3) means,
And if you fear that you cannot do justice to orphans, marry such women 
as seem good to you, two, or three, or four; but if you fear you will not 
do justice, then (marry) only one or that which your right hands possess.
This is more proper that you may not do injustice.
However, the other verse (4:129) states,
And you cannot do justice between wives, even though you wish (it), but 
be not disinclined (from one) with total disinclination, so that you leave 
her in in suspense. And if you are reconciled and keep your duty, surely 
Allah is ever Forgiving, the Merciful”
By combining both verses, Muslimat NU argued that the ideal form of marriage in 
Islam is monogamy. The verse (4:129) emphasizes on the certainty of the males 
difficulty to do justice even if they desire to do it, whereas the important 
requirement to take more than one wife is to do justice first (4:3). As stated by 
Engineer, the verse (4:129) orders male to refrain from taking more wives than 
one (1992:103).
Muslimat NU further recommended to the NU board to reconsider NU’s 
decision made at its Congress in Lirboyo, East Java, 1999 about the call for the 
withdrawal of PP 10/1983 since this government regulation was still relevant 
especially for gender protection from the view of legal justice. Moreover, 
Muslimat NU recommended to the government to review some articles in the 
Marriage Law including the phrase ada atau tidaknya (with or without) an 
agreement from his wife in the article 41 b. Muslimat NU proposed “harus ada 
persetujuan isteri” (there must be an agreement from his wife) in its place 
(Thohir, [nd. 2001 ]:66).
However, this Muslimat NU’s reinterpretation of Islamic teachings 
concerning polygamy did not reflect all members of Muslimat NU. Many of them
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exposed their ambiguous position towards this issue as I explain in the following 
section.
Interviewees’ response to the polygamy issue
Although there was not one interviewee who argued that polygamy has to be 
totally prohibited, views ranged from defending the Quranic interpretation 
permitting such practice to regarding it as an abuse of the Islamic teachings. 
Therefore, some women advocated the abandonment of polygamy whereas some 
others preferred to abstain. However, all the interviewees agreed that personally 
they do not want to become victims of polygamy. For instance, Khofifah Indar 
Parawansa said,
Praise to Allah, none of Muslimat NU board members whether they are 
at national level or at regional level is dipoligami (a victim of polygamy), 
even board members who are wives of traditional kyai. Take for example, 
the wife of Kyai Muhaiminan, she is not a victim of polygamy.
Similarly, Lathifah Hasyim said, “I just follow what the religion says...in 
principle, I do not want to know about that [polygamy], no one of my family does 
that”. A clear statement was said by Ratu Dian Hatifah, “Within NU, the 
discourse on polygamy is a common one ...as long as it does not happen to me. It 
is unfortunate that sometimes I have to take someone’s example for explaining 
about the polygamy marriage”.
The fact that the polygamous marriage is common among traditional 
Muslims is admitted by other interviewees. Umroh Machfudzoh said, “I think 
many of our people [within NU] do polygamy”. Meanwhile, Anisah Mahfudz 
emphasized that the classical texts are the reason behind why many kyai practice 
polygamy. She said, “I think that the educational process passed by ulama was 
based on those kitab kuning which sometimes promise the repayment in the 
hereafter such as...paradise. That is why some women and men support the 
practice of polygamy”.
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The majority of interviewees agreed that they could not challenge the 
traditionalist interpretation that the Quran permits polygamy. However, they did 
not think that polygamy is neither optional nor prohibited. Aisyah Hamid 
Baidlowi, for instance, commented on the abuse of the verse on polygamy:
Indeed, the Quran permits men to take two, three or four wives. I could 
not reject this verse, otherwise I will be in disagreement with the 
principle of the religion. However, they [males] often cut the verse in the 
middle and do not continue to the end. They use this verse as a 
justification to marry more than one [wife].
Ida Fauziyah exposed, for instance, a group which promotes polygamy. “It is a 
difficult issue ... There are writings from Hizbut Tahrir (Freedom Party) 
explaining that polygamy is a solution for many women’s problems. I do not 
agree with their point of view”. Although Zunatul Mafruchah personally disagreed 
with polygamy, she acknowledged that Islam and adat permit polygamous 
marriage.
Polygamy is permitted both in religion and adat (culture) and the society 
does not think too much about this issue. The important thing now is how 
to respect the feeling of those women. In Islam, there is the feeling of 
justice, the feeling of comfort and hindering the annoyance... From a 100 
percent people who do polygamy, I believe only one percent who can do 
what the religion commands to do. I personally disagree with polygamy, 
even though a wife accepts.
Ermalena also expressed her discomfort with polygamy but in an ambiguous way,
Maybe I am not a person who really disagrees with polygamy. I see that 
men are rational...as long as he can do justice, if he cannot do that, we 
have to fight him, because it is the main source of violence. Do not do 
that if you cannot do justice.
The discourse on polygamy is heavily dominated by the interviewees’ 
questioning about how far men can fulfill the conditions of polygamy, particularly 
the justice. Ida, for instance, measured the justice by the state of family in
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polygamous marriage. If all members of the family, including their children, live 
in harmony so, it can be said that justice is done. Another interviewee, Umroh 
Machfudzoh, proposed a specific term for a man fulfilling the conditions. “Unless 
there is a mukhlis (a very sincere person to Allah) who behaves really just as the 
Quran commands, he can do the polygamy. However, so far, I have rarely found 
someone who is like that”.
It is true that the majority of interviewees have a rather ambivalent 
position towards polygamy, since the Quran permits and many of kyai practice 
polygamous marriage. However, there were two interviewees, one defended the 
permission of polygamy based on the Quran and another firmly rejected the 
practice of polygamy based on the reinterpretation of the same source. The first 
was maintained by Asmah Sjachruni and the second by Sinta Nuriyah 
Abdurrahman Wahid. Asmah said,
Polygamy is permitted in our religion. We will never state that polygamy 
is haram (prohibited). Not like some of the new generation of NU ... 
who say that polygamy is haram. I am a Muslim. I cannot refuse 
anything that is determined by the religion. My principle is 'what is halal 
(permitted) is halal, and what is haram is haram’.
Another tone is expressed by Sinta Nuriyah. She said,
In the Quran, there are two words which mean justice, those are 
‘qasatha’ and ‘adala. Qasatha is used for justice concerning material 
condition, while ‘adala is used for justice concerned with the emotions 
(,immaterial) such as caring and love. Can men fulfill those requirements?
The answer is no. Walan tastathi‘u an ta‘dilu baynan nisa’i walau 
harashtum (Then you will never be able to be fair and just between 
women, even if it is your ardent desire) (The Quran, 4:129). That 
implicitly means the marriage in Islam is monogamous, not polygamous 
... If there is a politician who does polygamy, he breaks the Islamic 
teachings and he must be sacked, not be chosen because he does not do a 
good deed.
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Sinta Nuriyah’s refusal of the polygamous marriage was expressed again 
when she attended the 2004 Congress of NU in Surakarta. The Congress 
committees allowed Puspo Wardoyo, the primary supporter of polygamy, to open 
his food stall with cheap price during the Congress. Sinta Nuriyah expressed her 
disagreement by opening a rival food stall and organising a rally to reject Puspo’s 
foods. She further said that allowing a polygamous restaurant chain owner to 
serve foods in such an important congress is a disregard towards the status and the 
dignity of women (Tempo Interaktif, 2004).
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Illustration 5: Cover of the module for women’s voter education, 1999
(Are women independent in their political choice?)
MODUL
PEL ATI HAN RELAWAN 
PENDIDIKAN PEMIL1H BAGI PEREMPUAN
MUSLIM AT NU - FATA VAT NU - I PPM! 
Bekerjasama
UNITED NATION DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
(U N D P)
Source: (Munir et ah, 1999)
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Chapter six: Muslimat NU’s strategies in negotiating 
gender relations
Different strategies of Muslimat NU
In this chapter I analyse the way in which Muslimat NU has negotiated gender 
relations with NU. Investigating the activities of Muslimat NU from different 
historical eras and political contexts, I found that Muslimat NU used varied 
strategies when negotiating with its parent organisation, NU. I mention four 
strategies: persuasion, bargaining, the ‘patriarchal bargain’, and pressure. I also 
noted that external political factors played an important role in the conduct and 
process of negotiations.
Although those strategies can be described independently, in fact, 
strategies may overlap one another. Furthermore, Muslimat NU may use several 
strategies in different negotiations during the same historical and political context.
The persuading strategy
This strategy involves women in Muslimat NU making efforts to persuade men 
(i.e. NU) about the importance of their involvement in gaining interests for both 
parties. The persuading strategy is often used when women are in a weak position 
for negotiating gender relations, although not exclusively. Women may still use 
this strategy while in a strong position of negotiating gender relations in order to 
further strengthen their position. In this regard, Asmah Sjachruni’s view is 
interesting.
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Within NU, we should not oppose (musuhi) them [men]. But we should 
present our ideas, which we hold strongly. We [women in the 1950s] 
were perceived as the left wing. Thus, we should persuade them 
(membangun pengertian) that the left wing has to be equal to the right 
wing.
This strategy was used by women of NU in negotiating gender relations 
such as in the case of women’s insistence to be accepted as active members prior 
to the establishment of a women’s section within NU in 1946 (see chapter two). 
They based their persuasive argument on the ground that their contributions were 
beneficial for the interest of ahlus sunnah wal jama ah followers (Muslim 
traditionalists) at large. For instance, during the 1938 Congress of NU in Menes, 
Banten, Nyi R. Djuaisih, made a speech that set out this position.
She explained in detail the principles and the aims of Nahdlatul Ulama. 
Nahdlatul Ulama is an organisation which focuses on the education of the 
Muslim community about all aspects of Islam. In Islam, not only men 
have to be educated about religious teachings; women, as their spouses, 
have to be (wajib) educated as well. This will bring them towards the 
salvation in this world and the hereafter. “I, on behalf of Muslim women 
(Muslimaat) of Bandung welcome this Congress in Menes. I hope that all 
decisions taken here will advance all Muslim women” (Dachlan A,
1955:32).
Nyi R. Djuaisih in her speech persuaded the men of Nahdlatul Ulama of the 
importance of women being educated in their religion because educated women 
will help all family members (men and women alike) to gain salvation. The 
argument that women -and especially spouses- need to be educated has the 
further implication that women should be involved in the public sphere, such as 
being active members of NU, an issue which had not been accepted by NU up 
until that moment.
Solechah Saifuddin Zuhri (1979:41) in her history of Muslimat NU 
addresses this issue.
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Movements of women emerged from several points, impacted on Muslim 
women in Indonesia as well, particularly Muslim women of ahlus sunnah 
wal jama ah (traditional Islam). It is hard to imagine the strategies those 
women who loved NU used in order to persuade (meyakinkan) different 
parties in this organisation to offer Muslimat a chance to play a role 
within the organisation.
These comments indicate that women of NU persuasively negotiated better 
relations on the basis of the argument that interests of men and women would 
benefit from the result of negotiation (e.g. traditional Islam would be defended 
and would flourish). The emergence of women’s organisations such as Aisyiyah 
founded in 1917 and affiliated to the reformist organisation, Muhammadiyah, is 
an external factor which was significant for the process of negotiation between 
women of NU and NU during the 1930s.
On the other hand, at that time NU considered that women’s participation 
was still unnecessary because it was perceived that women’s appropriate place 
was their home as the kitab kuning suggest and that men’s efforts were enough to 
defend the interest of ahlus sunnah wal jam a’ah. In addition, the fact that 
Indonesia was under the Dutch administration made kyai of NU fear that the 
administration would also apply some restrictive regulations such as BVV (see 
chapter two) to women if they were involved in an organisation. It is also 
important to note that many leaders of Muslimat NU were (and continue to be) 
family members and relatives of kyai (see Diagram 3).
All those reasons contributed to NU’s refusal of female members. NU 
stated that women’s participation in the organisation would pose more problems 
(,mudharat) than bring benefit (manfa’at) (see chapter two). In its refusal, NU 
followed a principle of fiqh  (Islamic jurisprudence) stating “dar’ul mafasid aula 
min (muqaddamun ’ala) jalbi al-mashaU^. This principle means that if there is 
both danger and benefit in doing something, a traditional Muslim should prioritise 
avoiding the danger rather than pursuing the benefit (Daman, 2004:91). The 
benefit in this case is the defence and the spread of the concepts of ahlus sunnah 
wal jama ’ah among women while the danger was women being suspected by the
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Dutch administration. NU preferred, thus, avoiding the danger by prohibiting 
women from being active in the organisation.
The process of negotiating gender relations between women of NU and the 
wider organisation by persuasion continued during the 1930s until some male 
leaders endorsed the idea that women’s involvement in the organisation was 
important. Women’s participation by attending in mass in the 1938 Congress of 
NU was a new step towards better relations. During this meeting two opposite 
views from men were presented: first, the supportive view of K.H. Wahab 
Chasbullah, a principal founder of NU, as follows (as cited in Dachlan A, 
1955:31).
Within the Muslim community, it is not only men (kaum bapa) who have 
the obligation to learn and practice the religion as their duty towards the 
God, but women (kaum ibii) also have to follow men in this regard. Both 
men and women have to practice together what Islam teaches to them.
Second, the unsupportive view of K.H. Abdurrahman Menes, a local kyai, as 
follows (as cited by Dachlan A, 1955:31).
In fact, wives have to follow all orders from their husbands. If they 
disregard orders and advice from their husbands, it means that they 
disobey God. Such wives will feel the lure of hell which is very hot.
However, K.H. Abdurrahman Menes also acknowledged the importance of 
understanding the principles and the aims of NU for the female audience (i.e. the 
interest of both parties).
The bargaining strategy
Using the bargaining strategy, women (i.e. Muslimat NU) bargain with men (i.e. 
NU) about more equal gender relations. The bargaining strategy is used when 
women are relatively equal in power -though it may only be momentary- vis-a- 
vis men when negotiating gender relations because women have, for example, a 
certain quality or a position that already serves ‘men’s interests’. The failure of
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such negotiation might have the consequence that women will use their relatively 
equal power to do what they think will consolidate equal gender relations without 
the consent of men.
The case of Umroh Machfudzoh while negotiating her participation in 
politics with her husband shows the use of this strategy. Umroh said during the 
interview,
When I finished my study at the state institute of Islamic studies, I 
wanted to apply for a position as public servant in the religious court. My 
husband did not agree. “No, no, why do women enter the religious 
court?” I replied, “So, why did I continue my study? What for?” I went 
on to say, “Okay, if you disagree that I apply to be a public servant in the 
religious court, I will be active in politics”. My husband then said,
“That’s fine, if you want to be active in politics I welcome it. You can 
guide religious meetings”. Thus, I felt resolute in my decision to become 
involved in politics.
Umroh Machfudzoh had six children when she attended tertiary education with 
the permission of her husband. She had to bear burdens while continuing her 
study. This quality (i.e. having the tertiary degree, bearing burdens during the 
study, being permitted by the husband or even supported) made Umroh possess 
relatively ‘equal’ power to her husband. She further bargained for his permission 
to apply for the job in the religious court. The refusal of her husband added 
another push for her power. She, then, bargained for participation in politics. In 
this case, the bargain ended with her husban’s acceptance that she could become 
involved in politics.
The bargaining strategy is called by Handayani and Novianto (2004:144) 
the strategy of devotion (pengabdian). These authors studied the power of 
Javanese women through their cultural values. They argued that Javanese women 
have the persistence to bear burdens in order to gain the authority. They went on 
to say,
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The importance issue is how women’s needs can be fulfilled without 
jeopardising the harmony because they drive out their cultural values.
Therefore, carrying, serving and total devotion to their husbands can be 
understood as women’s strategy to posses authority and receive what 
they expect.
This strategy also means memangku (to hold a person on your lap) or mengambil 
hati (to win someone’s heart). Javanese people believe that someone will obey 
another if his or her heart is won. This is symbolised by the Javanese ‘letter’ (a 
letter corresponds to a syllable) which becomes ‘silent’ (mati), a consonant, when 
the letter is held on by a symbol which corresponds to the act of sitting down 
(Handayani & Novianto, 2004:144). Since the majority of NU women are 
Javanese (see chapter five) they are likely to use this ‘Javanese’ strategy in their 
negotiations with NU.
The bargaining strategy was effectively used by women of NU when they 
negotiated their relation with NU after the proclamation of Indonesian 
independence. NU released its fatwci in 1945 known as resolusi jihad (holy war 
resolution) urging men and women to bear arms in the name of Allah for fighting 
against the Dutch administration (see chapter two). Following this fatwa, NU 
women’s involvement in the public sphere was very significant. Women helped 
men in providing food, information (doing liaison), and some women even 
became active soldiers. These activities of women of NU were opportunities to 
access relatively ‘equal’ power to that of men. They showed the quality of women 
(e.g. they could organise) and at the same time served ‘men’s interests’ (e.g. they 
assisted men in the struggle). That women could gain equal power because of the 
war is also maintained by Vreede-de Stuers (1960:163).
The next step is clear. Women of NU used their involvement during the 
war as evidence of their capability to play a role in the public sphere and their 
devotion to interests articulated by men. They negotiated active participation in 
NU as part of better relations. Their bargain was that if NU did not agree that 
women could be active members and could organise themselves within NU, they 
would join other women’s organisations. Because they were aware that “to
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improve their situations women have to organise themselves in organisations 
where women can express what is in their heart. They can work and do activities 
together to achieve the improvement” (Dachlan A, 1955:28-29). In this regard, I 
have mentioned the attitude of prudence showed by K.H.M. Dachlan (see chapter 
two), a former general chairperson of NU, which indicated his fear that women of 
NU could join other organisations or other political parties if their demand was 
not accommodated by NU and consequently, NU would lose part of its interests 
(e.g. loss of women’s support for spreading the traditional concepts of Islam).
NU finally decided to accept them in a section called Nahdlatul Ulama 
Muslimat in 1946. The decision of NU was likely based on another principle of 
fiqh stating idza ta’aradla mafsadatani ra’iya a ’dhamuha dliraran bi al-irtikabi 
akhajfihima. This principle means that if there are two negative impacts, a 
traditional Muslim has to consider the less dangerous of the two (Daman,
2004:91). According to K.H.M. Dachlan (1955:10), male delegates during the 
1946 Congress of NU still opposed to the creation of a section for women. 
However, Dachlan could convince them by his explanation and with support from 
K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari and K.H. Wahab Chasbullah (see chapter two). If this new 
decision of NU is compared to its previous stance, it can be said that the view that 
the involvement of women in the organisation posed more problems than benefits 
was still held. However, the new development (i.e. the war and its consequences) 
signalled new threats (e.g. women of NU disobeying their husbands by joining 
non-NU organisations, loss of NU men’s interests). If both dangers were 
compared, accepting women within NU would be less dangerous, and that was the 
decision.
The bargaining strategy which occurred in the above case also depended 
on external political factors. The end of Japanese occupation and the war against 
the Dutch administration in order to defend the independence of Indonesia 
impacted on the changing political situation in Indonesia. The negotiation for 
better relations between NU and women of NU which follows this new political 
situation was successful, partly because of this new political context and partly 
because some influential ulama changed their view based on the new development
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and others based on the new paradigm in gender relations (i.e. I refer to the case 
of K.H. Wahab Chasbullah who supported women’s membership even before the 
war occurred).
The same strategy was used after the changing of the status of Muslimat 
from a women’s section into an autonomous body. In 1952, NU granted Nahdlatul 
Ulama Muslimat a more independent status following the withdrawal of NU from 
the Masjumi Party. In order to mark this event Nahdlatul Ulama Muslimat 
changed its name to Muslimat NU. As a consequence of its withdrawal from 
Masjumi, NU changed its nature from a socioreligious organisation to a political 
party (see chapter three). As such NU needed mass electoral support especially to 
participate in the 1955 elections. The changing status of Muslimat NU was meant 
to support NU’s new orientation. Muslimat NU was needed to politically support 
NU and this strengthened its power for negotiating better gender relations. In this 
regard Muslimat NU made two important demands during the 1954 Congress, 
namely women holding positions in the religious court and women being selected 
as candidates in the 1955 elections. The 1954 Congress delivered a decision 
saying that women were permitted to be ‘members’ of the religious court. 
Furthermore, a fatwa was delivered in 1957 permitting women to become MPs 
(see chapter three). Five women of Muslimat NU were elected as members of the 
Legislative Council in the 1955 elections. In this case, the external political factor 
(i.e. the withdrawal of NU from Masjumi and the 1955 elections) contributed to 
the reinterpretation of religious texts and the bargaining strategy resulted in better 
gender relations.
The ‘patriarchal bargain’ strategy
This strategy refers to a situation in which women achive some gains for 
themselves without challenging the norms that support male power. Kandiyoti (as 
cited in Waylen, 1996:18) says, “Different systems may represent different kinds 
of “patriarchal bargain” for women with different rules of the game and differing 
strategies for maximising security and optimising their life options”. She further 
maintains that the ‘patriarchal bargain’ can explain the reason why women
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sometimes act in ways which are in conflict with their long-term interests. Women 
pay the price of a ‘patriarchal bargain’ but they get the protection in return. This 
bargain is likely to occur if other alternatives for women’s empowerment are 
absent (as cited in Waylen, 1996:18).
The ‘patriarchal bargain’ strategy was used by Muslimat NU during the 
critical period under the New Order regime within effectively restricted women 
activities in the public spere, using the alleged atrocities commited by Gerwani in 
1965 as the justification (see chapter four). The imposition of the New Order 
ideology confining the role of women in the domestic sphere resulted in a fear of 
voicing demands for gender equality. Furthermore, Muslimat NU feared the 
regime because of its association with NU, which was considered as an opposition 
party (see chapter four). With regard to this political pressure, Muslimat followed 
the government initiative to establish a family planning program. This can be seen 
as using the ‘patriarchal bargain’. By organising such activities Muslimat NU 
expected that they would be less suspected by the regime or gain a certain 
security, though Muslimat NU, by so doing, seemed to support the ideology of the 
regime which was in conflict with its long-term interests.
From another perspective, particularly from the bargaining strategy 
perspective, Muslimat NU’s program in family planning, which entailed its 
demand to NU to deliver a fatwa supporting its program, was an advance in 
certain aspects of gender relations. Muslimat NU could use its relative power 
obtained through its conformity with the regime’s ideology to bargain with NU in 
delivering such a supporting fatwa.
With regard to this initiative, the family planning program organised by 
Muslimat NU was appreciated by the wider organisation. Muslimat NU’s effort 
could be understood as moderating the regime’s negative perception of both NU 
and Muslimat. The attitude of initiating protection for the whole family while in 
danger is called cancut tali wondo in Javanese tradition (Handayani & Novianto, 
2004:139). They argue that this attitude is one of the characteristics of Javanese 
women. It means “an attitude which depicts the ability to involve, to play a
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significant role, or even to take over the command and the strategy in facing the 
problem from the idea to the implementation” (Handyani & Novianto, 2004, 139).
However, the overall price Muslimat NU had to pay with regard to other 
aspects of gender equality during the New Order was considerable. For instance, 
Muslimat NU members in the Legislative Council decreased from seven women 
in 1960 to only two women in the 1992-1997 session. Starting from the late 
1970s, NU did not include members of Muslimat NU in Syuriyah (Supreme 
Religious Council).
The decision of NU to deliver a supporting fatwa with regard to the family 
planning program and to cease women’s membership in Syuriah was likely based 
on afiqh principle stating tasharruf al-imam ‘ala al-ra’iyah manuthun bil al 
mashlahah. This principle means that the leader should Rile the Muslim 
community according to their best interests. K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, a former 
general chairperson of NU, often mentions this principle12. NU placed (and 
continues to place) itself as the leader of all autonomous bodies affiliated with it 
(see Diagram 2). As such NU had to consider their best interests when making 
decisions. The fact that NU was considered by the regime as the opposition 
restricted its activity. In order to reduce the political pressure on all autonomous 
bodies, and in this case on Muslimat NU, NU decided to assist Muslimat by 
delivering a supporting fatwa and to cease women’s membership in Syuriyah 
because, according to NU, they served the best interests of Muslimat in this 
critical period.
The pressure strategy
In the pressure strategy women (i.e. Muslimat NU) use the external factors with 
which they were proactively involved in designing in order to pressure men (i.e. 
NU) in negotiating more equal gender relations. The pressure strategy is similar to 
the bargaining strategy but the difference is that with the pressure strategy women 
are proactive in designing the external factor while with the bargaining strategy
12 The last time that I heard him mentioning this principle was at a discussion during his visit to 
Canberra on December 2004.
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the external factor appears without involvement from women. With the pressure 
strategy, the power which women posses in negotiating better gender relations is 
from their own efforts. Women using this strategy are likely to be in ‘equal’ 
power to men. Women are more confident with the result compared to the 
bargaining strategy since they were involved in designing the pressuring factor. 
The failure of the first negotiation will add to women’s power and can be used 
through the second negotiation and so on. A similar view of the use of external 
pressure is stated by Topi Omas Ihromi (as cited in Robinson, 1998:217), “they 
[international instruments] can be used as a perkakas yang ampuh (an 
invulnerable instrument) by activists because they impose a reporting back to the 
international forum’’.
The new discourse in the quota system is an example of the use of the 
pressure strategy. With regard to the idea of pressure, Khofifah Indar Parawansa 
said in the interview (i.e. talking about a quota system and gender sensitiveness),
I am afraid that the political will of men appears if they are pressured. If 
the pressure is gone, they return to their former stance. Now, they are 
under pressure. They will feel shame if they are perceived as insensitive 
to the gender problems. This has a big influence on them.
Members of Muslimat NU through several political parties as well as the 
Muslimat NU board were involved in and supported the enactment of the 30 
percent quota for women candidates for the Legislative Council (see chapter five). 
The quota bill as Blackburn (2004) says “if enforced, will impact on Islamic 
parties, in ways that are as yet unforeseeable. This is a good example of sustained 
lobbying by women across the political and religious board having an impact on 
political Islam”.
The use of the quota system which itself is an external political 
development to pressure NU while negotiating better gender relations is the next 
step in the pressure strategy. According to Khofifah (interview), she used the 
quota issue to question women’s position within NU’s structure during the 2004 
NU Congress in Surakarta.
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I was involved from the first process, in discussions, in the steering 
committee, and in the muktamar (congress). I even led a session. But I 
concluded that the gender relation issue in NU is still at the level of a 
wacana (discourse). For the implementation, unfortunately ....their 
response is, “Yes, we did not refuse it [the discourse]. But this doesn’t 
mean that it should be written down”. What we need is a written 
decision, so it is binding on district and provincial boards ... I proposed 
“How about adding the numbers of chairpersons to include at least 10 
people. Seven PBNU and 3 women”. They insisted once again that males 
did not refuse this but there was no need for it to be written down
Although the negotiation failed, Khofifah noted that subsequently the NU central 
board proposed that Muslimat NU head some of NU institutions. In fact, a similar 
demand of women’s involvement in Tanfidziyah (Executive Body) has been 
posed by Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi during the 1999 Congress of NU (PP Muslimat 
NU, 2000a:23-25). Yet, NU only included two women in Syuriyah (Religious 
Supreme Council) as a ’wan (non-core committee members).
Why do women matter in Tanfidziyah? NU as the leading socioreligious 
organisation in Indonesia often makes decisions related to internal affairs (e.g. 
organisational policies, bahtsul masail or religious discussion) and to the external 
affairs in politics, economy, etc. without consulting and involving women, though 
all members including women suffer the same consequences (PP Muslimat NU, 
2000a:23-24). According to Khofifah (interview), because most of PBNU’s 
policies are not socialised to its autonomous bodies, it is only the men who 
receive the benefit from those policies. In addition, outsiders often think that 
having an agreement with NU will cover all its members, including women, 
which is untrue.
However, at the level of discourse, as admitted by Khofifah, NU has 
shown some progress. The fatwa (religious advice) of 1997 on women’s place in 
Islam, followed by another fatwa in 1999 calling for an affirmative action, support 
the importance of women playing a significant role in the public sphere (see 
chapter five). The draft of the 1999 fatwa  mentions a principle offiqh  (Islamic
110
jurisprudence) which is used as the basis for this view, alhukmu yaduru ma ’a 
‘illatihi wujudan wa ‘adaman (PBNU, 1999:58). This principle means that the 
regulation follows the reason behind its enactment, if the reason vanishes, the 
regulation changes (Daman, 2001:92). Following this argument, women’s 
restrictive rules were a product of certain historical circumstances. Because people 
have changed, those rules lost their raison d ’etre, thus the rules have to change. 
The downfall of the New Order regime and the press freedom open new 
opportunities for women to actively participate in the public sphere. This 
changing political situation is a new circumstance which requires new rules of the 
game for gender relations. According to Blackburn (2004), “it is just a matter of 
time before they [political Islam] accept more liberal interpretations of scriptures” 
and they implement them.
The proactive character of Muslimat NU’s actions is also seen from its 
efforts to hold independent bahtsul masail (religious discussions). Muslimat NU 
held two seminars in 2000 and 2001 concerning current issues regarding marriage. 
The seminars were followed by bahtsul masail and a fatwa related to polygamy 
and divorce (see chapter five). Within NU’s rules, such fatwa delivered by 
Muslimat NU has to be reported first to Syuriyah NU for its legalisation.
Muslimat NU’s view on polygamy can be seen as a new discourse which 
discourages the practice. From the 1940s onward women within NU’s 
organisations rarely discuss this sensitive issue especially with a negative tone 
since many of NU leaders (kyai) practice polygamy (see chapter five). This new 
approach impacts on Muslimat-NU relations. For instance, in the 2004 Congress 
of NU held in Surakarta, Central Java, NU allowed all autonomous bodies of NU 
to hold their respective bahtsul masail and they may not need the Syuriyah’s 
approval as long as they follow the NU methods in delivering fatwa (interview 
with Khofifah, for NU methods see Masyhuri, 1997:364-367).
A similar proactive action is showrn by some prominent leaders of 
Muslimat NU such as the critical study group about kitab kuning chaired by Sinta 
Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid. Through her project, she -supported by many 
women activists and gender-sensitive men- published Wajah Baru Relasi Suami
1 1 1
Istri, a critical book reviewing male gender-biased views on kitab kuning (see 
chapter one). There is a strong chance that the Sinta Nuriyah model will be 
followed by other similar actions in the future. There is an emergence of ulama 
perempuan or kyai perempuan (women religious scholars) in the last 40 or 50 
years alongside the emergence of pesantren putri (Islamic boarding school for 
girls) (Faiqoh, 2003:32; Marcoes-Natsir & Hasyim, 1997:10). In addition, the 
number of young females who attend madrasah (Islamic schools) has overtaken 
the number of young males with 51 percent females and 49 percent males 
according to the 2001 statistics (Faiqoh, 2003:278)n .
This analyis of Muslimat NU’s strategies shows that women of NU during 
more than sixty four years since 1938 have struggled for gaining equal gender 
relations. Their continous struggle was done in silence since many strategies 
which they used emphasized on soft negotiations with akhlaqul karimah (good 
manners). Leaders of Muslimat NU claimed that their organisation has had a 
tradition of avoiding conflict (Blackburn, 2004). By so doing, Muslimat NU is 
often perceived as an organisation which did not struggle for gender issues (PP 
Muslimat NU, 2000a:44). But perhaps, as argued by Blackburn (2004), it was the 
stronger for that reason.
13 According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs the number of female students in madrasah in 
2000-2001 is 2,778,927 greater than that of male students 2,670,443 or female students represent 
51 percent and male students 49 percent. In contrast, in public schools the percentage is 52 percent 
for male students and 48 percent for female students out of a total number of 37,993,854 students.
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Chapter seven: Conclusion
The history of Indonesian Islam, according to Benda (1985), is the history of the 
expanding santri civilisation and its impact upon the religious, social and political 
life of Indonesia. Nahdlatul Ulama, the leading organisation of santri, from the 
Japanese occupation played an important role in flourishing the social and 
political life in Indonesia. The Japanese believing that to win the hearts and minds 
of Indonesian people should increase the role of religious leaders.
Muslimat was initially formed as a women’s section of NU, established in 
1946 with the permission of NU after years of struggle for the acceptance of the 
parent organisation. It was made possible because Muslimat worked hand in hand 
with NU in the struggle against the returning Dutch administration. The further 
history of Muslimat shows its survival throughout decades. It shows Muslimat’s 
ability to engage with different political systems using diverse strategies. Hence 
its strategies have saved Muslimat during its critical times. Expressions used in 
the books published by Muslimat NU which I refer to in this study also reflect the 
diverse historical and political contexts that Muslimat NU has passed through.
One might doubt that Muslimat has made important changes with regard to the 
equal relations between men and women, but one must agree that Muslimat has 
succeeded to survive within many constraints imposed by changing political 
systems.
This historical perspective of Muslimat NU shows the dynamic of the 
women’s movement amongst traditional Muslims. Muslimat NU, as a women’s 
organisation within NU, played increasing public and visible roles in politics from 
1946 to 1970. The Muslimat’s participation in the war against the Dutch marked
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the beginning of Muslimat’s engagement in public life. Muslimat members joined 
the army, providing food, nursing, or sometimes became under cover agents. 
Muslimat members then supported NU in political practice. Following the 
secession of NU from Masyumi, Muslimat became an important agent of NU for 
gaining more electoral support in the first Indonesian 1955 general elections. 
Muslimat NU was among the first women’s organisations which had members 
elected to the national parliament. Muslimat NU also succeeded in enhancing their 
pubic role by joining other women’s organisations. Together with representatives 
of these other groups, Muslimat established a new institution concerned with 
marriage in 1960. Muslimat NU stood in opposition when a draft of Law on 
Marriage was imposed by the government in 1957. Muslimat NU has also shown 
its concerns with mothers’ and children’ care by establishing health centres since 
1962. A significant role was played by Muslimat in demanding NU to release a 
firm statement against the communist party after the 1965 attempted coup. Once, 
Muslimat NU was the leader of a big rally demanding the ban of the communist 
party.
However, the growing equal relations between NU and Muslimat were 
disrupted when opportunities for smooth negotiatons were interfered with the 
New Order regime. Both NU and Muslimat were vulnerable at that moment. The 
political pressures and the ideology promoting the confining of women from the 
public sphere slowly deteriorated the relations between NU and Muslimat. Both 
NU and Muslimat had to survive in order to ensure their ummah (followers, 
Muslim community) were no longer pressured. Finally NU decided to stay out of 
politics, whereas Muslimat wanted to save both Muslimat and NU by endorsing 
programs superimposed by the regime. They both had to believe that ‘house and 
children’ were the proper place for women. NU did not even include women in its 
board, something that did not happen in the 1950s. It seemed that NU would like 
to return to the period of 1940s where Muslimat were trapped in their houses. It 
seemed also that the state had succeeded to superimpose its ideology upon these 
organisations.
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The late period of the Soeharto regime was marked by an improvement of 
gender relations within NU. Muslimat NU began to build new relations with NU. 
Muslimat wanted to be more independent from its parent and finally Muslimat 
dared to state that Muslimat was independent vis-ä-vis all political parties. This 
strategy was successful in obtaining assistance from the regime. Muslimat also 
began to endorse the international agenda, which primarily discuss all matters 
related with women issues from diverse cultural backgrounds.
Male members of NU began to rethink male-female relations. In 1997, NU 
supported by female participants declared an important decision related to 
women’s public roles. Women were permitted to become leaders of the nation as 
long as they fulfilled all requirements. Although political circumstances were 
assumed to be the reason of the emergence of such a decision, at least, Muslimat 
together with other female organisations affilated to NU felt that it was the 
starting moment to confidently campaign for more political participation of 
women. In the 1999 Congress, NU released a fatwa which sensitively supported 
women’s roles in the public sphere. NU introduced the word ‘affirmative action’ 
and contextual reading over the kitab kuning. NU re-included Muslimat in the 
Syuriyah structure. The way that NU has dealt with the demands for gender equity 
coming from Muslimat NU reflects the way NU deals with all political 
challenges: by reflecting jurisprudence.
However, Muslimat NU has learnt that the struggle to gain male-female 
equal relations could not only occur from within. It should also be pushed from 
the outside. Since the reformasi era Muslimat encouraged its members from 
different political parties to propose a quota for women. The quota system can be 
used as a new perkakas yang ampuh to pressure NU males towards better 
relations. An independent bahtsul masail was introduced by Muslimat as another 
way to voice a different religious perspective on men-women relations.
The history of relations between NU and Muslimat shows that NU women 
have been able to work effectively with the parent organisation, and that despite 
what some would regard as a conservative image, NU has been able to 
accommodate emerging demands for more gender equity. It is of hope,
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nevertheless, that this study can contribute to fulfil the neglect of third word 
women's ‘public’ political actions, signalled by Stivens (1991:10), which “alone 
represents a number of missed opportunities, not only for mainstream political 
science, but also for some feminist theorising”.
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Appendix (Short biography of the interviewees)
Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi
Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi14 was born in Jombang, East Java, on June, 6, 1940 from 
a prominent kyai family within NU. Her father, K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim, was a 
former member of KNIP, a Minister of Religious Affairs (and a leading figure of 
NU between the 1940’s and 1950’s. Meanwhile her mother, Solichah A. Wahid, 
was a prominent figure of Muslimat and a member of the national parliament from 
the NU Party. Her grandfather, K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari, was a founder of NU and its 
only Rais Akbar. Furthermore, she is a sister of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, former 
president of Indonesia. Growing up within this family of activists and politicians 
her participation in both organisations and politics was a normal course.
Aisyah was the general chairperson of Muslimat NU central board 
between 1995 and 2000. However, she started to participate in organisations while 
she was still young. She joined Fatayat NU after she finished high school; first at 
Matraman branch Jakarta where she became, in 1959, its deputy chairperson. She 
then became a chairperson of Fatayat NU at provincial level from 1962 and a 
secretary of Fatayat NU’s central board from 1967. Meanwhile, she started to 
participate in the social section of Muslimat NU’s central board helping her 
mother who from 1962 was the first chairperson of Muslimat NU’s central board 
and at the same time was the social section’s head. Later on Aisyah held several 
positions within Muslimat NU’s central board such as the secretary and since 
1985 the director of YKM. In 1984 she was appointed the third chairperson of 
Muslimat NU’s central board, then the second chairperson in 1989. When Asmah 
Sjachruni retired from her position as the general chairperson of Muslimat NU’s
14 Hamid is the first name of Aisyah’s husband and Baidlowi is the name of her husband’s father 
(as it is clear from Diagram 3). Since Indonesians do not often have a ‘real’ surname, citing a 
surname of woman (eg. Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi) may even confuse her with her husband or her 
husband’s father. For shortening, I will use respondents’ first name to refer to them. Otherwise, I 
will cite their long name. However, during my interview Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi highlighted her 
long name since she was often confused with another Aisyah (i.e. Aisyah Amini) who was a 
veteran parliamentarian from PPP.
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central board at the 13th congress in Jakarta in 1995, Aisyah was elected to replace 
her.
Aisyah was also active in other organisations. For instance, she was the 
secretary of Ikatan Keluarga Pahlawan Nasional Indonesia (Association of Family 
Members of Indonesian National Heroes). In KOWANI she has held the position 
of chairperson since 1988. Because of her activities in social organisations she 
was designated by KOWANI in 1991 Tokoh Wanita Indonesia (Figure of 
Indonesian Women).
At the time Aisyah was the general chairperson of Muslimat NU central 
board she joined Golkar. According to her, her interest in politics was raised when 
she was contacted by Slamet Effendi Yusuf, a leader of Golkar from NU’s 
background. He reminded her about the importance of being a parliamentarian. 
During the interview she said,
I was a social worker. My friends in Golkar, particularly, Slamet Effendi 
Yusuf, said to me. “It’s okay that you like to work in a social 
organisation and do a lot there. But, do you think that bills, which have 
been passed up until now, give sufficient warranties for women, your 
clients?” From this discussion I started to have an interest in participating 
in politics because I realised that at that moment there was a lack of bills 
such as about ageing people.
After some thought she joined the party. Her entry to Golkar helped to establish a 
good relationship between her and Mbak Tutut (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana), 
daughter of Soeharto and a former Minister of Social Affairs. Muslimat NU got a 
benefit from this relationship such as assistance to finish Muslimat’s multi­
purpose building (especially for skills training).
Aisyah was the general chairperson of Muslimat NU who strictly applied 
the rules which banned double positions. That meant that a member of Muslimat 
NU’s core board cannot at the same time be a member of a political party core 
board or any other organisation. “Muslimat NU should have some distance vis-a- 
vis different political parties” was a common expression within board members.
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This policy was based on the fact that board members of Muslimat NU were 
affiliated to different political parties. Aisyah said,
There were some board members of Muslimat NU who were active in 
Golkar since their husbands were public servants. Automatically they 
followed their husband’s political choice. We saw that as reality. Thus, 
we maintained mles saying that every one could have her own political 
choice yet she should not carry the name of Muslimat NU but her 
individual name.
NU’s decision in 1984 to return to its Khittah 1926 (founding charter) was also 
used to support this policy since it stated that basic activities of NU were in social 
and religious affairs and that NU was not meant to involve directly in politics.
However, Aisyah’s campaign for an independent Muslimat NU with 
regard to politics, particularly in 1997, was often seen as campaigning for Golkar. 
In fact, she was a Golkar party candidate during the 1997 elections and was then 
elected as a member of the national parliament. Yet, the majority of NU’s votes at 
that time went to PPP. Further, she applied the same rigorous practice of banning 
dual positions within Muslimat NU during the 1999 elections and called on NU 
not to privilege a specific party (PP Muslimat NU, 2000a:appendix). Her stand 
caused disputes between her and her eldest brother K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid 
who was the general chairperson of NU and a founder of PKB (Helmy & 
Ma’shum, 2002:70). It impacted also on her in her failure to hold the chair of 
Muslimat NU at the 14th congress in 2000.
Currently, Aisyah holds within Muslimat NU’s structure the chairperson 
of the advisory council. In Golkar, she chairs Pengajian Al-Hidayah, the religious 
wing of the party. She was elected again as a member of the national parliament in 
1999 and for the third term in the 2004 elections. During the interview she was the 
chairperson of a parliament special committee on a pornography bill. She 
admitted that in order to secure this position she had to argue first with her party 
leaders. She told me of her experiences,
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At this moment I am the chairperson of a special committee to discuss 
the pornography bill. In order to obtain this opportunity I had to be 
strong, rigid, ready to be harassed, detracted and so on. At first my party 
did not put me forward for this special committee. My party tried to leave 
it to men. But I persisted and I said “I wanted this committee and not the 
others”. I persisted because I know that major victims of pornography or 
objects of porno-actions were, in fact, women. Thus, my concern was 
how we could protect them.
Anisah Machfudz
Anisah Machfudz was born in Malang, East Java, on November 16, 1961 from a 
religious leader family. Her mother is a respected nyai owner of a pesantren for 
young females in Singosari, Malang. Although she attended public schools and 
she is now preparing for a masters degree in government administration (public 
policy) at the Brawijaya University of Malang, she is well versed in Islam through 
attending informal teachings within her religious milieu.
Anisah joined Fatayat NU branch in Malang and is still its first deputy 
chairperson. Currently, she is also a counsellor of LKP2 which is an organ within 
Fatayat NU providing advocacy and support for the victims of domestic violence. 
Furthermore, she has been involved in some of the programs of Muslimat NU and 
has been used to work on Puan Amal Hayati’s projects, a brainchild institute of 
Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid advocating gender equality.
Anisah started to participate in politics when PKB was founded in 1998. 
Fatayat NU and Muslimat NU branch of Kabupaten Malang had recommended 
that she participate in PKB. According to Anisah, she was appointed because of 
her educational background which was in political sciences. It was difficult to find 
women within NU who had an educational background that was not in religious 
sciences. At first she was put in the women’s section of PKB at district level.
Later on when the section was formalised and called PPKB she became the head 
of PPKB for Kabupaten Malang.
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Currently, Anisah holds in PKB’s structure the position of deputy head of 
Dewan Tanfidz of DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or District Party Board) of 
Kabupaten Malang and deputy head of the provincial board of PPKB (East Java). 
She is the only woman on her party board. She was appointed because of an 
internal regulation to include women within the political party structure.
There was a regulation within PKB that the core party board had to 
include women. I was put in though I was just one, the only woman of 22 
members. I regretted that my proposal to include women in theformatur 
team (which set up board members) was not accepted even though the 
chairperson of that meeting was a woman.
She was appointed, as she said, because some people within the party board were 
her friends while studying so they personally knew her, in addition to her quality 
and her significant roles as an activist within women.
With regard to her participation in politics Anisah admitted that it was not 
her dream to be a politician though she had chosen to study political sciences. She 
went on to say that PKB, the child of NU, had motivated her to join politics. 
“When PKB was founded and sponsored by NU, I wanted to defend its values”. 
Within her close family circle she was the first person to join politics. According 
to her, her interest to participate in politics came from herself. However, her far 
relatives such as K.H. Wahab Chasbullah whom she counts as her grandfather 
(see Diagram 3) had already been active in politics. She still remembers what 
Mbah (grandfather) Wahab used to say about the participation of NU in the 
government during the Soekarno regime that NU had to get involved in politics 
from the inside, so it could make changes even within Nasakom cabinet.
Before the 2004 elections Anisah was appointed to represent women in a 
special committee called tim mantap which was set up by the district party board 
in order to draw up the candidature list for Kabupaten Malang. At a meeting, 
Anisah was supported by the chairperson of Dewan Syuro of PKB of Kabupaten 
Malang to head the committee. This support resulted in an agreement by five 
members that she would chair the committee. She maintained that as the
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chairperson, she could defend women’s interests. In the 2004 elections, she was 
selected as the first of several candidates for the national parliament from PKB 
representing Daerah Pemilihan Jawa Timur V (East Java Elective Region V 
including Malang) and she was elected.
When this interview was conducted Anisah had not yet taken up office. As 
a new parliamentarian she admitted that she was still confused which commission 
she would choose. According to her there were several be possibilities. She might 
choose a commission related to home affairs which was well-matched to her 
educational background. Otherwise she might choose a commission related to 
education or women. However, she preferred to choose commissions which 
lacked PKB representatives; there were already enough people from PKB in some 
of the commissions such as education and women.
Asmah Sjachruni
Asmah Sjachruni was born in Hulu Sungai Selatan, South Kalimantan, in 1928. 
She was one of the successful Muslimat NU leaders. For 16 years she was the 
general chairperson of Muslimat NU central board starting from 1979 to 1995. 
When she was elected to hold this position for the first time at the 10th congress of 
Muslimat NU held in Semarang in 1979 she beat three other candidates Solichah 
Wahid Hasjim, Sholechah Saifuddin Zuhri and Aisjah Dahlan (Helmy & 
Ma’shum, 2002:61). Within NU traditions her win had significant meaning since, 
first, the other candidates were wives / widows of prominent figures of NU and 
the family origin is an important issue within NU (see Diagram 3). For instance, 
Solichah was the widow of K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, a former minister of religious 
affairs (1949-1952), Solechah was the wife of K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri, another 
former minister of religious affairs (1963-1968), and Aisjah was the wife of 
K.H.M. Dahlan, who according to NU sources (Ma’shum & Zawawi, 1996:120, 
Zuhri, 1980:135) was also a former minister of religious affairs (1950). Second, 
Asmah Sjachruni’s origin from South Kalimantan is another interesting point 
since Muslimat and NU are largely Javanese (East and Central Java) dominated 
organisations. Non-Javanese branches were apparently solid in supporting Asmah
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Sjachruni at the 1979 congress. On the other hand non-Javanese NU branches 
were solid behind Idham Chalid who was also from South Kalimantan during the 
NU congress which was held at the same time (Bruinessen, 1994:152). As Asmah 
Sjachruni indicated,
I was elected to hold the general chairperson position of Muslimat’s 
central board at the Semarang congress in 1979. At the same moment NU 
held its congress which was most virulent when Idham Chalid had to face 
Achmad Sjaichu and finally Idham won (Helmy & Ma’shum, 2002:61).
Asmah Sjachruni’s participation in Muslimat NU which offered further 
opportunities in pursuing a political career was exceptional and rather a 
coincidence. She and her family were forced to evacuate from her village, Timbuk 
Baru, to Kota Rantau (a nearby town about 100 km north of Banjarmasin) 
following a military revolt. In this town they rented one part of a big house15. The 
other part was occupied by the owner who was the NU’s secretary of Kandangan 
branch. When NU held its congress in Palembang in 1952, the house owner was 
one of delegates. The Palembang congress was a turning point for NU since it 
declared its withdrawal from the Masyumi Party and became an independent 
party. As a new party NU needed voters. The chairperson of Muslimat NU 
(Mahmudah Mawardi) and NU’s national board mandated, thus, NU’s chairperson 
of South Kalimantan to form the provincial board of Muslimat NU in order to 
open branches in South Kalimantan. There had already been several branches of 
Muslimat NU but not yet a provincial board. While searching for a candidate for 
the office, NU’s chairperson of South Kalimantan met NU’s secretary of 
Kandangan, the owner of Asmah Sjachruni’s house. The latter highly 
recommended her, saying that his tenant had likely leadership talent. She was then 
contacted to meet board members of NU who were totally unknown to her. She 
only knew NU as an organisation which defended principles of kaum tuha 
(traditionalist Muslims). At first she refused the offer to be the chairperson of 
Muslimat NU because she thought that she had not enough ability to lead the 
provincial board. The chairperson of Syuriyah NU of Kandangan branch, a
15 According to Asmah Sjachruni, she shared this part of the house with her uncle who was the 
father of Syamsul Muarif (former Minister of Information during Megawati’s government).
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respected ulama (religious leader), gave her some advice and support “My 
daughter, please try. From somebody like you who knows her shortcomings and 
wants to learn, will make a good leader”. She consulted, then, her uncle, who fully 
supported her. After giving it some thought, she accepted the offer on condition 
that she should be instructed in religion, the constitution of NU, etc. and should 
have her first speeches prepared for her.
Asmah Sjachruni was a young woman (25 years old) when she held for the 
first time the chairperson of Muslimat NU of South Kalimantan. Many of her 
relatives and friends were apprehensive about her capacity to lead Muslimat NU. 
This anxiety became particularly great since, starting from 1954, NU hjad to 
prepare for the 1955 general elections. In order to fill her gaps as it was first 
appointment, Asmah Sjachruni took some part of every day after the maghrib 
(sunset) prayer to learn about how to deliver speeches, how to manage an 
organisation, about NU, etc., and prepared for her by an NU member who worked 
at the local Department of Information.
Although her husband supported her activities in Muslimat, Asmah 
Sjachruni faced also many domestic problems. For instance, in order to form 
branches and to do campaigning work, she had to do, what her son described, 
babat alas (open the jungle) which sometimes took a week away from her home. 
She told that she had to bring her new born child with her to breastfeed while 
touring and to leave the older children at home with her husband. Even worse she 
had to support her baby while she was campaigning at the podium (see also Patria 
in Helmy & Ma’shum, 2002: 84).
During the 1955 elections Asmah Sjachruni stood as a candidate for the 
national parliament. She was listed on the voting papers as the third candidate for 
South Kalimantan from the NU Party even though she had been proposed as the 
second candidate for her province. This change caused a protest from her to 
Zainul Arifin, who was the first vice prime minister but personally unknown to 
her. Regarding this incident which showed how gender relations was negotiated 
she told,
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“What’s the matter?” Zainul Arifin said to me. I said to myself “Hmm, 
this is the man”. Then, I replied to him, “Nothing Pak, I just would like 
to talk with you. Could I?” “You could, especially if you are a beautiful 
woman,. I am pleased”. “No Pak. I am not joking. I would like to talk 
seriously”. He said then “Please take a seat”. “In South Kalimantan I 
have had but difficult struggle. I have worked tirelessly so that Muslimat 
NU could have a winning seat. But, how could my candidature suddenly 
become the third on the list? I just want to know”. What was the 
argument? “Well, PBNU has its own considerations, political and 
others,” he replied. I said, “And because you have the power?” “Well, 
yes maybe yes” he started to run around.
Finally she knew that the policy had been taken because the third candidate was a 
minister and NU would appreciate him by selecting him as the second. Although 
she was still unhappy with NU’s policy she gracefully accepted her third position. 
Fortunately, the NU Party got three out of the six seats and Asmah Sjachruni was 
elected.
When the NU Party merged with several other Islamic parties part, to form 
PPP (United Development Party) Asmah Sjachruni became one of leading figures 
within the party. She was the most vocal of all the speakers from PPP to reject the 
first government draft of the Marriage Law in 1973. When it was finally passed 
the Marriage Law of 1974 was a compromise between the government and the 
parliament particularly the PPP. From 1980 to 1982 she was elected the 
chairperson of Commission VIII, commission of parliament related to welfare.
She ended her career as a member of parliament from PPP in 1987 after 32 years 
of long and productive service.
Ermalena Mhs
Ermalena was born on July 22, 1957 in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. She graduated 
from the faculty of Pharmacy of the University of Pancasila Jakarta in 1984. 
Although she did not come from an NU family, she dedicated almost her entire 
career to this organisation. Her involvement in the organisation began in 1979,
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when she was appointed as a vice secretary of Fatayat NU central board (Young 
Women of Nahdlatul Ulama). In 1984 she became the secretary general and in 
1989 the first chairperson of this board. Since the general chairperson was absent 
for a study purpose, she was then the acting general chairperson.
While she was active in Fatayat NU, in 1982, she joined LKK NU, an 
institution within NU concerned with the Family Planning and Welfare program. 
She became a vice secretary of its central board in 1986. Since 1986 she has 
organised programs funded by international institutions such as UNICEF related 
to children’s health. She was also involved in some of the joint programs between 
Muslimat and Fatayat NU concerned with women’s economic empowerment such 
as the cooperatives program. Currently she is the director of IFPPD (Indonesian 
Forum of Parliamentarian on Population and Development) and a program 
manager of Primary Eye Care, Helen Keller International.
Ermalena said that her struggle within NU (because of her Sumatraneese 
origin) was supported by Gus Dur. She said,
Since I am not a Javanese, I come from Sumatra, I entered NU and then 
became a central figure, there was a rumour...what for this 
Muhammadiyah entered (NU)... However, it was Gus Dur who 
supported me to develop my career [within NU]. It was Pak Fahmi 
Saifuddin who supported me much. They were all from the top position 
[of NU]. [They said]...Don’t worry. Indeed I was successful until the end 
of my office.
Ermalena joined PPP in 1997 and elected as a Member of Parliament. As 
her main activities were concerned with women and health, she chose 
Commission VII related to issues such as health, women, and manpower. When 
she was asked about her decision to become involved in politics, she said,
Honestly, this (becoming an MP) was by accident. At that time PPP 
never won in Lampung, Sumatra. But I promised that I would work hard 
and I won.. .If we involve in politics, it will be effective for us [to defend 
women’s issues], because ‘power’ is in our hand. We are powerless if we
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remain outside. Now, the problem is how do we maximize our power.
For this reason we should form a networking.
With regard to the support from the organisation for a political career she
The organisation did not prepare someone to be involved in politics.
Khofifah became an MP because of herself. I became an MP because of 
myself. Everyone [from NU women] struggled for herself as shown by 
the Bu Asmah case. They became MPs without any support from the 
organisation.
She further said that NU should manage and support all its human resources 
because this will be beneficial for the nation. She noted that NU started recently to 
support its male members. “Even though it is limited to men, this is a good point. 
We have to support this”. However, it should be expanded to all autonomous 
bodies of NU, including affiliated women’s organisations, since they also carry 
the attribute of NU. She said, “We agree that NU is our parent organisation. 
Everyone will never say, “This is Fatayat”. They will always say, “This is Fatayat 
NU, NU women”. She went on to say,
We are different from the past. Compared to the past, Muslimat resources 
are more qualified. Now, they have facilities, they have money, they are 
smart. They are lebih didenger lah (more appreciated) by the society than 
before. NU should distribute all these resources in political parties.
Ida Fauziyah
Politics were not far from Ida Fauziyah’s family. Her father, H. Moch. Sya’roni, 
was four times a member of the district parliament from PPP (United 
Development Party) for Mojokerto, East Java. However, she chose a different 
party from her father’s party when she was selected and then elected in 1999 as a 
member of the national parliament. She argued that her decision to choose PKB 
(National Awakening Party) was motivated by the fact that PKB was founded and 
sponsored by members of NU. She felt comfortable with PKB and thought that
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her aspirations were similar to the party’s objectives. She added that her father 
died in 1998 before the foundation of PKB.
Ida Fauziyah was born on July 16, 1969 in Mojokerto, East Java and grew 
up within NU milieu. She went to a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in 
Tambak Beras, Jombang and lived in for several years from the age of 12 years. 
She finished her secondary education (junior and senior high school) from a 
madrasah (religious school) in this pesantren. There she started to became 
involved in the organisation. She once held the chairperson of a female santri 
association. While she continued her study at IAIN (state institute for Islamic 
studies) in Surabaya, she joined IPPNU (Ikatan Putri-Putri Nahdlatul Ulama 
Association of young females of Nahdlatul Ulama) of Mojokerto and became its 
deputy chair. She continued to be an active member of the association when she 
finished her tertiary study and became a teacher in Jombang, Sidoarjo, and later 
on in Surabaya. Her involvement in this association brought her, in 1996, to be 
elected as the chairperson of IPPNU of East Java (see also Parlementaria, 2003; 
Panduan Parlemen Indonesia, 2001).
When PKB was founded in 1998 she joined the party which had turned to 
different organisations within NU for recruitment of its cadres. At first she was in 
the young bureau of PKB of East Java (provincial level). Then she moved to the 
women’s wing when PKB formed PPKB (women’s wing of PKB). In this wing 
she held the secretary of PPKB of East Java. For the 1999 elections she was 
selected as a candidate for the national parliament from PKB. According to her, 
her selection was based on the policy of PKB of East Java to include all segments 
including youth and women and she matched with these characteristics. Ida 
Fauziyah was finally elected in 1999 and at 30 years of age she was the youngest 
parliamentarian to take office for the 1999-2004 session (see also Parlementaria, 
2003).
In the Parliament, Ida Fauziyah was involved actively in KPPI (Women 
Caucus of the Indonesian Parliament) which was formed on July 19, 2001. This 
caucus was set up across political parties and aimed at empowering female 
parliamentarians and developing a united front to defend women’s interests. She
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was one of five chairpersons who formed the presidium of this caucus serving 
from 2001 to 2004. Within her own party her career blossomed. She was secretary 
of the PKB fraction in the parliament between 1999 and 2004. She is currently the 
general chairperson of PPKB's national board (women’s wing of PKB). In the 
2004 elections, she was again selected and elected as a member of parliament for 
Daerah Pemilihan Jawa Timur VIII (East Java Elective Region VIII including 
Mojokerto).
As a female member of parliament she admitted that she had to face 
domestic problems. For instance, sometimes she had to attend meetings five to six 
times a day from early morning to late at night. She had even to attend “meetings 
outside the office for several days leaving her child and family at home”. She 
went on to say that “(i)t was my choice, so, I have to enjoy it. If not it would be a 
very hard task for me” (Parlementaria, 2003). Fortunately, her husband, Taufiq R. 
Abdullah, is also an activist within NU and thus understands the busy schedule of 
his wife. Currently he is a deputy secretary of Tanjidziyah PBNU (executive body 
of NU’s national board). However, sometimes their timetables clashed and their 
communication diminished. To solve the problem she tried to develop quality 
familial communication meaning not much but effective communication. For 
example, she always took daily prayer together in the morning (salat subuh 
berjamaah) to communicate with her husband.
Although she stated that she still preserved her santri tradition, she 
maintained that this tradition did not prevent from holding different views when 
attending meetings in the parliament. For instance, she always respected elder 
people. When she met them -some were nyai or female religious leaders and 
owners of pesantren- she kissed their hand. However, if she disagreed with them 
she would talk frankly and would defend her views (Parlementaria, 2003).
Khofifah Indar Parawansa
Khofifah Indar Parawansa was the first woman of Muslimat NU to become a 
minister. At 34, she was the youngest member of the Cabinet announced by
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Megawati in 1999 during the Abdurrahman Wahid presidential period. She was 
born on May 19, 1965 in Surabaya, East Java. As she said, she was raised in a 
kampung (residential area often occupied by the middle-lower class) in Surabaya 
where people were religious. For instance, during religious festivities it was very 
hard to find people of her kampung wearing pantaloon (trousers) instead of 
sarong. Many of them read and wrote Arabic characters but not Latin characters. 
She herself attended two schools, a religious (madrasah) and a public one, a 
practice her parents adopted for all their five children.
While studying political sciences at the University of Airlangga (one of 
prestigious public universities in Indonesia), Khofifah Indar Parawansa joined 
organisations affiliated to NU. In 1986, she became at the same time a chairperson 
of IPPNU (association of young females of NU) at the district and a board 
member at provincial levels. Yet, she was also a chairperson of PMII (student 
union of NU) at the regional level. Her activities in organisations led Khofifah 
Indar Parawansa to be elected as the general chairperson of KOPRI (Korps PMII 
Putri or female section of the student union of NU) at national level between 1988 
and 1991. Having finished her study, she became a member of the teaching staff 
of different tertiary private institutions in Surabaya, first at Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu 
Tarbiyah (1989-1990) then at Universitas Wijaya Putra (1991-1992).
Khofifah Indar Parawansa joined PPP (United Development Party) in 
1990 and became a member of the research and development division of this party 
while she was still the general chairperson of KOPRI. As an activist with a 
background in the political sciences, she was often offered the position of a 
moderator of seminars on politics. Once, she moderated for a high party leader 
who was attracted to her quality. One day following the seminar, she was visited 
by the party leader while she was in discussion with her students and was offered 
a winning seat for the 1992 elections. At first she was surprised and after thinking 
about it and talking it through with her friends and husband she accepted the offer 
(Taju & Dewanto, 1997:171). During my interview she told her of consultation 
with her (former) teacher,
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When I knew that I was offered a winning seat, I met Ibu Nur Zaenab, 
now a DPD (regional representative in the national assembly) candidate 
for East Java. She was ‘my teacher’. I told her about my feelings that 
persons who will be a long time counted in the hereafter are 
parliamentarians. They are people’s representatives but they do not 
struggle for the people. It was a very big burden. Ibu Nur Zaenab replied 
that the important thing is that I make an effort. “If you made an effort 
and you failed, you have got one reward”, reward of ijtihad (reasoning). I 
thought this was the response to my doubts.
Khofifah Indar Parawansa was 27 years of age when she was elected a 
member of the national parliament for the first time in 1992. As a young 
parliamentarian with little political experience from PPP which was an opposition 
party she had to adapt to her new environment. “The process took about the first 
nine months in order to understand members’ political stances and behaviour ... 
while proposing my perceptions”, as she said. However, she still faced difficulties 
with regard to the political system which she thought was unequal and not 
transparent (Taju & Dewanto, 1997:172).
She told during the interview about difficulties faced by female politicians 
and especially an active politician like her. Once she was invited to visit some far 
of regions by male members while she was pregnant and close to deliver. “I was 
offered by men members to visit far regions. Yet, I was pregnant close to deliver. 
But, I enjoyed it. This was an amanah (trusteeship)”. Leaving the family at home 
for several days was also a great problem. For instance, in 1998 soon after PKB 
(National Awakening Party) was founded her eldest daughter said to her “(M)om, 
you should dissolve the party, you go rarely back to home”. Her other child’s 
case, a boy presents another example. Recently, in addition to a gift presented 
directly to her on mother’s day he sent her a letter by post saying “(N)ice 
Mother’s Day. Mom, do not work too hard”. However, she considered that 
problems related to the family’s getting their backs-up fluctuated. Sometimes they 
supported her, sometimes they protested strongly.
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Khofifah Indar Parawansa’s career as a politician improved substantially 
when she moved from PPP to PKB. Abdurrahman Wahid was an important 
person behind her decision to move to PKB in 1998. However, at first she had to 
bear some heavy consequences by her move to PKB. She had to resign from her 
parliamentary office which still had a year to run. Relating to her move to PKB in 
1998 she said,
I am someone who is a bit troublesome when facing senior, kyai. When 
Pak Mathori (the first general chairperson of PKB) invited me to join 
PKB, I replied to him how if I first finish my office since Pak Hamzah 
(PPP’s general chairperson) asked me not to resign. Many other seniors 
gave me similar advice. But what happened? Pak Mathori called Gus Dur 
(Abdurrahman Wahid) in my presence. I heard what they discussed. How 
could I refuse when Gus Dur asked me personally?
In the 1999 elections she was elected again for the membership of the 
national parliament. Further, she was appointed as a deputy to the speaker. Soon 
after Abdurrahman Wahid was elected by the National Assembly for the 
presidency in October 1999, she was recruited as Minister for Women’s Affairs. 
This appointment was to everyone’s surprise because this Ministry was long 
questioned as to its raison d ’etre by Khofifah Indar Parawansa herself. However, 
she accepted without conditions. She demanded in return more authority for the 
Ministry; such that all regulations and laws concerning women come under the 
one roof and that was from her Ministry, she demanded also that BKKBN 
(National Family Planing Co-ordinating Board) be under her authority; and not to 
be forgotten, she proposed an 18 percent increase in the Ministry’s budget 
(Bianpoen, 2000:301). In addition, she renewed the facade of her Ministry by 
changing its name to the State Ministry for the Empowerment of Women. Taking 
a similar step, organisations for “wives” changed their names from PKK standing 
for Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Welfare Tutorship) to 
Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Empowerment for Family Welfare) 
(Parawansa, 2001:76).
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Although Khofifah Indar Parawansa held her Ministry for only two years, 
her ideas and actions made a big impact. For example, she proposed a quota of 30 
per cent women in the top two echelons of the bureaucracy and in the legislature 
(Parawansa, 2001:76). The Ministry of the Empowerment for Women supported 
women’s networking in politics which led to the establishment of caucuses for 
women parliamentarians in 2001. During her office, the Indonesian government 
signed and ratified in 1999 the Optional Protocol which was part of the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(2001:76). This ratification led to the legislation against domestic violence by the 
parliament in September 2004.
While she was still in office as a Minister, Khofifah Indar Parawansa was 
elected as the general chairperson of the Muslimat NU national board in 2000. 
Here, her ideas to improve Muslimat’s members’ participation in politics were 
implemented. For example, she organised a program called Capacity Building 
which was run four times in 2003. This program was aimed at strengthening 
networks between Muslimat’s members in the parliament as well as for future 
members of parliament who came from different political parties such as PPP, 
PKB and Golkar. In the interview she said that the need to increase members’ 
knowledge and to develop their ability to work as a team were among the 
objectives of such program.
Khofifah Indar Parawansa was once again elected as a member of the 
House of Representatives for the period of 2004 -  2009. She was also entrusted to 
hold the head of commission VI. This was the second time a Muslimat member 
had become the head of commission since Asmah Sjachruni between 1980 and 
1982 and the fourth time for a women to hold the office since the New Order era.
Lathifah Hasyim
Lathifah Hasyim was born in Surakarta, Central Java on October 10, 1938. She 
was one of the daughters of Machmudah Mawardi, a former general chairperson 
of Muslimat NU. Her grandfather was a founder of pesantren A1 Masyhud, a
133
place where many female daughters of kyai have spent their time learning and 
who later became prominent members of the Muslimat NU board. She spent her 
childhood in Surakarta and had a lot of female friends from different areas. This 
was partly because her mother established a new school for young women, called, 
Madrasah Nahdlatul Muslimat in 1930. This school attracted daughters of kyai 
especially from East Java to study here, such as Umroh Mahfudzoh etc. Her 
father died when she was one year old, and her mother continued to be a widow 
until her death in 1987.
Since she was young, she followed her mother’s activities in social 
organisation. After she married in 1965 to Moh. Hasyim Mochtadi, Lathifah 
joined Muslimat NU in 1968 as a second secretary. This period marked the 
beginning of her deep involvement in Muslimat NU. She was appointed as the 
first secretary of Muslimat NU in 1979 and afterwards became a chairperson of 
Muslimat NU.
Different from her mother and her brother, Lathifah was never interested 
in politics. Her brother, Cholid Mawardi was a former ambassador of Syria and 
also was a former MP, whereas Lathifah was largely concerned with social 
religious organisations. This can be seen from her performance. Lathifah is a 
prototype of a woman who was sincerely dedicated to her work for the benefit of 
Muslimat. She was a diligent woman. She spent her full day working at the 
Muslimat office. Thus she knew a lot about Muslimat activities. Although she 
knew Muslimat members who participated in politics, she never wanted to enter 
politics. She once said: “If everyone is busy with politics, who is going to 
responsible for the continuity of this organisation?” This comment at least 
indicates who really Lathifah is.
Ratu Dian Hatifah
Born in Jakarta, July 4, 1969, Ratu Dian Hatifah represents the progressive young 
woman of NU. Her father used to be active in Hizbul Wathan of Banten, an ex 
Muslim militia formed during the war. After Hizbul Wathan was dismissed, her
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father joined the military. The name of Ratu indicates that she belongs to an 
aristocratic family of Banten. Ratu Dian graduated from the State Institute of 
Islamic Studies. During her student days at the university, Ratu Dian was invited 
by her friends to join the girls’ organisation of NU.
Her first involvement in the NU organisation was occurred in 1988. She 
joined the IPPNU (female student’s association of NU) at the regional level. She 
said: “I never joined any other NU organisation before, so did my father. I am 
genuine. What I know is that my family is NU”.
Ratu Dian actively participated in organisations such as KNPI (Youth 
National Committee) and FKPPI (forum of sons and daughters of retired armed 
services officers) since her father was a former member of the Indonesian army. 
Her national career began after she was entrusted as a secretary general of IPPNU 
board in 1996. A year later she married the secretary general of PMII, Rusdin M. 
Nur. From that moment, her career developed more than before. She joined the 
KNPI central board and she was also involved in a voter’s education program 
which was funded by the UNDP. In 2000, she was elected as the general 
chairperson of the IPPNU central board. She joined Muslimat NU after she 
finished with IPPNU.
Her first involvement in politics began in the organisation. She said, “I 
learned politics firstly through the organisation. The organisation is a warming up 
before we enter politics”. Then, after her duty in IPPNU finished, she joined PKB. 
She became a member of the women’s section of PKB called PPKB (Women of 
National Awakening Party). She was interested in PKB because she was 
impressed by its leadership. She said, “At that time, Gus Dur (Abdurrahman 
Wahid) was my idol. He is smart and he always gives a welcome to anyone. He 
has a close relationship with the young generation. He has a lot of humour”.
She learnt politics from her eldest brother, Tubagus Haryono. He was a 
former general chairperson of the KNPI central board and was also a former MP 
from Golkar. She said, “I saw my brother enjoy being a politician, even though he
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had to walk step by step. Then I convinced myself, if my brother could do that, 
why could not I?”
However, her involvement in PKB did not last long. In 2003, she resigned 
from PKB and joined Golkar. For this reason, she said,
Actually I was really happy with that first party. In politics, anyone who 
is strong must be in power. In fact, I could not face it. This was the most 
incredible experience I ever had. My political intuition could not function 
well.
She further said that competition between women was sometimes quite difficult. 
She said,
My experience is that women politicians are more unkind. This is partly 
because women are reluctant to forgive and forget if there was a case.
She tended to remember all the time. This is different with men. This is 
because a feeling of distrust arouses among women. They tend to use 
‘feeling’. If only Indonesian women trusted each other, I am sure that 
they can be developed.
Ratu Dian is finally critical about women’s position within kyai’s cultural 
tradition in PKB, especially for her (i.e. non-Javanese and non-‘santri). She said,
I think PKB is suitable for women. There are a lot of opportunities for 
women. However feudalism and primordialism still occur (in this party).
There are a lot of cultural obstacles that cannot be penetrated by women.
It does not mean that I could not penetrate, but it was because I did not 
understand ewuh pakewuh (tradition) in communication or the tradition 
surrounding the kyai. I am not from pesantren.
Sinta Nuriyah
Nuriyah was born in Jombang, East Java, in 1948. She married Abdurrahman 
Wahid in 1969 when she was 21 years of age. Nuriyah had a graduate degree from 
the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta. She
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first became involved in Muslimat NU activities in 1972. Nuriyah was known to 
be very enthusiastic about studying. An automobile accident in 1993 which left 
her in a wheelchair until now did not hamper her plans to continue her study. In 
1995 she finished her Master’s degree in Women’s Studies at the University of 
Indonesia. Her thesis focused on “Early Marriage and Reproductive Health’’ 
(Tempo Magazine, 2001).
Nuriyah’s involvement in women’s rights activities dated long before her 
husband became the president. She involved, for instance, in the forum Hear 
Women Speak advocating for victims of abuse in the May 1998 riots. Nuriyah’s 
activities were appreciated by many institutions, for example, she received a 
special honor in Okinawa from the Japanese government for her efforts to help 
women victims of abuse (Bianpoen, 1999).
Nuriyah’s other important work was her initiative to establish FK3 (Forum 
to Study Kitab Kuning). The FK3 aimed at reviewing and reinterpreting the 
teachings of classical texts. Her idea apparently came from research for her 
Master’s degree. She said that her study opened her eyes to the discriminative 
treatment received by women from both the society and the religion. Once she 
told me that her supervisor, Professor Saparinah Sadeli questioned her about the 
use of certain kitab kuning in pesantren. She said, “My supervisor asked me what 
is Uqudulujjaynl I answered, “This is an important kitab about women taught in 
pesantren”. My supervisor said, “I think it is very interesting that you make a 
research about this kitab”. In an interview conducted by Bianpoen (1999) she said, 
“Women are seen as occupying a position even lower than that of the lowest of 
slaves”. Nuriyah’s involvement in seeking reform of the classical teachings is 
important because most of these kitab kuning are degrading to women. In this 
regard, she also chairs two hundred 'pesantren putri' (religious boarding schools 
for Muslim girls) under the banner of PUAN Amal Hayati.
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Umroh Machfudzoh
Umroh was born in Gresik, East Java, on February 4, 1936. “Within the pesantren 
circle in Java, Umroh, indeed, is a well known figure”, Taju and Dewanto 
(1997:481) started their introduction about Umroh Machfudzoh. They went on to 
argue that people knew her because she was a descendant of influential religious 
leaders within NU. Her grandfather was K.H.A. Wahab Hasbullah who was the 
most significant traditionalist Islamic leader in Indonesia in the 20th century 
(Fealy, 1996:41) and a principal founder of NU. Umroh Machfudzoh was the 
eldest daughter of K.H. Wahib Wahab who was the Minister of Religious Affairs 
from 1959 to 1962. Growing up within this circle of politicians, politics for her 
was a daily conversation. “Patriotic and heroic values were part of her life that 
were always taught in her family” (Taju & Dewanto, 1997:481). It was not strange 
that 15 years old Umroh Machfudzoh had already a dream to become herself a 
politician.
Umroh Machfudzoh has several qualities. She can read and understand 
kitab kuning. Her first primary school was in Gresik at a madrasah banat 
(religious school for girls). She moved then to Surabaya because of the war. She 
finished her primary school from a madrasah organised by NU in 1949. During 
the holidays she often spent her time in Jombang where she had learnt kitab 
kuning in the pesantren of her grandfather. In 1950, she continued her study at a 
school established by a former general chairperson of Muslimat NU, Mahmudah 
Mawardi, in Surakarta, Central Java. She lived in a pesantren directed by K.H. 
Mashud, the father of Mahmudah Mawardi. According to Umroh, she was the 
first daughter of a Jombang kyai who was sent to study in Surakarta. She further 
said, “After I continued my study in Surakarta, many Jombang kyais sent their 
daughters to Surakarta”.
Umroh also has the oratory skill. When she was in Surakarta she was often 
invited by Muslimat branches in Central Java to preach in a pengajian akbar 
(mass religious meeting). She went to Semarang, Kendal, Batang, Salatiga, 
Pekalongan. She said,
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Everytime I preached in a pengajian I had been given gifts by many 
women such as batik halus (fine batik cloth), kerudung (veil), and so 
forth. I sent some of those presents to my mother. I gave some of them to 
my friends. Therefore, my friends liked me if I was invited outside.
Umroh was one of the founders of IPPNU (Association of female student 
of NU). She became the first chairperson of IPPNU in 1955. It was through her 
activities in IPPNU that later she knew her future husband. Tolchah Mansur, who 
was a former chairperson of IPNU, proposed marriage to her in 1958. With his 
support Umroh finally got involved in real politics.
Umroh began her political involvement when she was 18 years of age, 
after NU became a political party. Umroh was approached by NU to participate as 
a campaigner. She campaigned mainly in Central Java. According to her, the 
experience of campaign was exciting. She told,
Once I went to Salatiga. I was invited by Nyai Zuhri, a leader of a 
Muslimat NU branch, to campaign. It was in a mountainous area with 
difficult transportation. Then the Ansor branch invited me to ride a horse.
1 went to that place by riding a horse. When 1 had reached the place, 
someone told me that this place was actually a base of PKI. I was not 
afraid. What I wanted was to expose NU values. 1 made a poem about 
Allah’s commands to the people. They had appreciated my campaign 
because of my speech and perhaps, because I was still a young woman, 
that later I heard they wanted to make their place a peaceful place during 
and after the general elections.
After she had finished her study in Surakarta she married and then moved 
to Yogyakarta. In 1967, she continued her study at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga 
Yogyakarta, though she had already had six children. Umroh graduated from 
IAIN with cumlaude in 1973. She was then active in Muslimat NU Yogyakarta. In 
1975 she was elected as the chairperson of Muslimat NU Yogyakarta for three 
periods. While she was the chairperson of Muslimat, Umroh joined PPP and she 
was appointed as a vice treasurer. She quit Muslimat in 1986 because she was 
offered the position of treasurer of PPP. Most of Muslimat members supported her
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to accept PPP’s offer because they thought that she had the capability to be 
successful in politics. In the same year Umroh was selected as a candidate and 
then elected as a member of the provincial parliament.
There was an important event related to Umroh’s relations with her male 
colleagues in the party. It happened when Attabik Ali was sacked by the central 
party board from his office as the chairperson of PPP of Yogyakarta. Attabik Ali 
was a son of K.H. Ali Ma’shum, a former Rais Am of Syuriyah NU central board. 
The party board decision was apparently caused by the bad relations between 
Attabik and J. Naro, former chairperson of PPP central board. According to 
Umroh, Attabik used a plenary forum to denigrate Naro and his political 
maneuvering. Umroh further said that before Darussamin (vice chairperson of 
PPP Yogyakarta) told Attabik of the decision he came to her house to meet her 
and her husband. Darussamin informed her about the decision and asked her to 
replace Attabik. She said,
My husband then responded, “I am okay if she will be appointed to head 
the PPP provincial board. I will support her. But first thing, you have to 
ask the blessing of Kyai Ali [father of Attabik] and ask him whether he 
agree or disagree with my wife’s appointment”. When Darussamin 
informed Kyai Ali about the recalling of his son from his office and the 
leadership change of PPP Yogyakarta, Kyai Ali asked him, “Who’s going 
to replace him?” Darussamin replied. “Because Attabik is from the NU 
circle so he must be replaced by another NU member. And Ibu Umroh 
will become the next chairperson”. Kyai Ali exclaimed ‘Alhamdulillah 
(praise to Allah)” and expressed his agreement. I asked then other 
Muslim representatives within PPP whether they agreed with my 
appointment or disagreed. They expressed their agreement and I became 
then the acting chairperson.
Umroh was elected for the national parliament in 1987, a year after her 
husband passed away. She was reelected in 1992 for a second term. While she 
was an MP from PPP, in 1992, she was appointed to head the women’s section of 
PPP which later became Wanita Persatuan (The Uniting Women). She was also 
invited to join Muslimat NU central board. She became a chairperson of Muslimat
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NU from 1990 to 2000. In 1997, she intended to retire from her office as an MP. 
However, she returned to politics when PKB was founded in 1998. She joined 
PKB and became a member of Dewan Syura (Abdurrahman Wahid is the head of 
this council). Umroh was the only woman in Dewan Syura. In 1999, she was 
reelected for her third term representing PKB of Banyuwangi. In 2004, Umroh 
retired from her office and returned to Yogyakarta. She continued her husband’s 
amanah (will) to develop her pesantren As Sunni Daarussalaam.
Zunatul Mafruchah
Zunatul was born on April 27, 1965. She was a daughter of Umroh Machfudzoh, a 
former chairperson of Muslimat NU. Although she was a descendant of a founder 
of NU, she never studied in pesantren. From her childhood, she studied in public 
schools. After she had graduated from the law faculty of the University of Islam 
Indonesia she became a lecturer at the University of Widya Wiwaha in 
Yogyakarta.
Zunatul Mafruchah joined several autonomous bodies of NU. First, she 
was involved in Fatayat NU at the regional level. In 1990, she was appointed a 
member of the IPPNU central board following her mother’s election as a member 
of the national parliament. In 1995, she was appointed as a Muslimat NU central 
board member in the department of economy and cooperatives.
Her first political career began in 1995, when she became a member of 
PPP of Jakarta province. Two years later, she was asked by board members of 
PPP to return to Yogyakarta and participate in PPP of Sleman, Yogyakarta 
(district level). In the 1997 general elections, she was elected as a member of the 
district parliament for Sleman. After the formation of PKB she moved to this 
political party. According to her, she was asked by NU men and women at the 
provincial level to join the party. She further said,
I agreed to move because I am a nahdliyin. It is of my obligation to 
support the political party formed by NU. The fact that so far, NU had 
been co-opted by the other elements of PPP added to my conviction to
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join PKB. Anyway, at that time, many NU MPs (within PPP) were
reluctant to join PKB since they doubted PKB’s future.
She resigned from PPP as well as her office as an MP in 1999. She 
claimed that her decision to join PKB impacted on PPP constituents. “After I 
joined PKB, many people particularly from the lower class followed my decision. 
They also moved to PKB”. In the 1999 general elections she succeeded to be 
elected as an MP for Yogyakarta province from PKB. In 2002, she married Agus 
Sunarto, her colleague at the provincial parliament but from a different political 
affiliation, IPKI (League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence).
While she was an MP for Yogyakarta, the PKB central board held a 
special congress in Yogyakarta in 2002. She was then appointed as a vice 
secretary of the PKB central board. This appointment raised resentment among 
her PKB colleagues at the provincial level. In 2003, hundreds of PKB members 
rallied in front of DPRD Yogyakarta. They wanted Zunatul to resign from her 
office because she became a member of the PKB central board. They claimed that 
she disregarded the decision of PKB provincial board to resign. She was also 
accussed of telling a lie to the public (kebohongan publik) (Bernas, 2003). They 
further claimed that her presence in the parliament had not been effective.
She was pregnant (4 month) when she faced the protesters’ accusations. 
She confronted all the protesters arguing that she had never signed any oficial 
letter regarding her position as an MP. She said that she had not told any lie to the 
public. In addition, her service in the House of Representatives, in contrast to the 
accusation, was very effective. She was supported by a lot of her constituents (NU 
men and women) from her district. She refused to resign from her office, but if 
she must do so she insisted on the condition that she had to be replaced by another 
woman. Since there were no evidence at all to bear out those claims, the case of 
Zunatul ended. She continued to hold her office until 2004. According to Zunatul, 
there was a male conspiracy to sack her (interview).
With regard to gender relations between NU and Muslimat she said,
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NU still holds the Islamic values (traditional Islam). It respects women, 
especially women who have brains. NU will apreciate Muslimat 
members who are able to discuss problems in a balanced way, for 
example, in politics they must know the intrigues. Women must 
understand or even give some solutions... They also have to be strong. I 
mean that sometimes the party holds a meeting until midnight or even 
until early morning. Women have to accept that without any hesitation.
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